concurring in the result.
Defining the cause of action for palimony “in general terms [as] a claim for support between unmarried personsf,]” ante at 253, 949 A.2d at 746, the majority declares that “cohabitation is not an essential requirement for a cause of action for palimony, but a marital-type relationship is required.” Id. at 248, 949 A.2d at 744. However, from its inception, a cause of action for palimony, even if valid, always has a bare proof of cohabitation. That requirement, and the rationale that undergirds it, require that the majority’s reasoning be rejected. However, because the majority ultimately rejects plaintiffs palimony claim, I concur in the result.
I.
The majority correctly notes that this Court “first recognized [a palimony] cause of action in Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979)[,]” and that “[p]rior to that decision, our courts would not enforce support agreements between unmarried individuals or married persons who lived together with someone other than their spousesf.]” at 253, 949 A.2d at 746. Kozlowski embraced Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (1976), where the Supreme Court of California held that modern mores required a more elastic view of when parties who are not married to one another nevertheless are entitled to a division of assets acquired during the relationship and, more to the point, virtue of the non-marital has assumed a continuing obligation of support *265and maintenance for the other.1 Kozlowski later led to Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126, 447 A.2d 173 (1982) (holding that equitable principles authorize enforcement of promise of support to unmarried but cohabiting party), and, more recently, to In re Estate of Roccamonte, 174 N.J. 381, 808 A.2d 838 (2002) (enforcing promise of support for life against decedent’s estate even when parties were married to others when they cohabited).
From that premise, the majority defines the question presented as “whether the parties may have a marital-type relationship, which is the underpinning of the consideration needed to support a claim for palimony, when they have not cohabited.” Ante at 258, 949 A.2d at 749. Concluding that cohabitation is not “a necessary requirement to a successful claim for palimony[,]” the majority instead “opt[s] for a more flexible approach that seeks to achieve substantial justice in light of the realities of the relationship.” Id. at 258, 949 A.2d at 750. The majority concludes that “[i]t is the promise to support, expressed or implied, coupled with a marital-type relationship, that are the indispensable elements to support a valid claim for palimony[,]” explaining that “whether the parties cohabited is a relevant factor in the analysis of whether a marital-type relationship exists, and [that] in most successful palimony cases, cohabitation will be present.” Ibid. Reasoning that “palimony cases present highly personal arrangements and the facts surrounding the relationship will determine whether it is a marital-type relationship that is essential to support a cause of action for palimony[,]” and that “[t]he trier of fact must consider the realities of the relationship in the quest to achieve substantial justice[,]” the majority defines the judicial task thusly: “in addressing a cause of action for palimony, the trial judge should *266consider the entirety of the relationship and, if a marital-type relationship is otherwise proven, it should not be rejected solely because cohabitation is not present.” Id. at 259, 949 A.2d at 750. In sum, it is the majority’s view that “cohabitation is one of the many factors a trial judge should consider in determining whether a plaintiff has proven a marital-type relationship to support a cause of action for palimony” and that, “[i]n these highly personalized cases, it is conceivable that a plaintiff, even in the absence of cohabitation, may establish a marital-type relationship and prove a cause of action for palimony.” Id. at 260, 949 A.2d at 751.
II.
Kozlowski, Crowe, and Roccamonte demonstrate that this Court indeed has recognized a cause of action for palimony. That recognition, however, is not without controversy. The majority does not mention, much less discuss, the objective fact that the overwhelming weight of authority nationwide rejects a claim for post-nonmarital relationship support or alimony obliinstead limits recovery to what a cohabitant has contributed to the relationship.
