Dissenting Opinion by
Van der Voort, J.:I must respectfully dissent.
While I do not challenge the findings of my Brethren voting in support of reversal, regarding the retroactive application of Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974) and Commonwealth v. Demmitt, 456 Pa. 475, 321 A.2d 627 (1974), and I also do not challenge the fact that the sentences are incorrect, I feel those supporting reversal have seriously misconstrued the holdings in those cases and, I further believe the appellant herein, on the basis of the record, is not entitled to take advantage of the holdings in those cases.
In Commonwealth v. Rose, supra, the Supreme Court stated:
“We emphasize that our insistence upon the Commonwealth’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the crime does not require it to disprove a negative. Thus, to enable a defendant to seek to negate specific intent by reliance on the fact of his intoxication, there must be evidence in the case sufficient to place in issue that fact concerning de*425fendant’s mental condition. Such evidence may be adduced by the defendant as part of his case, or, conceivably, may be found in the Commonwealth’s own case in chief or be elicited through cross-examination. Once a defendant has come forward with such evidence, or it is in the case otherwise, the Commonwealth, as we have indicated above, may introduce testimony to refute it, but is under no duty to do so.” 457 Pa. at 389-90, 821 A.2d at 884-5. In Rose, the court noted that the risk of “non-persuasion” remains with the Commonwealth.
In Commonwealth v. Demmitt, supra, where the insanity defense was discussed, it was specifically held that:
“[t]he law in Pennsylvania is that in. order to establish insanity, a defendant must still meet at least one part of the two-pronged M’Naghten test. There must be evidence in the case from whatever source that he did not know the nature and the quality of his act or that he did not know that it was wrong.” 456 Pa. at 483, 321 A.2d at 632.
The appellant was found guilty of assault and battery and assault and battery in resisting arrest. There was a total of three (3) bills of indictment. The appellant was engaged in a disturbance in a tavern in the City of Philadelphia. Two police officers responded to it and found appellant fighting with two other men. He was kicking, punching and shouting. When they tried to break up the fight, appellant attacked the officers with bar stools. The officers testified that appellant acted “like a wild man”. He was subdued and taken to the Episcopal Hospital where, when the handcuffs were removed, he again became unruly and the third officer testified he was “very wild” and “just went berserk.” The appellant himself testified that he knew nothing of what happened in the tavern except that he was hit on the back of the head and woke up in the hospital. Appellant said he had been hospitalized in 1968 for seventeen (17) days for *426psychiatric treatment and again for seven (7)' days in 1969.
The evidence indicated clearly that the appellant was disorderly and unruly. There was no testimony as to the nature of his psychiatric treatment in either hospitalization. The majority holds that upon this vague and equivocal testimony regarding some mental instability the Commonwealth is put to the Herculean task of proving that appellant was sane at the time he became disorderly. This extends the holdings in Rose and Demmitt. It expands the demands upon the Commonwealth to an unwise extent.
In Demmitt, Dr. Bernard J. Willis, Assistant Superintendent of Farview State Hospital testified that appellant Demmitt was “seriously, severely insane at the time. I think he did not know the nature and quality of his act. I do not think he was in a state where he could exercise any control over his behavior. I think he was completely disassociated, absolutely insane ... in my opinion he did not know the difference between right and wrong.” Three other psychiatrists offered corroborating testimony to that of Dr. Willis. They could not testify to his insanity at the time of the offense but they did testify that appellant Demmitt had been under treatment before the killing for a serious condition of schizophrenia. Our Supreme Court held that with this substantial testimony the question of insanity was placed in issue, that the presumption of sanity was overcome and that the Commonwealth must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
The instant case illustrates why the majority in Demmitt retained the presumption that the accused is sane. Otherwise on the flimsiest testimony the Commonwealth would be put improperly to the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s own testimony, together with the testimony adduced by the Commonwealth, do not provide evidence supportive of either part of the two-pronged *427M’Naghten test. The evidence produced fails to establish that appellant did not know the nature and quality of his act nor that he did not know that his acts were wrong.
For these reasons I am compelled to dissent from the decision to reverse.
I would affirm the convictions and remand the cases for re-sentencing.
Watkins, P. J., and Price, J., join in this dissenting opinion.