Concurring.
I join the majority opinion with the exception of its suggestion that, if and when Randy Todd Haag regains competence, he will be able to invoke the after-discovered evidence exception to the PCRA’s time restriction, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b) (l)(ii), to raise, in a second PCRA petition, cognizable claims known only to him, which he would have been able to raise under the PCRA now, but which he was unable to communicate to his next friend and PCRA counsel because of his present incompetence. See Majority op. at 280-81 & n. 11.
I fully agree with the majority’s determination that appellant must proceed with her next friend PCRA petition now, and that this Court should not stay the pending PCRA action. As the majority aptly notes, Randy Todd Haag may be entitled to immediate relief on one or more of the substantive claims that his mother, acting as his “next friend,” has raised in the PCRA petition filed on his behalf. A prisoner should not have to await a return to competence at some indeterminate time in the future to secure review of a claim that may entitle him to immediate relief now. See Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod and Gutnick, 526 Pa. 541, 587 A.2d 1346, 1350 (1991) (“Justice delayed is justice denied.”); Stottlemyer v. Stottlemyer, 458 Pa. 503, 329 A.2d 892, 901 (1974) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (same); see also Pa. Const. Art. I, § 11 (“All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay”) (emphasis added). In addition, there is a possibility that Haag may never again be deemed competent, especially since repeated efforts to involuntarily commit Haag in order to treat him for his *313mental illness have been unsuccessful. A perpetual stay of the PCRA proceedings pending Haag’s speculative return to competence could, thus, foreclose review of his substantive PCRA claims entirely, forever preventing him from receiving whatever relief he may be due. Even if Haag does regain competence at some point in the future, aged evidence and faded memories may make effective review of his claims, as well as a new trial or penalty hearing should one be required, more difficult.
I also agree with the majority that it is incongruous to stay the PCRA proceedings where a next friend has been appointed. The very reason that courts permit such vicarious litigation by a next friend is so that third-parties may pursue matters on behalf of parties who are unable to do so themselves. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (“A ‘next friend’ does not himself become a party to the ... action in which he participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real party in interest.”) (emphasis added). The test for next friend status is designed to ensure that the party who would conduct the vicarious litigation is one who truly has the disabled litigant’s best interests at heart. Where a qualified next friend (here, Haag’s mother) and competent counsel stand ready to pursue the cause on an incompetent PCRA petitioner’s behalf, the matter should proceed so that the petitioner may promptly have the claims reviewed and reap the benefit of any claim deemed meritorious. The indefinite suspension of Haag’s PCRA proceedings would perversely effect the very result that the next friend doctrine is meant to prevent: the effective abandonment of a potentially meritorious cause of action merely because the PCRA petitioner is personally incapable of pursuing the matter at the time. Not surprisingly, while many decisions in this jurisdiction and elsewhere have recognized the propriety of a next friend stepping into the shoes of an incompetent capital defendant and vicariously litigating a cause on his behalf, appellant cites no authority holding that the true purpose of next friend standing is to immediately halt *314that vicarious litigation after once establishing the power to pursue it.
As the majority also recognizes, a perpetual stay is problematic because it could effectively destroy the notion of finality in capital cases. The inability of a party to meaningfully participate in any vicariously litigated cause has a potentially adverse effect upon the cause, but that would be no reason to abandon or delay a cause especially where the alleged harm — • here, wrongful conviction and punishment — is not merely a past episode but is present and ongoing by the fact of incarceration. It is difficult to imagine a non-capital prisoner, whether pursuing the matter in his own right or represented by a next friend, filing a PCRA petition and then insisting that it be placed in indeterminable stasis: the notion of vindication after many years wrongly served in prison is anathema to a system of justice. In capital cases, however, the calculus is inherently different, since “delay is often an end in itself for the death-sentenced prisoner.” Commonwealth v. Michael, 562 Pa. 356, 755 A.2d 1274, 1284 (2000) (Castille, J., concurring); see id. (noting that capital prisoners, unlike other defendants, have an incentive “to utilize every means possible to delay the carrying out of their sentence”), quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 340, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). I think it is obvious that potential next friends, and capital litigation counsel, are as likely, if not more likely, to view delay as inherently beneficial in a capital case and, accordingly, I would not overdramatize the alleged difficulties in proceeding with the matter now despite Haag’s present incompetence.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the indeterminate stay requested by appellant and approved by the dissenting opinion is not authorized by the PCRA, which is the authority under which appellant seeks relief. In addition to the fact that the PCRA does not specifically authorize perpetual stays, such a suspension would be squarely at odds with the PCRA’s one-year time restriction. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). That time restriction is an essential element of the PCRA, enacted in an attempt to bring some semblance of finality to criminal *315cases. See Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 A.2d 638, 643-44 (1998); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693, 700 (1999). Finality in criminal cases is an essential goal. “Finality is essential to both the retributive and the deterrent functions of criminal law” for “ ‘[n]either innocence nor just punishment can be vindicated until the final judgment is known.’ ” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555, 118 S.Ct. 1489, 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998), quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991). In addition, it is only with “real finality” that “the victims of crime [can] move forward knowing the moral judgment [of the State] will be carried out.” Id. at 556, 111 S.Ct. 1454.