As a threshold matter, Alabama, Idaho, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Utah recognize common law marriages, and, for that reason, do not allow palimony claims. See, e.g., Beck v. Beck, 286 Ala. 692, 246 So.2d 420 (1971); Herd v. Herd, 194 Ala. 613, 617, 69 So. 885, 887 (1915); In re Estate of Wilkins, 137 Idaho 315, 48 P.3d 644 (2002); Mueggenborg v. Walling, 836 P.2d 112 (Okla.1992) (explaining that common law marriage requires, among other things, “ ‘consummating [the] arrangement by cohabitation’ ” (quoting v. Maness, 470 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Okla.1970))); Tarnowski v. Lieberman, 348 S.C. 616, 560 S.E.2d 438 (App.2002); Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d 504 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
The vast majority of states that do not acknowledge common *267law marriages also have rejected a cause of action for palimony,2 although most have allowed parties to recoup either assets brought into the relationship or the value of the services they have provided to the relationship. Thus, even though Alaska does not explicitly recognize a Marvin /palimony cause of action, it does allow for the division of property acquired during cohabitation, noting that “to the extent it is ascertainable, intent of the parties should control the distribution of property accumulated during the course of cohabitation.” Tolan v. Kimball, 33 P.3d 1152, 1155 (Alaska 2001) (footnote omitted). Arkansas too does not recognize a palimony claim; although it forbids common law marriages under its laws, Arkansas does recognize common law marriages validly formed elsewhere. Brissett v. Sykes, 313 Ark. 515, 855 S.W.2d 330 (1993). Connecticut expressly states that “no right to palimony exists under Connecticut law.” Vibert v. Atchley, 1996 WL 364777, at *2, 1996 Conn.Super. LEXIS 1353, at *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. May 23, 1996). However, Connecticut “[cjourts will enforce a contract, express or implied, between non marital partners, and may employ equitable remedies to enforce those agreements where necessary.” Hrostek v. Massey, 2007 WL 1677009, at *3, 2007 Conn.Super. LEXIS 1316, at *7 (Conn.Super.Ct. May 25, 2007) (citing Boland v. Catalano, 202 Conn. 333, 521 A.2d 142 (1987)). Delaware likewise rejects palimony claims, particularly when one of the parties is already married. Wells v. Boardley, 1981 WL 15150 (Del.Ch. July 23, 1981).
Georgia explicitly rejects any palimony claims. v. Marino, 212 Ga.App. 113, 441 S.E.2d 475 (1994). Illinois jettisons palimony claims as surrogates for outlawed common law marriages. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill.2d 49, 31 Ill.Dec. 827, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979). Although it does not recognize palimony claims, Iowa *268allows unmarried cohabitants to enforce property claims based on “a recognized legal theory outside marriage to support the claim.” In re Marriage of Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 2004). Kansas disallows a palimony claim, but provides for “equitable division of the property accumulated by the parties during the period they were living together[,]” Eaton v. Johnston, 235 Kan. 323, 327, 681 P.2d 606, 610 (1984), a view also shared by Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, South Dakota and West Virginia. Davis v. Davis, 643 So.2d 931 (Miss.1994); In re Kynett, 1994 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 224 (Mont.Dist.Ct. Dec. 1, 1994); Tapley v. Tapley, 122 N.H. 727, 729, 449 A.2d 1218, 1219 (1982) (refusing to “recognize a contract which is implied from the rendition and acceptance of ‘housewifely services[,]’” but acknowledging that “upon the dissolution of a non-marital living arrangement, either party may seek a judicial determination of the equitable rights of the parties in particular property”); Bracken v. Bracken, 52 S.D. 252, 257, 217 N.W. 192, 194 (1927) (“[i]f a woman should assume the duties of a housewife and care for a home, while the man assumed the duties of a husband and ran the farm, although both parties knew there was no marriage, such assumed relation might have a great bearing in determining the right to wages of one against the other, or upon the interest of each in the property acquired in the joint enterprise”); Thomas v. LaRosa, 184 W.Va. 374, 400 S.E.2d 809 (1990).
