Com. v. Chavis, J.

J-S12023-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMAL SHAMONDRAY CHAVIS :
:
Appellant : No. 1155 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 7, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0004829-2019

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: AUGUST 23, 2023

Jamal Shamondray Chavis1 (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, following a

jury trial where he was convicted of robbery/serious bodily injury but found

not guilty of aggravated assault.2 Appellant challenges both the weight and

sufficiency of the evidence for robbery, arguing: (1) his acquittal of

aggravated assault precluded a finding of serious bodily injury; and (2) the

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant is identified as Jamal Shamondray Chavis on his court documents,

but he testified at sentencing that Shamondray is his first name. See N.T.
Sentencing, 5/7/21, at 2.

2 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(i), 2702(a)(1), respectively.
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Commonwealth failed to show he used force in taking the unconscious victim’s

possessions. We affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

We glean the following evidence presented by the Commonwealth from

the notes of testimony of Appellant’s jury trial. In the early morning hours of

August 31, 2019, Appellant had been dropped off near his apartment on Scott

Street, Harrisburg. See N.T. Jury Trial, 3/8-10/21, at 151-53. Meanwhile,

the victim, Jermaine Beason (Victim), and his wife, Eboni Beason, both

intoxicated, were driving home. See id. at 19, 43-44. Eboni testified at trial

that they were lost, and Victim stopped the vehicle on the side of the road

upon realizing he was too intoxicated to drive. Id. at 32-33. Victim stepped

outside the parked car to walk over to his wife’s side when the couple heard

Appellant say, “What the [f]uck are you looking at?,” and observed him

approaching the car. Id. at 19. Appellant and the Beasons did not know each

other. See id. at 153, 161.

Victim testified Appellant walked toward them and was “argumentative,”

and Victim told Eboni “to run.” N.T. Jury Trial at 45. Victim stated the next

thing he remembered was waking up in the hospital in severe pain the

following morning. See id. at 46-47. Dan Galvan, M.D., a trauma surgeon

at Penn State Holy Spirit Hospital, testified Victim suffered two orbital

fractures, which required a transfer to another hospital for specialized

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intervention. See id. at 126. Victim stated he continued treatment for his

injuries for about two months. See id. at 48-49.

Meanwhile, Eboni testified that upon seeing Appellant nearing the car,

she fled on foot just before he and Victim “were going to interact with each

other.” N.T. Jury Trial at 21. She flagged down two police officers on patrol

nearby. Id. at 23. They replied they were responding to another call and

could not “stay.” Id. at 24. Shortly thereafter, Eboni’s mother arrived to pick

her up, and they later followed Victim to the hospital. See id. at 24-25.

Commonwealth witness Connor Mullins, a rideshare driver, testified to

the following. He was helping an elderly passenger to her front door when he

“heard some shouting at the intersection [ ] of Scott and Magnolia.” N.T. Jury

Trial at 74, 78. Mullins saw a “fight broke out” and Appellant “knock[ed] out”

Victim.3 Id. at 79. Mullins witnessed Appellant “kicking [Victim] on the

ground, maybe punching [Victim],” all while Victim appeared to be “knocked

out cold.” Id. at 82. Mullins then observed Appellant “reaching into [Victim]’s

pants pocket and pulling something out” while Victim lay motionless. Id. at

81. Four to five minutes later, as Mullins drove away, he could see Appellant

“dragging [Victim’s] body up [from the middle of] the intersection onto the

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3 Throughout his testimony, Mullins referred to Appellant and Victim by the

color of the shirts they were wearing – Victim in a gray shirt and Appellant in
a white shirt. See N.T. Jury Trial at 78. Officer Restrepo testified “[t]he man
in the white shirt was” Appellant. Id. at 103.

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curb[.]” Id. at 79, 84. Mullins informed two officers near the intersection

that “there’s a guy getting beat up down there[.]” Id. at 85.

