dissenting.
In my view, the trial court properly performed its “gatekeeper function” when it ruled that there was no scientific basis for the opinion offered by plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Huggins. Ordinarily, when the trial court is “‘faced with a not generally accepted theory of causation,’ ” a Rule 104 hearing is appropriate “ ‘to assess the soundness of the proffered methodology.’” Ante at 426, 809 A.2d at 85 (citation omitted). In this case, Dr. Huggins’ theory has been considered by the scientific community and no basis for a eausal connection between the rubella vaccine and Congenital Rubella Syndrome has been found. I would not remand this case on the slender proffer rejected by the trial court, but would instead affirm the well-reasoned decision of the Appellate Division upholding the trial court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint.
I agree with the majority that the more relaxed standard of Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 125 N.J. 421, 449, 593 A.2d 733 (1991), should be applied not only in the toxic tort context but whenever “a medical cause-effect relationship has not been confirmed by the scientific community but compelling evidence nevertheless suggests that such a relationship exists.” Ante at 430, 809 A.2d at 88. The problem here is that plaintiffs have not put forward anything resembling compelling evidence. It is not con*434tested that live attenuated vaccine passes through the placenta to the fetus or that the wild virus can cause Congenital Rubella Syndrome. Dr. Huggins admits, however, that no ease has been documented demonstrating that the vaccine causes Congenital Rubella Syndrome. Indeed, there are substantial studies indicating an “observed risk ... [of] zero” from vaccination. Sandra W. Bart, et al., “Fetal Risk Associated with Rubella Vaccine: An Update” 7 Reviews of Infectious Diseases 95, 101 (Supp.Mar.Apr.1985). Because the studies are based on voluntary reporting, plaintiffs’ expert claims there may be significant underreporting that could affect the results. Nonetheless, he can point to no documented link in any of the literature to support his theory.
Most troubling, plaintiffs’ expert admits that because there was a rubella epidemic (hence the county’s vaccination program), the mother “could have had a high probability of exposure” to the wild virus. Based on a lack of medical records indicating a “clinical rubella infection during pregnancy,” the expert concludes “with a reasonable degree of medical certainty” that the immunization caused the syndrome. Yet, it is uncontroverted that many people who are infected with the rubella virus are essentially asymptomatic. In the facts as presented, the expert’s conclusion simply cannot withstand scrutiny.
The Rubanick standard is now an important part of our jurisprudence. In Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 N.J. 404, 605 A.2d 1079 (1992), we reaffirmed and further explained its application. We also focused on the need for a sufficient demonstration of reliability so that the trial' courts can exercise their discretion to exclude unreliable opinions. See id. at 417, 605 A.2d 1079 (holding that “experts ... must be able to identify the factual bases for their conclusions, explain their methodology, and demonstrate that both the factual bases and the methodology are scientifically reliable”). We must allow the trial courts to act as gatekeepers in such cases. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-42, 118 S.Ct. 512, 517, 139 L.Ed.2d 508, 516 (1997) (affirming that district courts, performing their “gatekeeper” role under Federal Rules of *435Evidence, must ensure that admitted scientific evidence is reliable). Without that discretion, we have nó standard at all.
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
Justices VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA join in this opinion.
For reversing and remanding — Justices STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, and ZAZZALI — 4.
For affirming — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices •VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA — 3. join.