Kentucky rejects palimony claims for a straightforward and logical reason: “[w]ere it otherwise, the courts, in effect, would be reinstituting by judicial fiat common law marriage which by expressed public policy is not recognized.” Murphy v. Bowen, 756 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Ky.Ct.App.1988). Louisiana too rejects palimony claims. Schwegmann v. Schwegmann, 441 So.2d 316 (La.Ct.App.1983). Holding that “[i]t is not right to treat unmarried people as if they were married[,]” Maine does not recognize a palimony claim, but does allow recovery for “business[-]related services” and for “domestic services performed solely to allow the defendant to devote more time to his businessf.]” Ring v. Thompson, 1996 Me.Super. LEXIS 279, at *4-5 (Me.Super.Ct. Aug. 29, 1996). *269Maryland bars a palimony cause of action based on a continued sexual relationship, Donovan v. Scuderi, 51 Md.App. 217, 443 A.2d 121 (1982), or a promise to marry “whether attired in the full raiment of the prohibited action or disguised as another type of action.” Miller v. Ratner, 114 Md.App. 18, 51, 688 A.2d 976, 993 (1997). Michigan explicitly rejects, as a matter of public policy, the palimony cause of action set forth in Marvin, supra. Carnes v. Sheldon, 109 Mich.App. 204, 215, 311 N.W.2d 747, 752 (1981).
New York does not enforce contracts implied from the relationship of unmarried cohabitants, but does enforce express contracts for the distribution of earnings and assets acquired during the cohabitation. Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (1980). Ohio “decline[s] to follow [Marvin, supra, and like decisions] insofar as they recognize a new legal status for persons living together without benefit of marriage[,]” holding that “[t]here is no precedent in Ohio for dividing assets or property based on mere cohabitation without marriage[.]” Lauper v. Harold, 23 Ohio App.3d 168, 170, 492 N.E.2d 472, 474 (1985). Tennessee and Vermont do not allow palimony claims, but do enforce claims for property acquired during the relationship on a partnership theory. Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38, 44 (Tenn.1991) (explaining that “[t]he fact that the parties cohabited ... has absolutely no bearing whatsoever [as a] partnership can be implied in this case while completely ignoring the parties’ social relationship”); Harman v. Rogers, 147 Vt. 11, 510 A.2d 161 (1986).
Several Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington and Wyoming— do not explicitly address whether a palimony claim for support is cognizable, focusing instead on whether assets acquired during the non-marital cohabitation relationship are divisible. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 142 Ariz. 573, 577, 691 P.2d 664, 668 (1984) (stating that although “[t]he law will not give to non-marital cohabiting parties the benefit of community property rights, since these rights derive solely from the marital relationship[,]” nevertheless “ ‘the fact that *270the parties engaged in a meretricious relationship does not bar either from asserting against the other such claims as would be otherwise enforceable[,]’ ”)(quoting Fernandez v. Garza, 88 Ariz. 214, 219, 354 P.2d 260, 263 (1960)); Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263 (Colo.2000); Maria v. Freitas, 73 Haw. 266, 275, 832 P.2d 259, 264 (1992) (recognizing that “marriage holds ‘positive and negative legal consequences for each party[and that a] person who is not legally married does not qualify for the positive legal consequences of marriage.’” (quoting Aehegma v. Aehegma, 8 Haw.App. 215, 221, 797 P.2d 74, 79 (1990))); Bright v. Kuehl, 650 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (holding that in context of claim for compensatory damages arising out of cohabitation, “a party who cohabitates with another without subsequent marriage is entitled to relief upon a showing of an express contract or a viable equitable theory such as an implied contract or unjust enrichment”); Davis v. Misiano, 373 Mass. 261, 366 N.E.2d 752 (1977) (holding that unmarried partners have no right to support or alimony); Wilcox v. Trautz, 427 Mass. 326, 330, 693 N.E.2d 141, 145 (1998) (explaining that Massachusetts “do[es] not recognize common law marriage, do[es] not extend to unmarried couples the rights possessed by married couples who divorce, and reject[s] equitable remedies that might have the effect of dividing property between unmarried parties”); Hudson v. DeLonjay, 732 S.W.2d 922, 927 (Mo.Ct.App.1987) (stating that “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether there was an agreement, either express or implied in