OPINION
Justice McCAFFERY.The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order of the Superior Court vacating Curtis Jones’s judgment of sentence for first-degree murder and robbery. The Superior Court concluded that the search warrant issued during the investigation of the murder and robbery was invalid and that evidence seized pursuant to that warrant should have been suppressed. We reverse, concluding that the Superior Court erred by not upholding the validity of a search warrant supported by probable cause.
In the early hours of April 15, 2002, Chester City police officers responded to reports of gunfire occurring on the campus of Widener University. The investigating officers spoke to a witness who stated that he had heard five gunshots and then saw, from his bedroom window, a tall individual running from the area. The witness provided a description of *193the fleeing individual that was later determined to match that of Jones. The police soon thereafter located the victim’s dead body lying in a pool of blood, riddled with five gunshot wounds. Shortly after the body’s discovery, and based on a set of keys found on the body that suggested the victim may have been a student at the university, university personnel provided a photograph to police that appeared to identify the victim as Abdul Sesay, a 20-year-old student. No other identity materials were found on the body. At the time of his death, Sesay was rooming with fellow student Curtis Jones in a university dormitory “blocks away from” the crime scene. Commonwealth v. Jones, 928 A.2d 1054, 1060 (Pa.Super.2007).
At approximately 11:00 a.m. that same morning, police interviewed Jones, at which time he provided them with a version of the events of the previous evening. Jones told police that Sesay had left their dormitory room (and the company of their friends who had gathered in the room) after receiving a call on his cellular telephone. Jones told police that at the time, Sesay stated that he would be back, but he did not return.
In the early afternoon of the same day, a magisterial district judge issued a search warrant for Sesay’s and Jones’s dormitory room. The affidavit of probable cause stated as follows:
On 2/19/2001[1] Officer Gizzi responded to the area of the 100[0] blk of East 18th St. for a call of shots fired. Upon arrival the officer was advised by witnesses that the shots were coming from the end of the street[.] Officer Gizzi then went to the end of the [sjtreet and discovered a B/M wearing a black shirt and black jeans shorts laying [sic] on his back in a pool of blood with what appeared to be gunshot wounds to the head[.] [T]he victim was unresponsive and not breathing. Paramedics [pro]nounced the victim deceased at 0216 [h]rs.
*194Det. Hampel discovered keys on the victim[’]s body that belonged to Widener University[.] Upon checking with Widener Security it was found that the victim may have been a [W]idener student[.] [A] picture was given to police by Widener Security and was compared to the victim that was discovered on the 1000 blk of East 18th Street, and found [sic] that the victim and the picture provided to police were identical.
With the information provided[, p]olice believe that the victim is Abdul Sesay[,] B/M/20[,] who resides [sic] Widener University Campus at [T]hayer Hall Room # 306[.]
Id. at 1059. The application for the search warrant sought “Any evidence that provides Identification/Cellular Phones, Pagers, Drugs, Drug Paraphanalia [sic], handguns, bullets.” Id.
The search warrant was executed that afternoon, while Jones was away on a shopping trip with friends in New Jersey with a cache of newly found money. Seized from the dormitory room were items that the Commonwealth asserted were observed by the police in plain view. These items were the victim’s cellular telephone, which was observed to have blood on it (the blood was later determined to match that of the victim); a cellular telephone box and sales paperwork concerning this telephone in the victim’s name; a dock handgun users’ manual; white t-shirts, one of which, ultimately determined to belong to Jones, contained a bloodstain on it (the blood was later determined to match that of the victim); other clothing, including shorts owned or worn by Jones but exhibiting blood later determined to be that of the victim; and three damp wash cloths. The suspicions of the police were aroused when they found the victim’s cellular telephone because Jones had previously told them that the victim had taken it with him on the evening of the murder.
