dissenting.
The intentions of the trial court, announced from the bench during the hearing on November 18,1991, were never reduced to a formal order of court. The certified record confirms that a hearing on custody was scheduled for December 9, 1991, before the same judge who held the hearing on the Petition to Enter Agreement as Order of Court. The refusal of the trial judge to adopt a provision requiring binding arbitration on the issue of custody does not constitute an abuse of discretion. For all three of these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
*173Lori J. Miller, “Mother”, has brought this appeal relying solely on statements made by the distinguished trial judge, the Honorable Susan Devlin Scott, during a hearing on a petition to enter a marital settlement agreement, and related documents, as an order of court. Mother asks us to accept the following declarations by Judge Scott as the “order” we are to review on this appeal:
II. ORDER IN QUESTION
“... the marital settlement agreement, which is P-1 for this record, I will enter as the order of court now.
Section 4 of the marital separation agreement refers to a mediation/arbitration contract, which is P-2 in this record. The provision of P-2 which calls for binding arbitration on the issue of eustody/visitation I find is void against public policy, and anything contrary in P-1 is also to be striken [sic] on the issue of custody.”
TRANSCRIPT OF 11/18/91 HEARING, INCLUDING THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ORDER IS INCLUDED IN THE REPRODUCED RECORD (R 51a).
Brief of Appellant, filed March 16, 1992, p. 2. The intentions of Judge Scott were never reduced to a formal order for her review and approval. A formal order has not been entered on the docket. The docket entries certified to this court contain the following entry:
111891 ORDER ENTERED. DENIED HEARING HELD AND ORDER ENTERED. SEE FILE.
SCOTT/J VOICE/CR
A Civil Court Sheet contained within the certified record includes the following, unsigned handwritten entries:
PI [P-1?] marital separation agreement entered as order of court excluding anything on custody. P2—Binding arbitration on custody—-void against public policy. No counsel fees to be awarded today. P3—Custody agreement will not be enforced by court. P4—Not to be enforced by court. Pre*174liminary objections on custody rescheduled to 12/9/91 10 AM. Only matter before court on custody.
An examination of the entire fifteen page transcript of November 18, 1991, leads this writer to conclude that many things remained to be formalized following the conclusion of the hearing, including a hearing on a separate custody proceeding involving the same parties scheduled for less than a month later. Transcript of Proceedings (N.T.), November 18, 1991, p. 14, R.R. 56a. If we restrict our review to the language of the trial court selected by Mother as the “order” supporting her appeal, we are still faced with indefiniteness.
Although Judge Scott states that she “will enter” the marital settlement agreement “as the order of court now” N.T. p. 9, R.R. 51a, the surrounding colloquy makes clear that portions of both the marital settlement agreement and the mediation/arbitration contract are not to be considered part of the order of court. Not only does Judge Scott find the binding arbitration provisions of the mediation/arbitration contract void as against public policy—and therefore not includible in her order—N.T. p. 9, R.R. 51a; the court goes on to declare that “anything contrary [to public policy] in the marital settlement agreement is also to be stricken on the issue of custody.” Id.
The Petition to Enter Agreement as Order of Court filed September, 16, 1991 prays that the court “enter the parties Agreements as an Order of Court, thereby providing the Court with full jurisdiction to enforce the Agreements as an Order ...” Petition, p. 4 (emphasis added). The hearing transcript establishes that Judge Scott rejected the prayer with respect to both P-3, the Custody Agreement, and P-4, the Minutes—Detweiler/Miller. Judge Scott expressly stated:
THE COURT: ... .And to complete the record, P-3, which is the custody agreement, I will not enforce for the reasons I’ve stated____
*175THE COURT: P-4 I certainly will not enforce, which is what you asked me to enforce under common law arbitration. And to be consistent, P-3 I am not going to enforce ....
N.T., supra at p. 12, R.R. 54a.
I have found nothing in the record certified to this Court which establishes those portions of P-1 and P-2 which Judge Scott did, in fact, incorporate as an order of court. I find nothing clearly confirming that Judge Scott rejected both P-3 and P-4 as part of any order. Mother does not direct us to any place in the record where the trial court did, finally, enter any documents, or parts of documents, as an order of the court. There is an unsigned, proposed Order of Court attached to the front of the Petition which would have been intended, if and when signed, to accomplish the prayer of Mother in her Petition.
Absent a signed, executed order of court which reduces to a single writing the actions of the hearing court, I would be inclined to reject the appeal as having been taken prior to the entry of an appealable order.