Harrisburg City Police Officers Esteban Restrepo and Carson O’Connor,

in separate patrol vehicles, were the same officers both Eboni and Mullins had

approached earlier that evening. N.T. Jury Trial at 67, 100-01. They arrived

together at the scene of the incident. See id at 67. Officer Restrepo testified

he observed Victim lying on his back, appearing to be “completely

unconscious,” and Appellant “standing over him,” attempting to remove

Victim’s pants. Id. at 102. Officer O’Connor similarly testified Victim

appeared to be unconscious and unresponsive and “might have some sort of

head trauma[.]” Id. at 70. Appellant “was standing over [ ] the victim [with]

the victim . . . between [Appellant’s] legs.” Id.

Officer Restrepo arrested Appellant and conducted a search incident to

arrest. N.T. Jury Trial at 104-05. They retrieved keys from Appellant’s right

pocket and a wallet containing Victim’s identification from Appellant’s left

pocket. Id. at 106. Officer Restrepo pressed a button on the key fob which

activated the lights on the Beasons’ parked car. Id. at 106-07. Officer

Restrepo also testified that after conducting the search, “without being

questioned, [Appellant] yelled out, ‘Yeah, that’s his shit. I took it.’” Id. at

108.

Appellant was charged with one count each of aggravated assault and

robbery/serious bodily injury. A jury trial commenced on March 8, 2021.

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The Commonwealth presented the testimony of, inter alia, Victim,

Eboni, Officers O’Connor and Restrepo, Mullins, and Dr. Galvan, as

summarized above. While cross-examining Appellant, the Commonwealth

also played recorded telephone calls Appellant made from Dauphin County

Prison to his then-fiancée, Ashley Franklin, as well as his girlfriend, Sharon

Arnold, about the incident and charges.4 See N.T. Jury Trial at 167-84. After

the Commonwealth played one call with Franklin, Appellant admitted he did

not mention acting in self-defense, but did agree he told her, “I beat the shit

out of some N word [sic] right out in front of your building.” Id. at 173-74.

When asked whether he stated to Arnold on another prison telephone call that

he “would fuck [Victim] up again,” Appellant responded, “I probably said I

would, but I’m not sure.” Id. at 182.

Appellant testified in his own defense to the following. He had been

drinking alcohol at Franklin’s house in the hours before the incident. See N.T.

Jury Trial at 158. Victim approached him, asked for a cigarette, and had an

“attitude problem” when Appellant offered one that he had already began

smoking. Id. Appellant contended Victim threw the first punch and he acted

in self-defense. Id. at 153, 171. Appellant denied kicking or punching then-

unconscious Victim as well as reaching into Victim’s pockets, explaining he

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4 The notes of testimony of trial do not include a transcription of the prison

telephone calls.

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merely got close to Victim’s body as he was gathering his own possessions

and “noticed some of [his] belongings were under [Victim].” Id. at 156.

On March 10, 2021, the jury returned a guilty verdict for the robbery

charge, but found Appellant not guilty of the aggravated assault charge. On

May 7, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 120 to 240 months’

imprisonment for the robbery charge and imposed $2,500 of restitution.5

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, challenging the weight of

the evidence. It was denied on August 13, 2021.

Appellant did not file a direct appeal, but filed a timely, counseled

petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act6 (PCRA) on May 5, 2022,

for the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. The trial court

granted this unopposed petition on July 6, 2022.

Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court

filed a statement in lieu of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, suggesting that

Appellant has waived his issues on appeal, due to his failure to request a

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5 The Commonwealth noted at sentencing that due to Appellant’s 2010 felony

burglary conviction in Virginia, the present robbery conviction would be
treated as a “second strike crime of violence” and warrant a 10-year
mandatory minimum sentence. N.T. Sentencing at 3. The trial court
addressed the mandatory minimum and remarked that “sending [him] to
prison for 10 to 20 years is a real waste.” Id. at 21.

