dissenting.
From the moment Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World Inc., 102 R.I. 8, 227 A.2d 582 (1967), was published, we have consistently taken the position that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to *915any relief, no matter what state of facts can be proved in support of the claim. In determining the presence of such a doubt, the trial court and this court are required to resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor and accept all of his or her allegations as true.
This is a claim for damages arising out of an alleged abuse of process. On several occasions this court has pointed out that a plaintiff in an action for abuse of process concedes that the process was properly issued but claims that after its issuance there was a perversion of the process because it was used to accomplish some ulterior purpose for which the process was never intended. Powers v. Carvalho, 117 R.I. 519, 368 A.2d 1242 (1977); Smith Development Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises, Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 308 A.2d 477 (1973); Goldstein v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank, 110 R.I. 580, 296 A.2d 112 (1972); Manufacturers Supply Co. v. Parker, 103 R.I. 426, 238 A.2d 616 (1968).
Although the plaintiff’s complaint cannot be considered as a masterpiece of precise pleading, we are bound to view the complaint in the spirit of the rules of civil procedure. When this is done, it is clear that the plaintiff does allege that the defendants by their actions made “an illegal, improper, perverted use of both court process and the doctrine of lis pendens.” He also alleges that the defendants had “an ulterior motive or purpose in exercising such improper use of process.”
Thus it is that, with Bragg as my guide, I vote to vacate the judgment dismissing the complaint and leave the complainant to his proof. Whether he can prevail is a matter to be determined on the basis of his proof rather than on his pleadings.3 Any doubt concerning his ultimate success is no cause, at this stage of the proceedings, for dismissal of his suit.
. The defendant has also contributed to the confusion by filing a memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss in which it argues at great length that the lis pendens was properly filed. This issue, as well as the questions of res judicata and the need for a compulsory counterclaim, are totally immaterial because the only question was and is whether Grasso has stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.