concurring specially.
I concur in this Court’s order to grant defendants’ motion for rehearing, reconsideration, etc., originally filed December 15, 1989, and subsequently renewed. My concurrence with the order granting some of the relief sought in said motion is not indicative of any retreat from the position expressed in my dissent to the December 1, 1989, majority opinion. I concur in the grant of defendants’ motion for rehearing and reconsideration because it allows most of the judicial machinery of the State of Georgia to remain in operational status quo while the merits of these controversies are litigated in this Court, on appeal, and, perhaps, in the District of Columbia.
*1492I continue in my firm belief that where the only change in an existing judicial circuit is to increase the number of judges, such is not a “covered change” within the purview of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
In the December 1, 1990, opinion and order, a majority of this Court found a potential for discrimination because of the possibility of perpetuating “anti-single-shot” voting practices through circuit-wide elections of judges to numbered posts by majority vote. Also, it seems that the majority was unwilling to balance fundamental interests of the State of Georgia against a mere potential for some dilution of minority interests remediable only by drastic, intrusive redistricting. To me, the concept of a judge with a special interest constituency is no less anathematic today than it was last December.
The principles I embrace are not heard only in the “cannonade” of my earlier dissent. Such concepts are emerging from diverse courts. In State of Mississippi v. U.S.A., No. 87-3464, 1988 WL 90056 (D.D.C. August 2, 1988), Sentelle, Charles R. Richey, and Oberdorfer, JJ., granting a motion for summary judgment, observed “... there was no opportunity for single-shot voting prior to 1964, and there is no opportunity for single-shot voting today. Thus, undisputed facts establish that the legislation increasing the number of numbered judges in multi-judge districts does not effect any retrogression in minority voting strength, and hence has no discriminatory effect.” (emphasis added). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements, 902 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1990), noted “... that judges do not represent a specific constituency.” Observing that “district courts in Texas consist of individual judges who decide their cases alone”, that “there can be no share of the authority vested in each judge”, and that “the full authority of that office is exercised exclusively by one individual” the court ruled, “consequently, the county-wide election of district court judges does not violate the Voting Rights Act.” Ibid.
I hasten to add that the aforementioned two cases, while analogous, are neither controlling nor persuasive precedent here. Because they arose under different applications of the Voting Rights Act, the standard under which those cases were decided was that of “discriminatory effect,” not the “potential for discrimination” found in this case. However, since section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is arguably more intrusive than is section 5, it is not illogical to conclude that a practice which does not have the effect of discrimination is also without a potential for discrimination.
Thus, while I would prefer for this Court to reopen the entire matter and reverse its decision regarding the statutes which increase the number of judgeships in previously existing judicial circuits, I must nevertheless concur in a result which permits the operational status quo of Georgia’s judicial system for the duration of litigation.