The police interviewed Jones once again the next day, at which time Jones changed his story. In this second interview, Jones asserted that after Sesay received the cellular telephone call, Sesay placed a gun that he owned in his waistband and then asked Jones to accompany him as he went to meet the *195caller. Jones further stated that when the two neared the scene of the eventual shooting, Sesay instructed Jones to hide behind a bush in case the person they were to meet caused trouble. Sesay purportedly told Jones that in the event of trouble, Jones was to jump from behind the bush to distract the third party so that Sesay would have a better opportunity to shoot this person. Jones then stated that a truck pulled up driven by a black male and carrying a white female passenger; and, after an exchange of words between Sesay and the third-party male, gunfire erupted. The truck then abruptly drove away. Jones stated that he observed Sesay lying critically wounded on the ground. Jones then told police that he grabbed Sesay’s cellular telephone and ran back to the dormitory room. At the end of the interview, Jones gave the police permission to search the dormitory room.
After this interview, Jones volunteered to go to the police criminal investigation unit to take a polygraph test. Jones was given his Miranda warnings2 at that time, and he signed a form acknowledging his receipt and understanding of these warnings. During the interview that followed, Jones initially reverted to his first story that he had given the police, but shortly thereafter returned to his second version of events (that involving the purported gunfight with the truck driver) with additional embellishments.
A police diver subsequently recovered the murder weapon from a lake located behind the house of Jones’s mother in New Jersey after police received an anonymous tip.3 Jones’s friends, who had accompanied him on his post-murder shopping trip, told police that on the day after the shooting, and prior to going to stores, they had accompanied Jones to his mother’s house. There, his friends observed that Jones went behind the house for a lengthy period. Having obtained statements from Jones and other witnesses, and having recov*196ered the murder weapon, the police arrested Jones for the murder and robbery of Abdul Sesay.
Arguing violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the United States Constitution, Jones filed pre-trial motions to suppress his statements made to the police and the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant issued on April 15th.4 Following a hearing, the suppression court denied the motions. In explaining its determination to deny Jones’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant, the trial court stated, without further analysis, that under “the totality of the circumstances and using a common sense approach,” the affidavit of probable cause supporting the search warrant established that the police had probable cause to search the dorm room. Trial Court Opinion, dated June 6, 2006, at 25. The court also determined that even if the search warrant were found to be invalid, items seized pursuant to the warrant should not be suppressed because (1) Jones gave his permission to the police to search the room; and (2) the police would have inevitably discovered the evidence as part of their investigation. Jones was ultimately convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, with a consecutive sentence of 66 to 132 months’ imprisonment for robbery.
On direct appeal, the Superior Court vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded the matter for further proceedings after determining that the suppression court had erred by failing to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant, which the Superior Court determined was not supported by probable cause.5 The court held:
As [Jones] points out, the affidavit contains no explanation as to why police would expect to find the evidence Usted in the warrant in the victim’s dormitory room. Nothing in the affidavit states that the victim’s death was drug-related, yet *197some of the evidence sought clearly is so related. Because the affidavit gives no indication that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the victim’s dorm room blocks away from the crime scene, it is not supported by probable cause.
Moreover, although identification evidence belonging to Abdul Sesay would arguably logically be found in his room, it is clear from the warrant that police had already identified the victim as Abdul Sesay[;] thus, there was no reason to search for additional identification evidence, [and] certainly there was no stated reason. As such, there is no probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant for identification purposes.
For these reasons, the issuing authority had no basis upon which to authorize the search of [Jones’s] and the victim’s dorm room and the lower court erred in determining that the warrant was supported by probable cause and failing to suppress the evidence seized from the room.
Jones, supra at 1059-60. Aside from citing general principles of law regarding an appellate court’s review of the suppression court’s determination that a search warrant was valid, the Superior Court cited no case law specific to its conclusions.6
We granted the Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal and directed the parties to address the following issue: Whether the Superior Court erred by concluding that probable cause did not support the issuance of the search warrant of a murder victim’s residence for investigatory purposes.
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining *198whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831, 842 (2003). Where, as here, the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, “whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.” Commonwealth v. Mistler, 590 Pa. 390, 912 A.2d 1265, 1269 (2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Nester, 551 Pa. 157, 709 A.2d 879, 881 (1998)). Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review. Mistler, supra; Commonwealth v. Morley, 545 Pa. 420, 681 A.2d 1254, 1256 n. 2 (1996).