The PCRA time restriction, moreover, is jurisdictional. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214 (1999); Commonwealth v. Banks, 556 Pa. 1, 726 A.2d 374 (1999). For this reason, this Court has specifically held that it is not subject to equitable tolling. Fahy, 737 A.2d at 222-23 (“Jurisdictional time limits go to a court’s right or competency to adjudicate a controversy. These limitations are mandatory and interpreted literally; thus, a court has no authority to extend filing periods except as the statute permits.”). To permit this PCRA petition to be filed by a next friend, but then to hold it in abeyance for some indeterminate time would have the very same effect as tolling the time restriction. It would subvert the language and intention of the PCRA and our governing precedent. Consistently with principles of separation of powers and stare decisis, I do not believe we have the power to place the petition in repose. Our job is not to innovate creative ways to defeat the limitations period. The petition having been timely filed and the next friend being qualified to pursue the matter, it should be pursued now, or discontinued.
For all of the above reasons, I join the portion of the majority opinion holding that Haag’s PCRA proceedings cannot be stayed. I also join the portion of the majority opinion which holds that such a result does not violate Haag’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth *316Amendment of the United States Constitution, his right to effective assistance of PCRA counsel pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 904, or his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Majority op. at 281-85.
I respectfully disassociate myself, however, from the majority’s suggestion that, if Haag later becomes competent and there prove to be claims known only to him, which would have been cognizable under the PCRA now, but which he was unable to communicate to his next friend and counsel because of his incompetence, he will be able to raise those claims under the PCRA. Although the majority recognizes that “this issue is not ripe, and may never be,” and that the Court consequently “must leave it for another day,” id. at 12 n. 11, 737 A.2d 214, the majority nevertheless gives a strong indication that it would deem such claims cognizable under the after-discovered evidence exception to the PCRA’s time restriction. See id. at 12, 737 A.2d 214 (“[I]f Haag regains competency, he may seek review of any such claims through a second PCRA petition.”); id. at 12-13 n. 11, 737 A.2d 214 (“Under our understanding of the current PCRA, which the General Assembly may change before we ever have the opportunity to address the matter, Haag would have the opportunity to seek review of claims otherwise available under the PCRA, but unraisable in his first petition due to his incompetence.”). Moreover, the majority cites the putative availability of PCRA review in the future as one reason to reject appellant’s due process claim, thereby suggesting that it has not entirely left the matter for another day. Id. at 20, 737 A.2d 214.
The difficulty in addressing this futuristic scenario is that anything we might say is necessarily both speculative and ephemeral. Haag may be granted relief in this action; even if he is not, he may never be competent again or, if he is, there may in fact be.no non-waived, cognizable PCRA claims for him to pursue. In short, the issue posed may never ripen into an actual case or controversy. More importantly, as the majority recognizes, the standards that govern the availability of eollat*317eral attack are not immutable; thus, the PCRA landscape itself may be significantly altered by the time Haag would pursue relief via a serial petition. For example, depending upon the contours of the serial claim(s) to be raised, eligibility for relief may be affected by intervening decisional law. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii) (setting forth exception to PCRA time bar where “the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively”). This is not at all an unusual circumstance in the capital arena. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court’s recent holding in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), which held, for the first time, that execution of the mentally retarded is violative of the Eighth Amendment, no doubt has already generated litigation under this provision of the PCRA, centering around the question of retroactivity. Moreover, the standards governing both PCRA eligibility and PCRA procedural matters are subject to change by the General Assembly and by this Court through its rulemaking authority, respectively. Changes to PCRA legislation and PCRA procedural rules obviously are often directly responsive to opinions from this and other courts responding to previously unperceived or unanticipated issues. Thus, this very case may cause the General Assembly — which is better equipped than this Court to identify and balance all relevant considerations affecting the availability of collateral review under the PCRA — to squarely address the question of the incompetent PCRA petitioner who proceeds via a next friend petition. What we say today about the future, thus, may truly be “writ in water.”
The point is that it is impossible to state with any degree of certainty, at this time, what will happen if and when a serial petition is filed under the PCRA. The PCRA court will be obliged to survey the legal landscape in existence at that time to determine the availability of review and relief.
My comments in this regard are not intended to call into question the propriety of the Court inquiring into the future *318effect of its decision directing that the next friend should go forward. The question of what will happen to otherwise theoretically cognizable PCRA claims presently foreclosed as a result of Haag’s incompetence is central to the procedural and constitutional theories advanced by appellant. My comments are intended only to point out just how tentative any such theory must necessarily be. Having made the disclaimer, I offer my own assessment of why it is that I believe that review of these theoretically available claims is not clearly foreclosed, even under the law as it exists today.