fact, between the parties which was supported by valid consideration ... even though the parties’ contemplation of cohabitation may have been the reason for their entering into such an agreement at the outset”); Taylor v. Frost, 202 Neb. 652, 656, 276 N.W.2d 656, 658 (1979) (adopting rule that “ ‘[a] bargain in whole or in part for or in consideration of illicit sexual intercourse or of a promise thereof is illegal; but subject to this exception such intercourse between parties to a bargain previously or subsequently formed does not invalidate it’ ” (quoting Restatement of Contracts § 589)); Western States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff 108 Nev. 931, 937, 840 P.2d 1220, 1224 (1992) (holding that “[ujnmarried couples who *271cohabit have the same rights to lawfully contract with each other regarding their property as do other unmarried individuals” (citing Hay v. Hay, 100 Nev. 196, 199, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (1984))); Dominguez v. Cruz, 95 N.M. 1, 2, 617 P.2d 1322, 1328 (App.1980) (holding that “if an agreement such as an oral contract can exist between business associates, one can exist between two cohabiting adults who are not married if the essential elements of the contractual relationship are present” (footnote omitted)); Suggs v. Norris, 88 N.C.App. 539, 541, 364 S.E.2d 159, 161 (1988) (allowing “recovery by a plaintiff partner to an unmarried but cohabiting or meretricious relationship, from the other partner’s estate, for services rendered to or benefits conferred upon the other partner through the plaintiffs work in the operation of a joint business when the business proceeds were utilized to enrich the estate of the deceased partner”); Donnelly, 108 Or.App. 707, 710, 817 P.2d 764, 766 (1991) (reaffirming that “‘courts, when dealing with the property disputes of a man and a woman who have been living together in a nonmarital domestic relationship, should distribute the property based upon the express or implied intent of those parties’ ” (quoting Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 123, 577 P.2d 507, 510 (1978))); Knauer v. Knauer, 323 Pa.Super. 206, 228, 470 A.2d 553, 564 (1983) (finding “no public policy in Pennsylvania against entertaining suits between non-married cohabitors in property disputes”); Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1093 (R.I. 2002) (holding that assisting cohabitant in career and providing homemaking, business, consulting and counseling services is not illegal consideration “irrespective of the fact that the parties may have been living together when they entered into the contract”); Connell v. Francisco, 127 339, 349-51, 898 P.2d 831, 836-37 (1995); Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis.2d 506, 516, 405 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (1987) (explaining that “statute providing guidelines for property division upon dissolution of marriage, legal separation, etc., could also be applied to divide property acquired by unmarried cohabitants in what was ‘tantamount to a marital family except for a legal marriage’” (quoting Warden v. Warden, 36 Wash.App. 693, 698, 676 P.2d 1037,1039 (1984))); Shaw v. Smith, *272964 P.2d 428, 435, 438 (Wyo.1998) (noting that “a cohabiting couple can enter into binding contracts as long as the agreement complies with Wyoming’s law of contracts” and that it “will not ... reject a claim based on well-established principles of contract or equity solely because the parties have cohabited”).
Two states, by statute, have required that palimony claims must satisfy the statute of frauds in order to be enforceable. Minnesota provides that
[i]f sexual relations between the parties are contemplated, a contract between a man and a woman who are living together in this state out of wedlock, or who are about to commence living together in this state out of wedlock, is enforceable as to terms concerning the property and financial relations of the parties only if: (1) the contract is written and signed by the parties, and (2) enforcement is sought after termination of the relationship.
[Minn.Stat. § 513.075 (2007).]
Its legislature made that point clear when it enjoined that
[u]nless the individuals have executed a contract complying with the provisions of section 513.075, the courts of this state are without jurisdiction to hear and shall dismiss as contrary to public policy any claim by an individual to the earnings or property of another individual if the claim is based on the fact that the individuals lived together in contemplation of sexual relations and out of wedlock within or without this state.
[Minn-Stat. § 513.076 (2007).]