Before the suppression court, Jones challenged the legality of the search warrant under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, arguing only that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. Thus, Jones’s challenge has root in Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution7 and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.8’9
*199Article I, Section 8 and the Fourth Amendment each require that search warrants be supported by probable cause. “The linch-pin that has been developed to determine whether it is appropriate to issue a search warrant is the test of probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887, 899 (1991) (quoting Commonwealth v. Miller, 513 Pa. 118, 518 A.2d 1187, 1191 (1986)). “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a search should be conducted.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 448 Pa. 42, 292 A.2d 352, 357 (1972).
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the United States Supreme Court established the “totality of the circumstances” test for determining whether a request for a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment is supported by probable cause. In Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921 (1986), this Court adopted the totality of the circumstances test for purposes of making and reviewing probable cause determinations under Article I, Section 8. In describing this test, we stated:
Pursuant to the “totality of the circumstances” test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Gates, the task of an issuing authority is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place____It is the duty of a court reviewing an issuing authority’s probable cause determination to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. *200In so doing, the reviewing court must accord deference to the issuing authority’s probable cause determination, and must view the information offered to establish probable cause in a common-sense, non-technical manner.
* * *
[Further,] a reviewing court [is] not to conduct a de novo review of the issuing authority’s probable cause determination, but [is] simply to determine whether or not there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the decision to issue the warrant.
Commonwealth v. Torres, 564 Pa. 86, 764 A.2d 532, 537-38, 540 (2001).
As our United States Supreme Court stated: “A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants ... is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; courts should not invalidate warrants by interpreting affidavits in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.” Gates, supra at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (“Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according ‘great deference’ to a magistrate’s determination.”).10
Moreover, the “plain view doctrine” is wholly applicable to search and seizure issues under both the Fourth *201Amendment and Article I, Section 8. See McCree, supra at 626-28, 631. This doctrine permits a valid warrantless seizure of an item where: (1) the police have not violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the location from which the item could be viewed; (2) the item is in plain view; (3) the incriminating character of the item is immediately apparent; and (4) the police have a lawful right of access to the item itself.11 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133, 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990); McCree, supra at 625; Commonwealth v. Graham, 554 Pa. 472, 721 A.2d 1075, 1079 (1998); see also Commonwealth v. McCullum, 529 Pa. 117, 602 A.2d 313, 320-21 (1992) (implicitly recognizing that exigent circumstances may establish the basis for a lawful right of access).
In view of the above principles, it is readily apparent that the Superior Court erred in its conclusion that the search warrant issued in this case lacked probable cause and that the evidence seized by the police should have been excluded from introduction at trial.
Here, the police were investigating a murder. The victim appeared to be Abdul Sesay, whose dormitory room was located within several blocks of where his bullet-riddled body was found. The relevant evidence set forth in the affidavit of probable cause for the search warrant of the dormitory room was that a body was found shot to death in the City of Chester and that keys found on the body and a university student photograph indicated that a nearby dormitory room was the last known residence of the victim. Accordingly, the police sought to obtain evidence both to confirm the identity of the victim and to further their investigation. That evidence included, as listed in the application for the warrant, cellular telephones and pagers, which, if found, could provide leads with regard to any individuals who had spoken with or contacted the victim on the night of his murder.
There can be no doubt that the facts set forth in the affidavit of probable cause in this case “are sufficient in *202themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a search should be conducted.” Thomas, supra at 357. The affidavit of probable cause reasonably identified what was probably the last residence of the victim, within which there was a fair probability that the police would find evidence of the murder that had occurred nearby. Moreover, access to the dormitory room was required to obtain conclusive identification of the victim. The need for police to have conclusive identification was self-evident: to conduct an investigation intelligently, to have all reasonable certainty before contacting family members to inform them that their loved one has been murdered, and to provide the prosecution with the first piece of information the Commonwealth would be required to prove at a murder trial, i.e., that a specific individual had been found dead.
