concurring.
I am sympathetic to the task of the common pleas and intermediate appellate courts in addressing the “elephantine mass of asbestos litigation ... [which] defies customary judicial administration and calls for national legislation.” Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 2302, 144 L.Ed.2d 715 (1999). Ultimately, however, I agree with the majority that the common pleas court’s summary judgment decision, which turns on Quate v. American Standard, Inc., 818 A.2d 510 (Pa.Super.2003), was not an adequate resolution of Appellants’ claims in the present case.
Initially, I agree with the majority that Quate is unsound to the degree that it rejects, outright, the possibility of a valid differential diagnosis by a medical expert, and/or the potential for concurrent causation, in applying the injury threshold under Simmons v. Pacor, 543 Pa. 664, 674 A.2d 232 (1996). See Majority Opinion, at 314-15, 997 A.2d at 1164-65. While *319the common pleas court cannot be faulted for relying on Quate as prevailing Superior Court precedent, such reliance obviated an evaluative examination of Dr. Gelfand’s methodologies, which I believe belongs — explicitly—at the center of these cases. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litigation, No. 001 Oct. Term 1986, slip op., 2008 WL 4600385 (C.P.Phila.Sept.24, 2008) (reflecting an evaluative assessment of the “any breath” theory, on a developed record, upon a defense challenge pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923)); In re Toxic Substances Cases, No. A.D. 03-0319, 2006 WL 2404008, at *3-4 (C.P.Allegh.Aug.17, 2006) (same), rev’d on other grounds sub nom Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 9 A.2d 1134 (2010), petition for allowance of appeal filed, No. 278 WAL 2010.1
The difficulty in these cases, highlighted at length by Appellees and their amici, is that, at least on the face of his report, Dr. Gelfand’s differential diagnosis is explained solely in terms of the “any breath” theory of causation. See, e.g., Report of Jonathan L. Gelfand, M.D. (Summers), at 3 (June 25, 2003). Notably, in Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts, Co., 596 Pa. 274, 943 A.2d 216 (2007), this Court recently credited the opinion announcing the judgment of the Superior Court in the present case, authored by Judge Klein, to the degree it rejected the “any breath” theory as establishing a jury issue in cases in which the plaintiffs’ exposure to a defendant’s asbestos-containing product is de minimus. See id. at 291, 943 A.2d at 226.2
The difference here arises from the fact that Appellants have surpassed the de minimus threshold, which was the *320issue in Gregg. Thus, presently, the underlying questions are whether the “any breath” theory suffices to support a differential diagnosis and/or to establish concurrent causation, and whether there is some other undisclosed methodology or basis supporting Dr. Gelfand’s opinions.3 It is my considered position that, to the degree a plaintiff surpasses the de minimus threshold, such matters are best addressed via the procedure established under Civil Procedural Rule 207.1 (encaptioned, “Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony Which Relies upon Novel Scientific Evidence”). Accord In re Asbestos Litigation, No. 001 Oct. Term 1986, slip op., 2008 WL 4600385; In re Toxic Substances Cases, No. A.D. 03-0319, 2006 WL 2404008, at *3-4.4
It may be that the common pleas court believed that an inquiry into the admissibility of Dr. Gelfand’s opinion under Frye was not implicated, on the theory that the methodology employed was not novel. See Commonwealth v. Puksar, 597 Pa. 240, 255, 951 A.2d 267, 276 (2008) (explaining that the Frye test is limited to novel methodologies). However, as developed in my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Smith, 606 Pa. 127, 995 A.2d 1143 (2010), I believe that Pennsylvania common pleas courts should maintain a meaningful screening role in determining the admissibility of evidence adduced from those laying claim to special expertise. Thus, I would interpret the term “novel,” in the screening test to determine Frye’s applicability, to subsume any scientific method which cannot be fully explained in terms of generally accepted scientific theory upon a close evaluation. See Smith, 606 Pa. *321at 184, 995 A.2d at 1177 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (explaining that an unduly restrictive approach to Frye would allow speculative or manufactured conclusions to elude judicial screening solely because they are loosely couched within established scientific methodologies).5
Moreover, under our evidentiary rules not all proffered expert testimony must be admitted. Rule 702 indicates that such testimony should only be considered if it will “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue,” Pa.R.E. 702, a question whose resolution is committed to the common pleas court, see Pa.R.E. 104. This Court has explained, moreover, that Frye, like the federal test under Daubert, is a means of “insuring that only reliable expert scientific evidence is admitted at trial.” Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 576 Pa. 546, 557, 839 A.2d 1038, 1045 (2003). Although Daubert is understood as the more liberal standard in terms of admissibility, see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,142, 118 S.Ct. 512, 517,139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997), its purpose remains to guard against consideration by jurors of unreliable evidence disguised as scientifically-based expert opinion. See Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir.2005); see also Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 232, 369 A.2d 1277, 1282 (1977) (reflecting the concern that “scientific proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of laymen”); cf. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Tex.1995) (“Professional expert witnesses are available to render an opinion on almost any theory, regardless of its merit.”).
