dissenting.
The majority holds that local police officers engaged in the enforcement of the law, including the Alcoholic Beverage Law, may not search a tavern without a warrant despite the written consent of the owner. Consequently, two loaded revolvers as well as gambling paraphernalia which had been seized are now held to have been inadmissible in evidence at the trial of defendant who had been found guilt of possessing revolvers without a permit, possessing lottery materials and working for a *228lottery. This anomalous result is reached notwithstanding that the search was sanctioned by the unambiguous language of the statute regulating the liquor industry and the regulations duly promulgated thereunder by the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC).
The following evidence was adduced on the motion to suppress. On January 22, 1976, at approximately 11:00 a. m., two Paterson police officers went to Joyce’s Bar in Paterson in response to information they had received that stolen CB radios were being brought to the bar and sold. The tavern was owned by the J.K.J. Corporation whose plenary retail consumption license covered the first floor and the basement for storage. A search of a room in the basement where liquor was stored revealed gambling paraphernalia and piles of money on a desk, a stolen CB radio, and loaded .22 and .38 caliber revolvers. The defendant and two others were present. The three were placed under arrest. Williams was convicted of possession of lottery materials, working for a lottery, and possession of firearms without a permit; he was acquitted of receiving stolen property.
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that insofar as searches are concerned, the liquor industry is sui generis and the warrant requirement may be dispensed with by statute. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970), the Court recognized that the liquor industry is a business over which the Legislature “has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures,” id. at 77, 90 S.Ct. at 777, 25 L.Ed.2d at 65, and that Congress has ample power “to design such powers of inspection under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand.” Id. at 76, 90 S.Ct. at 776, 25 L.Ed.2d at 64.1 See also Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978), holding:
Certain industries have such a history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy . . . could exist for a proprietor over the stock *229of such an enterprise. . . [W]hen an entrepreneur embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation. [Id. at 313, 98 S.Ct. at 1821, 56 L.Ed.2d at 312; citations omitted]
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972), is analogous. That case involved the regulation of firearms dealers whose businesses, like those in the liquor industry, were “pervasively regulated” in the interest of crime prevention. Id. at 316, 92 S.Ct. at 1596, 32 L.Ed.2d at 92. A federal treasury agent conducted a warrantless search for firearms in the locked storeroom of a pawnshop. He found and seized two sawed-off rifles which the defendant-owner of the pawnshop was not licensed to possess. The defendant was convicted of engaging in business as a dealer in firearms without having paid the special occupational tax required under § 5845 of the Internal Revenue Code. The search was upheld for “[w]hen the officers asked to inspect respondent’s locked storeroom, they were merely asserting their statutory right . . . .” Id. at 314, 92 S.Ct. at 1595-96, 32 L.Ed,2d at 91.
The Court made the following significant statement:
It is also apparent that if the law is to be properly enforced and inspection made effective, inspections without warrant must be deemed reasonable official conduct under the Fourth Amendment. . . Here, if inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection; and if the necessary flexibility as to time, scope, and frequency is to be preserved, the protections afforded by a warrant would be negligible. [Id. at 316, 92 S.Ct. at 1596, 32 L.Ed.2d at 92]
Thus, if the Legislature has provided for warrantless searches of taverns, such searches will not be subject to the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment.
It is well settled that the State’s police power to regulate the field of intoxicating liquors is practically limitless. Fanwood Borough v. Rocco, 33 N.J. 404, 411 (1960). The liquor industry is peculiarly subject to strict governmental control. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Schmidt, 79 N.J. 344, 353-354 (1979); Grand Union Co. v. Sills, 43 N.J. 390, 398, 403-404 (1964). In exercise of its authority, the Legislature enacted the Alcoholic Beverage Law, N.J.S.A. 33:1—1 et seq., which embodies comprehensive control over retail dispensers of intoxicating liquors. *230This law is “intended to be remedial of abuses inherent in liquor traffic and shall be liberally construed.” N.J.S.A. 33:1-73.
The statute provides for inspections and searches of premises in which liquor is sold. N.J.S.A. 33:1-35. It also provides that:
Investigations, inspections and searches of licensed premises may be made without search warrant by the director, his deputies, inspectors or investigators, by each other issuing authority and by any officer, [Ib/d; emphasis added]
The act defines the word “officer” to mean
Any . . . police officer, member of the department of State police, or any other person having the power to execute a warrant for arrest, or any inspector or investigator of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control. [N.J.S.A. 33:1— 1(P)1
Use of municipal police to search for violations involving the alcoholic beverage law is also contemplated by N.J.S.A. 33:1-71 which states:
To the end that local police and other enforcing agencies shall enforce this chapter in the interest of economy and effective control, all officers shall use all due diligence to detect violations of this chapter and shall apprehend the offenders ....
The law empowers the ABC Director to promulgate general rules and regulations for the proper control of the distribution of alcoholic beverages and enforcement of the Alcoholic Beverage Law. N.J.S.A. 33:1-39. That section also specifies that the
rules and regulations may cover the following subjects: . . . ■ racketeering; prostitution; . . . criminals; disreputable characters; gambling, slot machines and gambling devices; . . . storage; . . . and such other matters whatsoever as are or may become necessary in the fair, impartial, stringent and comprehensive administration of this chapter. [Ibid.]
