dissenting:
While my respect for the insight of the members of the majority cause me to be hesitant to differ, I am compelled to expression of the view that this appeal should be quashed.
Appellant concedes that as a general rule, an order denying a petition to intervene is an interlocutory order, not appealable as of right. See: Scharnitzki v. Bienenfeld, 368 Pa.Super. 610, 534 A.2d 825 (1987); Ginter v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 359 Pa.Super. 200, 202, 518 A.2d 850, 851 (1986); Maginley v. Robert J. Elliott, Inc., 345 Pa.Super. 582, 584, 498 A.2d 977, 979 (1985); M. London, Inc. v. Fedders Corp., 306 Pa.Super. 103, 106, 452 A.2d 236, 237 (1982); Inryco Inc. v. Helmark Steel, Inc. 305 Pa.Super. 239, 243-44, 451 A.2d 511, 512-13 (1982); Boise Cascade Corporation v. East Stroudsburg Savings Assn., 300 Pa.Super. 279, 281, 446 A.2d 614, 615 (1982). Appellant contends, however, that in the instant case the order denying the petition to intervene is a final and appeal-able order since the order is “a practical denial of the relief to which the petitioner for intervention is entitled and can obtain in no other way____” Scharnitzki v. Bienenfeld, supra 368 Pa.Super. at 611, 534 A.2d at 825 quoting Frey’s Estate, 237 Pa. 269, 271, 85 A. 147, 148 (1912) (emphasis supplied). If this allegation were true, this Court would have jurisdiction in this matter. See: McDaniel v. Rexnord, Inc., 371 Pa.Super. 32, 35, 537 A.2d 365, 367 (1988).
The only evidence of record, however, pertaining to the finality of the order denying intervention, consists of the petition to intervene filed by appellant, the answer filed by appellee Wallace, and the answer filed by appellee Van Den Heuval. Appellant, in its petition to intervene alleged, inter alia, that (1) intervention was necessary in order to protect its statutory right of subrogation under the Delaware Workmen’s Compensation Law; and (2) that the applicable policy of insurance had been issued prior to the effective date of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, October 1, 1984, and that, therefore, *249the action was controlled by the provisions of the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act,1 under which subrogation is permitted. See: Vespaziani v. Insana, 501 Pa. 612, 462 A.2d 669 (1983).
Appellee Van Den Heuval, in his answer, denied that intervention was necessary to protect appellant’s subrogation rights, alleging that “[i]f Rockwood Insurance Company has subrogation rights, they will be able to enforce those rights without intervention in this proceeding.” Appellee Van Den Heuval and appellee Wallace both alleged in their answers to the petition to intervene that the No-Fault Act was inapplicable, appellee Van Den Heuval alleging that the applicable policy of insurance had been issued in Maryland.2 Following the filing of the appellees’ answers, appellant filed a petition for determination, without proceeding, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 209, to support the allegations of its petition. “Pa.R.C.P. 209 sets forth the manner of proceeding on petition and answer. Ordinarily, after the filing and service of an answer, the petitioner would proceed within 15 days to take depositions or move the case for argument on petition and answer____if the case is ordered for argument on petition and answer alone pursuant to Rule 209, 'all averments of fact responsive to the petition and properly pleaded in the answer should be deemed admitted for the purpose of the rule.’ ” Schultz v. Erie Insurance Exchange 505 Pa. 90, 94, 477 A.2d 471, 472 (1984).
“It is well settled that when a respondent effectively denies material allegations in a petition to open, the petitioner must support his position with clear and convincing proof. Philadelphia City Employees Federal *250Credit Union v. Bryant, 310 Pa.Super. 526, [529] 456 A.2d 1060, 1062 (1982); Hutchings v. Trent, 304 Pa.Super. 376, 380, 450 A.2d 729, 731 (1982); Bell v. Jefferson Republican Club, 304 Pa.Super. 157, 160, 450 A.2d 149, 151 (1982). Pa.R.C.P. 209 provides the procedure for establishing such proof. Pursuant to Rule 209, the petitioner must either take depositions on disputed factual issues or order the cause for argument on the petition and answer, thereby conceding the existence of all facts properly pleaded in the answer. Or, the respondent may, after fifteen days, in order to expedite the proceedings, obtain a rule to show cause why the petitioner should not take depositions or order the cause for argument on the petition and answer. Triffin v. Thomas, 316 Pa.Super. 273, [277] 462 A.2d 1346, 1348 (1983); Philadelphia City Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bryant, supra [310 Pa.Super.] at [530] 456 A.2d at 1063; Bell v. Jefferson Republican Club, supra, 304 Pa.Superior Ct. at 160, 450 A.2d at 151.
Lazzarotti v. Juliano, 322 Pa.Super. 129, 134, 469 A.2d 216, 218 (1983).
The sole argument raised on appeal in support of the assertion that the order denying intervention is a denial of the statutory relief [subrogation]3 to which appellant is entitled and which can be obtained in no other way, is that any action by appellant against the alleged tortfeasor would be barred by the Pennsylvania two year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions. See: 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(2). This argument is not well taken.
If appellee Van Den Heuval recovers a judgment in the the third party tort action, appellant may assert its subrogation rights against appellee Van Den Heuval, the statute of limitations as to personal injury actions being totally irrelevant to the subrogation action. See and compare State v. Donahue, supra (declaratory judgment action); Myers v. Commercial Union Assurance Company, 506 Pa. 492, 485 *251A.2d 1113 (1984) (declaratory judgment action); Maginley v. Robert J. Elliott, Inc., 345 Pa.Super. 582, 587, 498 A.2d 977, 980 (1985) (plurality opinion) (Concurring & Dissenting Opinion of Del Sole, J.) (“First, had the employee recovered sums ... which represented subrogable compensation payments, the employer would not be barred from filing a claim against the employee to recoup its subrogation.”). See also: 10 Del.C. § 8106.
I am simply not persuaded that to deny intervention “has the practical effect of denying relief to Rockwood, which cannot fully protect its subrogation interest in any other way”. Rockwood failed to establish why it was unable in this case to rely upon the usual and traditional method of protecting its subrogation claim. Thus, appellant has failed to establish that the denial of the right to intervene in this action operates to deny the relief to which it is entitled and could “obtain in no other way”. Thus it is that I would direct that the appeal be quashed.
. Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. 489, No. 176, 40 P.S. §§ 1009.101 et seq., repealed by the Act of February 12, 1984, P.L. 26, No. 11, § 8(a), effective October 1, 1984.
. While the trial court denied intervention on the grounds that the applicable policy of insurance had been issued pursuant to the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, which prohibits subrogation, we are unable to ascertain the basis for this conclusion. The issue is, in any event, irrelevant, since the subrogation right of appellant is to be determined pursuant to Delaware law. See: Myers v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 506 Pa. 492, 495, 485 A.2d 1113, 1115 (1984).
. See: Delaware v. Donahue, 472 A.2d 824, 826 (Del.Super.Ct.1983); 19 Del.C. § 2363.