6 See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9545.

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transcript of the trial and “provide an adequate certified record for appellate

review.” Trial Court Statement in Lieu of Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Opinion, 10/19/22,

at 2-3 (Trial Ct. Statement). We note the record transmitted on appeal does

include the March 3-10, 2021, trial transcript. The Commonwealth suggests

we “remand to the trial court for purposes of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion.”

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.

II. Statement of Issues on Appeal

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

1. The evidence presented was insufficient to prove the crime of
robbery beyond a reasonable doubt; There was not proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of serious bodily injury, and the evidence
established that the victim was unconscious and unaware that the
appellant rolled the victim over to take his wallet and robbery
cannot be committed upon an unconscious voluntarily intoxicated
victim because such a victim is unaware of the taking and no force
is necessary to compel him to part with conscious control of his
property to the thief, and thus at best, this criminal act constitutes
theft rather than robbery.

2. The verdict was against the weight of the evidence especially
where the evidence presented by the Commonwealth did not
prove the crime of robbery; There was not proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of serious bodily injury, and the evidence
established that the victim was unconscious and unaware that the
appellant rolled the victim over to take his wallet and robbery
cannot be committed upon an unconscious voluntarily intoxicated
victim because such a victim is unaware of the taking and no force
is necessary to compel him to part with conscious control of his
property to the thief and thus, at best this criminal act constitutes
theft rather than robbery.

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

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III. Serious Bodily Injury

In his first issue, Appellant challenges both the weight and sufficiency

of his robbery conviction, on the grounds that his acquittal of aggravated

assault precluded a finding of serious bodily injury. Appellant contends, in

sum, “there was no direct evidence presented at trial that indicate[d] a serious

bodily injury was inflicted upon [Victim,] especially as the jury decided

Appellant was not guilty of the [a]ggravated [a]ssault charge[.]” Appellant’s

Brief at 11.

We first note Appellant conflates the weight and sufficiency of the

evidence, offering identical reasoning for both his weight and sufficiency

claims. The difference between weight and sufficiency challenges is well-

settled:

The distinction between these two challenges is critical. . . .

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a
question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the
verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime
charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a
reasonable doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the
verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to
human experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim
the court is required to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit
of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict
is contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that
there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the
trial court is under no obligation to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner. An allegation that the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the

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discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted
because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge
on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. A
trial judge must do more than reassess the credibility of the
witnesses and allege that he would not have assented to the
verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the
thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine
that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of
greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight
with all the facts is to deny justice.

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751–52 (Pa. 2000) (citations &

quotations omitted, emphasis added).

Appellant’s contention, that his jury acquittal of aggravated assault

prevents a finding of serious bodily injury with respect to the robbery charge,

goes to the weight of the evidence. Appellant relies on a perceived

contradiction between the jury’s finding that he was not guilty of aggravated

assault, yet guilty of inflicting serious bodily injury in the context of robbery.

Therefore, we will address Appellant’s first challenge as a weight claim and

not a sufficiency claim.7

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7 In order to raise a weight claim on appeal, a defendant must “preserve[ it]

by a motion for a new trial. . . (1) orally, on the record, at any time before
sentencing; (2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or (3) in a
post-sentence motion.” Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1047 (Pa.
Super. 2022), quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3).

Here, Appellant preserved the claim by raising it in a timely post-
sentence motion, stating “[t]he verdict is against the weight of the evidence
as . . . it pertains to the Robbery conviction; it is clear that the Commonwealth,
at best submitted sufficient evidence of Theft . . . .” Appellant’s Post-
Sentence Motion, 5/18/21, at ¶ 14 (emphasis in original).

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Our standard of review for a weight claim rests on whether the trial

court committed an abuse of discretion when weighing the evidence at trial,

“not [ ] the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight

of the evidence.” Juray, 275 A.3d at 1047 (citation omitted). “[W]e are not

to disturb the jury’s verdict unless the weight of the evidence is ‘so weak and

inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from

the combined circumstances.’” Id. at 1045. A weight claim may not succeed

except where “the evidence [is] so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the

verdict shocks the conscience of the [trial] court.” Id. at 1047 (citation

omitted).