In accordance with that authority the Director promulgated N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.5(c) which states in pertinent part that
No licensee shall allow, permit or suffer the licensed premises to be . used in furtherance or aid of or accessible to any illegal activity or enterprise.
Lastly, an applicant for a liquor license acknowledged on an application form prepared by the Director that
The applicant consents that the licensed premises and all portions of the building containing same, including . . . cellars . . . and every part of the structure of which the licensed premises are a part . . . may be inspected and searched without warrant at all hours by the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control . . duly authorized inspectors, investigators and agents and all other officers, [emphasis added]
*231If anything is clear from these statutory provisions and regulations, it is that inspectors or investigators of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control have the right generally to search a tavern, including its Basement, without a warrant to uncover illegal activities such as harboring stolen goods. The provisions and regulations vest the municipal police with the same authority (which is acknowledged by the licensee in its written consent). Placing that authority in the local police comports with the powers of the police to enforce state as well as local laws. See State v. McFeeley, 136 N.J.L. 102, 107-108 (Sup.Ct.1947); State v. Sheehan, 14 N.J.Misc. 466 (Sup.Ct.1936); N.J.S.A. 40A:14-152.
This Court has previously considered and approved the propriety of a warrantless search of a tavern by local police in State v. Zurawski, 47 N.J. 160 (1966), aff’g o. b. 89 N.J.Super. 488 (App.Div.1965). Linden police searched a tavern and found lottery slips under a stack of towels in th'e pantry and beneath boxes on a shelf in the kitchen. Defendant’s contention that the statutory power in the Alcoholic Beverage Law was misused “because the search was conducted ‘to uncover a violation of the criminal law,’ ” 89 N.J.Super. at 490, was rejected. The Appellate Division whose opinion was adopted by the Supreme Court noted: (1) that local police were authorized to enforce the law by the statute, N.J.S.A. 33:1-35, as implemented by N.J.S.A. 33:1-71, 89 NJ.Super. at 490; (2) that the licensee had consented to searches by all other officers, id. at 491; (3) that the regulations prohibited possession of lottery tickets, ibid.; and (4) that the legislative policy for strict control of a business said to be “ ‘so prone to evils,’ ” citing Boller Beverages, Inc. v. Davis, 38 N.J. 138, 150 (1962), would be thwarted if the search were not upheld. 89 N.J.Super. at 492, See also State v. Ransom, 169 N.J.Super. 511 (App.Div.1979). The majority attempts to distinguish Zurawski on the ground that “[tjhere was no dispute that the search was authorized by the board.” 84 N.J. at 225. However, that is a misreading of the record. Drawing upon an apparent agreement in the parties’ factual statements in their briefs, the Appellate Division assumed no more than the fact that one of the police officers said the inspection was being made on behalf *232of the municipal alcoholic beverage control board. A fair reading of the opinion indicates that the search was authorized because of the statutory provisions, regulations and the licensee’s consent.
Even if the municipal police had not been authorized by statute to search the premises without a warrant, another reason supports the denial of the motion to suppress with regard to the charge of working for a lottery. The majority correctly notes that defendant Williams must have standing in order to challenge the search. This standing question is now merged with the substantive Fourth Amendment inquiry, so that defendant has the burden of showing a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 401 (1978) (citations omitted).2 Defendant made no such showing at the suppression hearing. In fact, he did not produce any witnesses or evidence. In considering a suppression motion, the court is limited to the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing. State v. Gora, 148 N.J.Super. 582, 592 (App.Div.1977), certif. den. 74 N.J. 275 (1977); State v. Jordan, 115 N.J.Super. 73 (App.Div.1971), certif. den. 59 N.J. 293 (1971). As defendant failed to show any interest in the searched premises at the hearing, the motion was properly denied.3
Finally, the majority claims that a two-day lapse between the tip about stolen radios and the actual search somehow necessi*233tated obtaining a warrant. There is no evidence in the record to indicate such a passage of time. Moreover, the warrant exception for the alcohol industry, in which one has a substantially diminished expectation of privacy, permits such searches although time may have been available to obtain a warrant.
The search in this case was made at a tavern where the police had reason to believe illegal operations in violation of the liquor laws were occurring. The police have been expressly authorized by statute to conduct warrantless searches to seek out such violations. As law enforcement officers they had a right to inspect the licensed premises to determine whether any such illegal activity existed. Suppressing relevant and probative evidence discovered in the course of that duty will only serve, contrary to the legislative intent, to weaken the Director’s control over this highly regulated industry.
I would reverse.
For affirmance—Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices SULLIVAN, PASHMAN, CLIFFORD, HANDLER and POLLOCK —6.
For reversal—Justice SCHREIBER—1.
The search in that case was invalidated because the relevant statute did not allow for forcible entries without a warrant.
The burden would be on the State, however, to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence an exception to the warrant requirement. See, e. g., State v. Whittington, 142 N.J.Super. 45, 51-52 (App.Div.1976).
Many “facts” relied upon by the majority were not produced on the motion. For example, there was no showing that the defendant lived in the building, was the janitor, and kept tools in the storage room.
Different considerations apply to the possession of lottery materials and unlicensed firearms charges. The cases at the time of the suppression hearing apparently granted defendant “automatic standing” to challenge the search as to those offenses, see Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), although this is no longer the law. See United States v. Salvucci,-U.S.-, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980).