I tend to agree with Mr. Chief Justice Zappala’s dissenting opinion that such claims would not be cognizable under the PCRA in its ciurent form. The after-discovered evidence exception found in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(h) covers situations “when the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(h) (emphasis added). The theoretical situation posed here, however, is not one where the facts would be unknown to Haag, but rather the exact opposite: the facts would be exclusively within his knowledge. That Haag, because of his mental illness, may be presently unable to communicate these facts to his counsel and next friend does not make them “unknown” under the plain language of § 9545(b)(1)(h).
Furthermore, as Chief Justice Zappala also notes' in his dissent, there is no automatic right to counsel upon a second PCRA petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(b). It is possible that a PCRA petitioner such as Haag may not have appointed counsel at the precise moment he regains competence, if he ever does.1 Such an uncounseled defendant would be required in 60 days to identify and raise any and all claims for relief which were not available to his next friend and counsel on his first petition. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). It may be difficult for any *319defendant proceeding pro se to comply with that deadline, let alone one recently recovered from a serious mental illness. Thus, even assuming that a second PCRA petition offers a theoretical means for appellant to raise claims that could not have been raised in his first petition due to his incompetence, appellant may find himself unable to negotiate this narrow avenue of review as a practical matter.
There is another possible avenue of further review for Haag, however: Pennsylvania’s habeas corpus statute. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6501 et seq. This Court has recognized that the PCRA subsumes the remedy of habeas corpus only with respect to remedies that were actually available under the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 A.2d 638, 639 (1998). The statutory writ of habeas corpus continues to exist, however, as a potential avenue of review for prisoners in those limited instances where the PCRA was unavailable for review of their constitutional claims. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Chester, 557 Pa. 358, 733 A.2d 1242 (1999). Accord Commonwealth v. Hall, 565 Pa. 92, 771 A.2d 1232 (2001); Coady v. Vaughn, 564 Pa. 604, 770 A.2d 287, 293 (2001) (Castille, J., joined by Newman, J., concurring) (“The rule that emerges from [Commonwealth v.] Isabell, Peterkin and Chester is that the state habeas corpus statute is alive and well and that the PCRA subsumes the statutory writ only to the extent that the underlying claim could have been brought under the PCRA.”).
If Haag returns to competence and wishes to challenge his conviction based upon a non-waived constitutional claim which, due to his mental illness, he was previously unable to communicate to his next friend and counsel — and assuming that the version of the PCRA then in effect does not permit review of that claim — Haag may be able to pursue the claim in a petition for state habeas corpus relief. See Commonwealth v. Isabell, 503 Pa. 2, 467 A.2d 1287, 1291 (1983) (since challenge to action of Bureau of Corrections in computing prisoner’s sentence was “not a direct or collateral attack on the conviction or sentence imposed by the trial court,” it was not properly brought under predecessor to PCRA and, consequently, prisoner could “re*320sort to the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum”); see also Coady, supra (Castille, J., joined by Newman, J., concurring) (because constitutional claim that parole was denied based upon retroactive application of new statute in violation of ex post facto clause of United States Constitution could not have been brought under PCRA, it was not subsumed within PCRA, and theoretically could be raised as original action in Court of Common Pleas under state habeas corpus statute). Haag could argue that his previous incompetence made such a constitutional claim unavailable to him on PCRA review and, because no previous avenue of review existed to raise the claim, statutory habeas corpus review is appropriate.
The state habeas corpus statute, which corroborates the exclusivity of the PCRA remedy in the sphere in which it operates, provides that, “Where a person is restrained by virtue of sentence after conviction for a criminal offense, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be available if a remedy may be had by post-conviction hearing proceedings authorized by law.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6503(b) (emphasis added). Since the claims that would be the subject of such a state habeas corpus petition in this instance arguably were not available for collateral attack given the PCRA’s time and serial petition restrictions and his then-incoippetence, Haag could argue that entertaining them would not run afoul of the PCRA. Haag could argue that his was not a circumstance contemplated by the present PCRA.
In sum, while I have serious reservations as to the availability of PCRA review for constitutional claims known to Haag but presently incapable of communication due to his incompetence, as the PCRA is currently constituted, I am not convinced that review of such claims is entirely foreclosed under present Pennsylvania law. And that consideration, in turn, reinforces my resolve that the majority’s holding that the next friend should go forward now is both correct and constitutionally sound.
. Haag is incompetent, of course, by virtue of a court order finding him so. Presumably, he could "return” to competence only by virtue of a succeeding court order in a competency hearing. Also, presumably, counsel would be appointed for that hearing, even if counsel were not appointed for purposes of filing a serial PCRA petition.