The Superior Court concluded that it was not necessary for the police to obtain further information concerning the identity of the victim.12 However, there is nothing in the jurisprudence of Article I, Section 8 or the Fourth Amendment that permits a court to invalidate a warrant supported by probable cause based on the court’s belief that the police simply do not need to seek further evidence of a crime. By making such a determination, the Superior Court erred.
In coming to our conclusions, we must reject Jones’s argument that a warrant can never be used as an investigative tool. Jones cites case law that purportedly supports his argument. Appellee’s Brief at 5-6. However, such case law is readily distinguishable and relates to instances where the police only have a mere suspicion that a crime has been committed and/or where the police are unable to describe the *203items to be searched for “as is reasonably possible.” See In re Casale, 512 Pa. 548, 517 A.2d 1260, 1263 (1986) (stating that a search warrant “is not available as a general investigatory tool to be used in place of a grand jury”) (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Smith, 511 Pa. 36, 511 A.2d 796, 801 (1986) (stating that “mere suspicions” of a possible crime “do not constitute probable cause to support a search warrant”); Commonwealth v. Bagley, 408 Pa.Super. 188, 596 A.2d 811, 815 (1991) (quoting Casale, and determining that the police could not execute a warrant to search the home of the decedent and her surviving husband for unspecified evidence that might shed light on her death in order to determine whether a crime had been committed). Here, there was no question that a crime had been committed and that the police could, with fair probability, expect to find evidence related to that crime in what was reasonably believed to be the dead victim’s dormitory room, including evidence concerning the positive identification of the victim and any persons with whom the victim may have had recent contact or with whom he may have been involved.
Pursuant to our Rules of Criminal Procedure, a search warrant may be used as an investigative tool, under the appropriate circumstances. Rules 200-211 govern the issuance of search warrants. Relevantly, Rule 201 defines the purposes of a search warrant as follows:
Rule 201. Purpose of Warrant
A search warrant may be issued to search for and to seize:
(1) contraband, the fruits of a crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; or
(2) property that is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense; or
(3) property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 201.
Notable is the third enumerated purpose: to search for “property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 201(3). The “comment” to *204Rule 201(8) references Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). In Warden, the United States Supreme Court reversed case law holding that only contraband and the fruits of a crime can be seized pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, but not “mere evidence.” The Court determined that nothing in the Fourth Amendment supports a distinction between contraband and “mere evidence,” concluding that evidence of a crime is clearly subject to search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to conduct otherwise permissible searches for purpose of obtaining evidence that would aid in apprehending and convicting criminals. Id. at 306-07, 87 S.Ct. 1642; see also Commonwealth v. Butler, 448 Pa. 128, 291 A.2d 89, 90 (1972) (holding that a search and seizure may be for “purely evidentiary items” when there is a “nexus between the items to be seized and the suspected crime,” citing and quoting Warden, supra at 307, 87 S.Ct. 1642).
Therefore, under Rule 201(3), we recognize that a search warrant may be issued to search for and seize property that may constitute “mere evidence” concerning a crime that has been committed. Thus, the Superior Court’s holding is additionally troubling for the reason that the court appears to have substituted its judgment for that of the police with respect to the direction of the unfolding investigation. The police necessarily should have, ivithin all applicable constitutional and legal limits, the widest possible latitude in determining the manner in which to conduct investigations without a reviewing court making a determination that an aspect of the investigation, based on probable cause, was unnecessary.
Finally, the record supports the suppression court’s conclusion that the evidence belonging to Jones that the police seized was in plain view, as all four elements of the doctrine were satisfied: (1) the police were not in violation of the Fourth Amendment as they were on the premises pursuant to a validly issued search warrant; (2) the seized items were in plain view; and (3) the incriminating nature of the items was readily apparent in this gunshot murder investiga*205tion, as they appeared to be wearing-apparel stained with blood. Moreover, (4) the police had a lawful right of access to the items because exigent circumstances required seizure of these items. See McCree, 924 A.2d at 625 (setting forth the prongs that establish the plain view doctrine). Had the police not seized the items at the point of their discovery, but waited to obtain a warrant for their seizure, the evidence could possibly have disappeared or been destroyed to avoid detection of crime, thus presenting the police with the appropriate exigent circumstance allowing for a warrantless search and seizure.13 See McCullum, supra at 320-21.