As stated above, Appellant was convicted of robbery/serious bodily

injury under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i), which provides: “A person is guilty of

robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he . . . inflicts serious bodily

injury upon another[.]” See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i). Appellant was also

charged with aggravated assault under subsection 2702(a)(1),8 which

includes the element of attempting to cause or causing serious bodily injury

to another, but found not guilty. “Serious bodily injury is defined as [b]odily

injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious,

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8 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1) (“A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he

. . . attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]”).

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permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of

any bodily member or organ.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 2 A.3d 598, 601

(Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc), quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301 (a defendant inflicted

serious bodily injury by delivering a single blow, resulting in the victim’s loss

of consciousness and traumatic head and brain injuries). See also

Commonwealth v. Patrick, 933 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en

banc) (finding serious bodily injury where a defendant delivered a “sucker”

punch to the victim’s head, causing the victim to fall unconscious and “strike

his head on the concrete”).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held “[c]onsistency in [jury]

verdicts is not required where there is evidence to support each verdict.”

Commonwealth v. Barkman, 295 A.3d 721, 738 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

& quotation omitted). Furthermore, “juries may issue inconsistent verdicts

and [ ] reviewing courts may not draw factual inferences in relation to the

evidence from a jury’s decision to acquit a defendant of a certain offense.”

Commonwealth v. Moore, 103 A.3d 1240, 1249 (Pa. 2014).

Appellant’s acquittal of aggravated assault, alone, does not preclude a

finding, with respect to the robbery charge, that he did not cause serious

bodily injury to the victim. See Moore, 103 A.3d at 1250 (holding a

defendant’s conviction of possession of an instrument of a crime (PIC) was

not invalidated by his acquittals of murder and attempted murder charges,

even though the verdicts may be “logically inconsistent”). Moreover,

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Appellant’s argument, that there was “no direct evidence” of serious bodily

injury, fails because there was considerable undisputed direct evidence of

Victim’s injuries and the actions Appellant took to inflict them. See Appellant’s

Brief at 11.

Furthermore, in its order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion, the

trial court found Appellant’s “actions in this case were the cause of the

unconscious state of the victim[.]” Court Order, 8/13/21. We agree.

Here, there was significant evidence to support a finding of serious

bodily injury. The Commonwealth presented the testimony of six witnesses,

among them: the Victim, who recounted the initial altercation and described

his injuries after the attack; Mullins, who observed Appellant punching Victim,

“knocking [Victim] out;” Officers Restrepo and O’Connor, who responded at

the scene and observed Victim was unconscious and appeared to have “head

trauma;” and Dr. Galvan, who treated Victim and described his two orbital

fractures, which were severe enough to require a transfer to another hospital

for treatment. N.T. Jury Trial at 70, 79, 104. Additionally, Appellant admitted

himself both at trial and on appeal that he “hit [Victim] once, maybe twice,”

rendering him unconscious. Id. at 155, 126; see also Appellant’s Brief at 12

(stating that the altercation “led to [Victim] being knocked unconscious by

Appellant”).

Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying

Appellant’s post-sentence motion to vacate his sentence.

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IV. Robbery & Use of Force

In his second issue, Appellant alleges the Commonwealth failed to prove

use of force, due to the unconscious state of Victim. He states there was no

direct evidence Victim “had been consciously aware of any force.” Appellant’s

Brief at 11. Appellant further avers that there was no “factual basis” for

robbery other than the fact that he “removed property from the unconscious

victim,” and there was no evidence of force or physical threat “during the

actual taking” of the victim’s keys and wallet. Id. at 13. Appellant extensively

discusses Commonwealth v. Williams, 550 A.2d 579 (Pa. Super. 1988),

where the Superior Court held that rolling over an already unconscious person

to remove his wallet did not rise to the level of “force however slight” for

robbery under Subsection 3701(a)(1)(v). See Appellant’s Brief at 13, 16-17;

Williams, 550 A.2d 579 (Pa. Super. 1988). Appellant also discusses several

related cases, including Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209 (Pa.