Texas likewise provides that a
promise or agreement [made on consideration of marriage or on consideration of nonmarital conjugal cohabitation] is not enforceable unless the promise or agreement, or a memorandum of it, is (1) in writing; and (2) signed by the person to be charged with the promise or agreement or by someone lawfully authorized to sign for him.
[Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 26.01 (2007).]
See also Zaremba v. Cliburn, 949 S.W.2d 822, 825-28 (Tex.App.1997) (applying statute of frauds to palimony case). Finally, as a matter of decisional law, Florida and North Dakota also do not acknowledge a palimony claim in the absence of a writing confirming the agreement of support. Posik v. Layton, 695 So.2d 759 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997); Kohler v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D.1992) (barring both palimony claims and equitable division claims by unmarried cohabitants, explaining that “[i]f live-in com*273panions intend to share property, they should express that intention in writing”).
The lesson to be gleaned is clear: for those limited instances where a claim for palimony is based on a writing confirming an agreement of a palimony claim be sustained absent proof of cohabitation. The rationale undergird-ing that obvious rule is equally self-evident: because they are easy to allege yet inherently contrary to fundamental legal concepts that have governed our jurisprudence for centuries, palimony claims must be viewed with great skepticism and must be subjected to harsh and unremitting scrutiny. It is to how this Court has guarded against sham palimony claims that I now turn.
III.
In Kozlowski, we adopted the rule that “an agreement between adult parties living together is enforceable to the extent it is not based on a relationship proscribed by law, or on a promise to marry.” Supra, 80 N.J. at 387, 403 A.2d 902 (emphasis supplied). The insistence on “adult parties living together” as a condition precedent to any palimony claim is utterly unremarkable as that condition appears explicitly in Marvin, supra, the decision on which Kozlowski firmly rests. In Marvin, the Supreme Court of California “base[d its] opinion on the principle that adults who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights.” Supra, 134 Cal.Rptr. at 825, 557 P.2d at 116 (emphasis supplied). In Roccamonte, we similarly allowed a palimony claim in circumstances where the parties “lived together as husband and wife.” Supra, 174 N.J. at 386, 808 A.2d 838. Clearly, this Court consistently has held that “living together as husband and “cohabitation” a necessary condition precedent to a palimony claim.
*274Even birthplace of the Marvin /palimony cause of cohabitation as a prerequisite to recovery on a palimony claim. Taylor v. Fields, 178 653, 660-65, 224 Cal.Rptr. 186 (Cal.Ct.App.1986) (holding that cohabitation was prerequisite to recovery under Marvin). California explains that “[c]ohabitation is necessary not in and of itself, but rather, because from cohabitation flows the rendition of domestic services, which services amount to lawful consideration for a contract between the parties.” Bergen v. Wood, 14 Cal.App.4th 854, 858, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 75 (Cal.Ct.App.1993). More to the point, California makes the critical “observation that if cohabitation were not a prerequisite to recovery, every dating relationship would have the potential for giving rise to such claims, a result no one favors[,]” ibid., because “a recovery under Marvin ‘requires a showing of a stable and significant relationship arising out of cohabitation.’ ” Cochran v. Cochran, 89 Cal.App.4th 283, 291, 106 899 (Cal.Ct.App.2001) (quoting Bergen, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at 857, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 75).
Those concerns rightly animated the Appellate Division’s decision below. Noting that “absent cohabitation, plaintiffs cause of action could not succeed[,]” Devaney v. L’Esperance, 391 N.J.Super. 448, 452, 918 A.2d 684 (App.Div.2007), the panel cited with approval to Levine v. Konvitz, 383 N.J.Super. 1, 890 A.2d 354 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 186 N.J. 607, 897 A.2d 1061 (2006), for “the policy rationale behind the law’s insistence on cohabitation as *275a necessary element to a cause of action for palimony.” Devaney, supra, 391 N.J.Super. at 452, 918 A.2d 684. Levine’s rationale deserves repeating at length:
Although the quality, nature, and extent of the consideration sufficient to sustain a palimony action may differ depending on all the circumstances, we are satisfied that the rendering of such consideration must be done in a setting of cohabitation. Without such a bright-line requirement, the concept of “marital-type” relationship is unacceptably vulnerable to duplicitous manipulation.
