DISSENTING OPINION BY
SHOGAN, J.:¶ 1 The majority reverses the order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by sellers, Richard and Mary McCaigue, on the basis that the McCaigues entered into a contract for the sale of real estate with buyer, Harold Trowbridge. I would affirm the trial court order concluding that no agreement existed between the parties.
¶ 2 Regarding contract interpretation, we have stated:
It is a well established rule of contract interpretation that “[t]his Court must construe the contract only as written and may not modify the plain meaning under the guise of interpretation.” Nevyas v. Morgan, 2007 PA Super 66, 921 A.2d 8, 15 (Pa.Super.2007), citing Currid v. Meeting House Restaurant, Inc., 2005 PA Super 65, 869 A.2d 516, 519 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 584 Pa. 694, 882 A.2d 478 (2005). A fundamental rule in construing a contract “is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties.” Shovel Transfer and Storage, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 559 Pa. 56, 65, 739 A.2d 133, 137 (1999), quoting Lower Frederick Township v. Clemmer, 518 Pa. 313, 329, 543 A.2d 502, 510 (1988). We must look to the writing to determine the intention of the parties:
It is firmly settled that the intent of the parties to a written contract is contained in the writing itself. [Shovel, 559 Pa. at 65, 739 A.2d at 138.] When the words of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the meaning *204of the contract is ascertained from the contents alone. Steuart v. McChesney, 498 Pa. 45, 49, 444 A.2d 659, 661 (1982). See J.K. Willison, Jr. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 536 Pa. 49, 54, 637 A.2d 979, 982 (1994) (contract terms must be construed as manifestly expressed by the parties and according to the accepted and plain meaning of the language used by the parties).
Mace v. Atlantic Refining Marketing Corp., 567 Pa. 71, 80, 785 A.2d 491, 496 (2001).
Imperial Excavating & Paving, LLC v. Rizzetto Constr. Mgmt., 935 A.2d 557, 561 (Pa.Super.2007).
¶ 3 Here, the document in question is titled as a “Purchase Offer” in large, bold, underlined type and the document outlined terms of the offer. Particularly, the Purchase Offer indicates that “If Sellers [] accept this offer, than [sic] both buyer and sellers will enter into a sales agreement.” The plain meaning of the language used by the parties indicates that the Purchase Offer was, thus, intended to be an offer that was conditional upon acceptance by the sellers. The Purchase Offer requires that an event must occur, namely, acceptance by the McCaigues before any contractual duties under a not as yet entered into sales agreement arose. Furthermore, although this event must occur, it is not certain to occur. The trial court concluded that the signed Purchase Offer was an “agreement to agree” and that “no express contract ever existed between” the McCai-gues and Trowbridge. Trial Court Opinion, 10/22/08, at 4-5. I concur. The majority seems to ignoi'e the “offer” language in the Purchase Offer, instead focusing only on whether essential terms of a contract were included in the Purchase Offer. I believe no meeting of the minds occurred herein and, thus, no contract resulted.
¶ 4 Accordingly, on this basis, I would affirm the trial court order. Thus, I respectfully dissent.