*322Thus, again, I would interpret Frye as subsuming all methodologies which reflect “novel” scientific evidence, including in the sense that such methods are not grounded in identifiable and generally accepted scientific principles. For example, a physician’s pronouncement that the cause of an injury was a particular condition should not be insulated from judicial scrutiny purely because this is the type of things physicians say. Rather, it is a fair inquiry for courts to meaningfully consider whether the physician’s specific methodology for arriving at the conclusion is supported by generally accepted scientific principles, as a prerequisite to admitting the opinion into evidence. For these reasons, I do not support as limited a perspective concerning our common pleas courts’ screening function as the plaintiffs advocate here. See Brief for Appellants at 21, 28-29. Specifically, I do not find it satisfactory to default to a let-the-jury-decide approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence.6
As applied presently, it may be true, for the reasons expressed in the opinion authored by Judge Klein, that Dr. Gelfand lacked a reliable scientific foundation to conclude that asbestos exposure represented a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs’ medical problems. Accord In re Asbestos Litigation, No. 001 Oct. Term 1986, slip op., 2008 WL 4600385 (concluding, upon an evidentiary record under Frye, that “the claimed methodology [to support the any-breath theory] simply does not exist or is so convoluted and inherently contradictory so as to defy any comprehension”). Nevertheless, channeling an evidentiary challenge through the appropriate *323procedure has the advantage of focusing the controversy and yielding overt evidentiary rulings which, where appropriate, will be made on a developed record. A salutary effect is to minimize the scope of the legitimate controversies on appeal, and, thereby, to increase the potential for consensus.
If that had been done here, the Superior Court, and this Court, might have had an adequate foundation to evaluate whether the trial court correctly determined that Dr. Gelfand’s reports did not raise a genuine factual issue. As it is, the Superior Court plurality would place judges in the role of independent scientific experts, which, obviously, is not their central area of expertise. See Summers v. Certainteed, 886 A.2d 240, 243, 245 (Pa.Super.2005) (Opinion in Support of Affirmance); see also supra note l.7 The plurality opinion also depends, in material part, on the scientific conclusion that it simply is not possible for a medical expert to assess substantial-factor causation relative to a diffusion reduction. While this may well be true, I believe Appellants were entitled to be informed, prior to an appeal, that this was a central basis for the determination that they have no present remedy. This would have sharpened the controversy and assured that it was channeled through appropriate procedural avenues, with fair notice and opportunity for response and development to all. Cf. In re Asbestos Litigation, No. 001 Oct. Term 1986, slip op., 2008 WL 4600385; In re Toxic Substances Cases, No. A.D. 03-0319, 2006 WL 2404008, at *3-4.
Accordingly, while recognizing the profound social impact of asbestos litigation, I support the remand directed by the majority to allow for appropriate process.8 Since, however, I maintain respectful but material differences with the majori*324ty’s reasoning, ray agreement with its opinion is limited to the result.
. While Appellees credit the common pleas court with having assessed Dr. Gelfand’s opinions overtly, see Brief for Appellee Allied Signal, Inc., at 18 ("The trial court determined that plaintiffs’ medical evidence regarding causation, which consisted of one line in each of the reports of Dr. Gelfand, did not meet the threshold requirement of admissibility!.]’’); Brief for Certainteed Corp. and Union Carbide Corp. at 18-19 & n.20 (”[T]he court acted well within its discretion when it evaluated plaintiffs’ expert conclusions to determine their competency and reliability as evidence.”), such assessment is, at the very best, implicit in the common pleas court's opinion.
. Indeed, in several material respects, the present majority opinion resembles the dissenting ones from Gregg.
. While the majority regards Dr. Gelfand’s conclusions as "readily support[ed]” in the record, Majority Opinion, at 315, 997 A.2d at 1165, I do not see any other rationale supporting a differential diagnosis, other than the "any breath” theory.
. While the effort of the common pleas court and the Superior Court to shortcut that process is understandable, I believe it has had the effect of weakening the offered justifications for summary judgment. Notably, it is precisely because the courts’ opinions are based on an implicit evidentiary ruling (which, concededly, is made more explicit in the opinion authored by Judge Klein), that a question arises concerning the appropriate standard of review. See Majority Opinion, at 306-08, 997 A.2d at 1159-60. In this regard, there is no question that evidentiaiy *321rulings are subject to the abuse-of-discretion standard applied in the Superior Court.
. The Smith majority approved the admission of a scientific opinion which was contrary to the scientific literature upon which expert relied. See Smith, 606 Pa. at 155, 995 A.2d at 1159. Thus, the decision seems to lend support to an extremely liberal approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence in the courtroom.
Nevertheless, the Smith majority discussed several aspects of the expert’s testimony in tandem, making it difficult to assess the breadth of the holding; the decision arose in the context of evaluating strategic, trial decisions of a criminal defense attorney; and the majority couched the relevant expert opinion as "questionable,” as opposed to contrary to the scientific literature. See Smith, 606 Pa. at 155, 995 A.2d at 1159. For these reasons, I do not read Smith as having broad-scale significance in terms of this Court’s approach to scientific evidence.
. As the Supreme Court of Texas has explained:
Expert witnesses can have an extremely prejudicial impact on the jury, in part because of the way in which the juiy perceives a witness labeled as an expert. To the jury an "expert” is just an unbridled authority figure, and as such he or she is more believable. A witness who has been admitted by the trial court as an expert often appears inherently more credible to the jury than does a lay witness.... Added to the potentially prejudicial influence of the term expert is the difficulty inherent in evaluating scientific evidence. Jurors are often expected to understand complex testimony regarding arcane scientific concepts and are even asked to resolve issues on which the experts camjot agree.
Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 553 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
. This would also raise a number of process concerns, as, for example, litigants are not permitted to voir dire the judge in terms of the relevant scientific qualifications.
. Appellants argue that Appellees have waived their right to an evidentiary hearing, see Reply Brief for Appellants at 3-4; however, the argument is not well developed. In any event, waiver was not the basis for decision to this point, and the issue remains for the common pleas court to determine in the first instance.