Accordingly, for the above reasons, we reverse the order of the Superior Court granting a new trial and reinstate the judgment of sentence.
Justice GREENSPAN did not participate in the decision of this case. Justice EAKIN joins the opinion. Chief Justice CASTILLE files a concurring opinion in which Justice BAER joins. Justice TODD files a concurring opinion in which Justice SAYLOR joins.1. The affidavit of probable cause set forth an incorrect investigation date, an error later described as caused by a hasty cut-and-paste procedure. Both the suppression court and the Superior Court determined that this technical mistake had no impact on the validity of the search warrant, a conclusion with which we do not disagree.
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. The murder weapon was later identified as Sesay's Glock handgun. It was established at trial that Sesay was a drug dealer.
. Apparently, all of the physical evidence that Jones wished to suppress was seized on April 15, 2002, before Jones had given his permission to search the dormitory room on April 16, 2002.
. The Superior Court affirmed the suppression court's denial of Jones's motion to suppress statements made to the police.
. Further, the Superior Court rejected the trial court's alternative arguments that the items seized should not be suppressed because Jones had given the police permission to search the dormitory room and/or that the police would have inevitably found the objects during their investigation. The court noted that Jones had not given his permission to search until after the search warrant had been executed, and that the trial court had failed to articulate any support for its conclusion that the police would have inevitably uncovered the seized items.
. Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
Pa. Const, art. I, § 8.
. The Fourth Amendment to Lhe United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, *199supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
. Jones has never set forth an argument as to why he should be afforded greater protection under Article I, Section 8 than under the Fourth Amendment.
. This Court has more often used the nomenclature “due deference” rather than “great deference” to describe the relevant standard. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rega, 593 Pa. 659, 933 A.2d 997, 1013 (2007); Commonwealth v. Rompilla, 539 Pa. 499, 653 A.2d 626, 632 (1995); Commonwealth v. Baker, 532 Pa. 121, 615 A.2d 23, 25 (1992); Commonwealth v. Moss, 518 Pa. 337, 543 A.2d 514, 518 (1988); and Commonwealth v. Jones, 506 Pa. 262, 484 A.2d 1383, 1387 (1984) (all articulating a due deference standard). However, as the question of such nomenclature is not pertinent to our disposition of the present appeal, we will not engage in any further discussion regarding this discrepancy in language or whether such discrepancy is reflective of any practical difference.
. The four prongs are sometimes combined as three. See, e.g., McCree, supra at 625, 628.
. The Superior Court stated:
Moreover, although identification evidence belonging to Abdul Sesay would arguably logically be found in his room, it is clear from the warrant that police had already identified the victim as Abdul Sesay[;] thus, there was no reason to search for additional identification evidence, [and] certainly there was no stated reason. As such, there is no probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant for identification purposes.
Jones, supra at 1060.
. Clothing and washcloths were not listed items to be seized in the affidavit of probable cause, and thus arguably were not subject to seizure absent exigent circumstances allowing for a plain view seizure. Concerning the particular items identified in the affidavit of probable cause, we note that the Superior Court erred by vacating the judgment of sentence based on its determination that probable cause did not exist to support the police identification of drugs or drug paraphernalia as items that were to be seized from the dormitory room. Here, no drugs or drug paraphernalia were seized. Suppression of evidence is required only for such evidence that is seized without probable cause; if other evidence seized at the same time is supported by probable cause, it shall not be suppressed. See Commonwealth v. Bagley, 408 Pa.Super. 188, 596 A.2d 811, 824 (1991); see also Commonwealth v. Grossman, 521 Pa. 290, 555 A.2d 896, 900 (1989) (‘‘[I]n any assessment of the validity of the description contained in a warrant, a court must initially determine for what items probable cause existed. The sufficiency of the description must then be measured against those items for which there was probable cause. Any unreasonable discrepancy between the items for which there was probable cause and the description in the warrant requires suppression.”).