Super. 2018), Commonwealth v. Windell, 529 A.2d 1115 (Pa. Super.

1987), and Commonwealth v. Smith, 481 A.2d 1352 (Pa. Super. 1984).

Appellant thus concludes that at best, the Commonwealth established the

elements of theft, but not robbery. Appellant’s Brief at 19.

We note that in Williams, the issue, whether the defendant applied

sufficient force on an unconscious victim established the elements of robbery,

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was treated as a sufficiency claim. Williams, 550 A.2d at 580. Accordingly,

we will address Appellant’s second challenge as a sufficiency claim.9

Our standard of review for a challenge of insufficient evidence is well-

settled:

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
elements of the offense. Additionally, we may not reweigh the
evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
finder. . . The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as
it links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Juray, 275 A.3d at 1042 (citations omitted).

As discussed above, “[e]vidence will be deemed sufficient to support the

verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and

the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751.

We reiterate the elements of Appellant’s robbery charge under

Subsection 3701(a)(1)(i) include only that a person “inflicts serious bodily

injury” while “committing a theft.” See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i). However,

the cases Appellant relies upon — Williams, Bedell, Smith, and Windell —

all relate to the use of force with regard to a Subsection 3701(a)(1)(v) charge

of robbery. Subsection 3701(a)(1)(v) includes the element of “force however

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9 A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence may be raised at any
time, including on appeal. Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(a)(7).

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slight.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(v). The use of force was not an element in

Appellant’s Subsection 3701(a)(1)(i) charge of robbery. Thus, Appellant’s

present case is distinguishable from the cases he relies upon, and his

arguments regarding the element of the use of force is mistaken. See 18

Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(v). It is not relevant whether the Commonwealth

presented evidence that Appellant used force, regardless of whether Victim

was unconscious. Accordingly, we find his claims regarding force are

meritless, and no relief is due.

V. Trial Court’s Suggestion of Quashal

Finally, we consider the trial court’s suggestion that all of Appellant’s

issues should be found waived, and this Court should quash this appeal, on

the grounds he failed to request a copy of the trial transcript, and thus

precluded the court from composing a meaningful opinion. See Trial Ct.

Statement at 2. See also Commonwealth’s Brief at 4 (suggesting remand for

trial court to prepare Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion).

We acknowledge, as the trial court correctly pointed out, that an

appellant bears the burden of ensuring the record is complete and includes

the materials necessary for appellate review. See Trial Ct. Statement at 2,

citing Commonwealth v. Bongiorno, 905 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(en banc). Furthermore, when presented with a weight of the evidence claim

on appeal, our proper review is of the trial court’s reasons for denying relief,

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rather than the “the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the

weight of the evidence.” See Juray, 275 A.3d at 1047.

Nevertheless, as stated above, the trial transcript has been included in

the certified record and has been reviewed by this panel in our review. We

determine that in this particular appeal — where again, Appellant’s legal

arguments are that: (1) his jury acquittal of another charge precluded a

finding of serious bodily injury under his robbery charge; and (2) the

Commonwealth did not establish an element, which was not included in his

robbery charge anyway — we are able to dispose of Appellant’s claims.10 We

thus decline to quash this appeal or remand for a supplemental trial court

opinion.

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10“[T]his Court may affirm the decision of the trial court on any basis.”
Commonwealth v. Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 770 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted).

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VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude no relief is due on Appellant’s

weight and sufficiency challenges to his robbery conviction.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Colins joins the Memorandum.

Judge Kunselman Concurs in the Result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/23/2023

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