(dissenting).
This appeal is from an order granting the motion of a creditor to vacate in part the usual ex parte order staying actions against the bankrupt and should be kept in force until he has had a reasonable opportunity to obtain his discharge unless the debt due the appellee is clearly not dis-chargeable. While the Bankruptcy Act defines in general terms what debts are discharged and what are not, whether the judgment of the state court here involved is in its nature included within or excluded from the scope of dischargeability in bankruptcy is a question which should ordinarily be decided first by the court in which the judgment was obtained and is enforceable. The state court is bound, when the discharge is properly brought to its attention, to give due consideration to the effect the Bankruptcy Act gives it. Hill v. Harding, 107 U.S. 631, 2 S.Ct. 404, 27 L.Ed. 493. And, if it errs in so doing, the error may be corrected by the Supreme Court. Dimock v. Revere Copper Company, 117 U.S. 559, 6 S.Ct. 855, 29 L.Ed. 994.
It may be that my brothers are right in their concept of the nature of the state court judgment, but I think that not so *708plain as to justify holding in effect that the matter is not even debatable.
If, as I think, there is a fair doubt on that score, it should now be resolved in favor of the bankrupt and the order reversed. In re Bernard, 280 F. 715 (C. C. A.2).