Requiring cohabitation as an element of a palimony action also provides a measure of advance notice and warning, to both parties to a relationship, and to their respective family members, that legal and financial consequences may result from that relationship. In this context, cohabitation requires the demonstrable act of setting up a household together. Thus, in contrast to an extramarital affair, even a long-term one, cohabitation announces to the ones most affected by the existence of the relationship, the innocent spouse and dependent children, that defendant has entered into a relationship that may result in significant and long-term impairment of family assets.
[Levine, supra, 383 N.J.Super. at 10-11, 890 A.2d 354.]
The reasons for requiring cohabitation as a condition precedent to a palimony claim could not be stated any clearer; in contrast, the majority’s rejection of that safety valve condition precedent is unexplained and without basis.
IV.
It is against that that is neither explored nor analyzed by the majority, either in respect of its reasoning or its ultimate the majority announces the unceremonious discard of cohabitation as a prerequisite for a palimony cause of action. No doubt, there is a strong emotional basis for a palimony claim. As stated in Roccamonte,
The principle we recognized and accepted [in Kozlowski and Crowe ] is that the formation of a marital-type relationship between unmarried persons may, legitimately and enforceably, rest upon a promise by one to support the other. A marital-type relationship is no more exclusively dependent upon one partner’s providing maid service than it is upon sexual accommodation. It is, rather, the undertaking of a way of life in which two people commit to each other, foregoing other liaisons and opportunities, doing for each other whatever each is capable of doing, providing companionship, and fulfilling each other’s needs, financial, emotional, physical, and social, as best as they are able. And each couple defines its way of life and each partner’s expected contribution to it in its own way. Whatever other consideration may be involved, the entry into such a relationship and then *276conducting oneself in accordance with its unique character is consideration in full measure. There is no doubt that plaintiff provided that consideration here until her obligation was discharged by [her cohabitant’s] death.
[Supra, 174 N.J. at 392-93, 808 A.2d 838.]
Yet, as we have been well warned, it is the very nature of a palimony claim that commands caution and strict proof requirements, and a distinct cohabitation requirement stands as a formidable bulwark against emotion-based yet meritless claims.
Because the majority concedes that plaintiff cannot satisfy even the lesser standard the Court sets forth, the end result in this case is the dismissal of plaintiffs palimony claim. That result should have been reached for a different plaintiff has failed to prove the element of cohabitation necessary to sustain a palimony not for the reasons tendered by the majority. Therefore, I concur solely in the result.
For affirmance as Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO andFor
For concurrence in
Ironically, on remand, the trial court found that the defendant never had agreed to support the plaintiff for the remainder of her life, and only awarded the plaintiff living expenses during a limited rehabilitation period, an award that was vacated on appeal. See generally Ann Laquer Estin, Unmarried Partners and the Legacy of Marvin v. Marvin: Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1381, 1381-82 (2001).
Virginia also does not recognize common law marriage, all the while "recog-niz[ing] as valid a common law marriage [ ] formed in accordance with the law of another state which recognizes common law marriage as valid.” Reynolds v. Reynolds, 2003 WL 21278869, *4, 2003 Va. Cir. LEXIS 315, *10 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 4, 2003). No reported Virginia case discusses a cause of action for palimony.
Cohabitation is defined as "[t]o live together as spouses” or "[t]o live together in a sexual relationship when not legally married." Webster's II New College Dictionary 218 (1995). This Court has defined the term as follows:
*274Cohabitation is not defined or measured solely or even essentially by "sex" or even by ordinary understanding of cohabitation is based on those factors that make the relationship close and enduring and requires more than a common residence, although that is an important factor. Cohabitation involves an intimate relationship in which the couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage. These can include, but are not limited to, living together, intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts, sharing living expenses and household chores, and recognition of the relationship in the couple’s social and family circle.
[Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 202, 729 A.2d 7 (1999) (citation omitted).]