Moreover, Judge Scott, at the same time she declined to adopt binding arbitration on November 18, 1991, set a hearing on the preliminary objections filed to the petition for custody in a related action. That hearing was scheduled for December 9, 1991 at 10:00 a.m. Neither Mother nor Father on this appeal have informed this court of the status of that custody proceeding. Nevertheless, because of the outstanding custody matter, I would be reluctant to give much weight to Mother’s averment in her Petition that:
15. Without the Agreements being entered as an Order of the Court, your Petitioner is without ability to seek relief and restitution for any violation of the Agreements.
Certainly, with regard to the custody of Justin Miller and Janell Miller, the courts of this Commonwealth are always open to consider that question in the context of the best interests of the children, without regard to the existence of any written agreement between the parents.
*176Finally, I am unable to join with my esteemed colleagues because I discern no error committed by Judge Scott. If it is assumed that Judge Scott’s statements from the bench constitute a reviewable order, all she did was to refuse to incorporate a provision for binding arbitration on the issue of custody into the order which she was prepared to enter. My colleagues do not inform me how this could possibly be either an abuse of discretion or error.
Raymond E. Miller, “Father”, filed an Answer to the Petition to Enter Agreement as Order of Court. There was .no testimony taken at the November 18, 1991 hearing on the Petition and Answer. Under these circumstances, we are required to determine only the relevant issues raised by the petition and answer, accepting as true the pertinent facts set forth in the answer and rejecting those which are alleged in the petition but denied in the answer. University City Savings and Loan Association v. Girard Life Insurance Company of America, 215 Pa.Super. 57, 62, 257 A.2d 92, 95 (1969).
The Mediation/Arbitration Contract, P-2, which Mother petitioned to be entered as an order of the court, contained the following terms and conditions:
... [SJhould a reconciliation not be possible, then the CCS [Christian Conciliation Service] will appoint a group of arbitrators/mediators ... who will mediate and, if necessary, arbitrate the outstanding issues relating to applicable actions: equitable distribution, alimony, alimony pendente lite, support and/or maintenance (child and spousal), custody/visitation, counsel fees, costs and expenses.
... [I]f the domestic dispute ... cannot be resolved and settled ..., then the parties shall submit to the authority of the Board and the dispute ... shall be submitted to the Board for mediation first, and if not successful, then for arbitration. In the event the dispute ... is not resolved after mediation, ... then the Board shall arbitrate and decide all issues in accordance with fair Christian principles ... and shall render a written decision (hereinafter referred to as “Determination”).
*177The parties agree, in advance, that if the issues cannot be successfully mediated, then both parties will abide by the Determination of the Board. The Determination of the Board shall be final and binding upon the parties, and judgment upon said Determination may be entered by any court having competent jurisdiction.
Petition to Enter Agreement as Order of Court, filed September 16, 1991, Exhibit B, Mediation/Arbitration Contract, pp. 1, 2. (Emphasis added).
Where the “Determination” involved child custody and would have been made by a group of arbitrators appointed by the Christian Conciliation Service of Bucks County, the hearing court refused to entered those provisions which called for binding arbitration as part of any order of court. This is fully consistent with existing law and, in no way, could amount to an abuse of discretion. Any contract pertaining to custody of minor children is always subject to being set aside in the best interest of the child. Mumma v. Mumma, 380 Pa.Super. 18, 22, 550 A.2d 1341, 1343 (1988), appeal denied, 524 Pa. 629, 574 A.2d 70; Walker v. Walker, 308 Pa.Super. 280, 283, 454 A.2d 130, 132 (1982).
The issue before this court is, stated simply, did Judge Scott err when she refused to enter an order which would have purportedly taken away from the court the right to consider the best interest of the children in any forthcoming custody dispute? I agree with my colleagues that an arbitration award cannot be binding on a court, in the matter of child custody, if such award is challenged by one of the parties as not being in the best interests of the child. Majority op., p. 1164. I, however, would go further. I view the obligation of the court to consider, and be responsible for, the best interest of the child at any time the processes and authority of the court are sought to be employed.
Here, Mother sought the power and authority of the court, when she petitioned to have the court approve binding arbitration to finally settle matters involving custody. The trial court had no alternative but to refuse this request. The majority declares that an arbitration award on the issue of custody is *178subject to review by a court of competent jurisdiction based upon its responsibility to look to the best interests of the child. Majority op., p. 167-69. I could not agree more. It is for precisely this reason that Judge Scott refused to incorporate binding arbitration as a part of any order she would be called upon to sign.
That refusal could not constitute abuse. It is entirely consistent with the law of this state. If this appeal is not to be quashed as having been brought prior to the entry of an appealable order, I would affirm the action of the distinguished trial judge. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.