The merchandise involved in this case consists of combed worsted wool tops of various grades, exported from Uruguay between May 16, 1953, and September 11, 1953, and entered at the port of Philadelphia between June 23, 1953, and October 16, 1953. In addition to the assessment of regular duties, concerning which no question has been raised, countervailing duties were levied pursuant to section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1303) and T.D. 53257 at the rate of 18 per centum of the invoice value of the merchandise and any dutiable charges thereon.
The assessment of countervailing duties is protested on several grounds, those relied upon at the trial being: (1) That no bounty or grant was paid or bestowed directly or indirectly upon the manufacture, production, or exportation of the imported merchandise; (2) that the Secretary of the Treasury’s determination that a bounty or grant was paid in connection with these wool tops was erroneous, arbitrary, and capricious; (3) that the assessment was in violation of the treaty between the United States and Uruguay, 56 Stat. 1626, T.D. 50786; (4) that the assessment was discriminatory and in violation of section 8, Article 1, of the Constitution of the United States and the fifth amendment thereto; and (5) that the assessment was invalid for failure to follow the procedure prescribed in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., 60 Stat. 237.
During the course of the trial, various documents were offered in evidence, the admissibility of which was not passed upon by the trial judge but decision was reserved for the division. These documents are the entry papers in their entirety, a chart, prepared by defendant’s witness Kenneth W. Mar-riner, entitled “Effect of Different Export Rates of Exchange on Wool Tops from Uruguay” (defendant’s exhibit B for identification), and a publication, issued by the United States Department of Commerce, entitled “licensing and exchange controls * * * Uruguay,” prepared by defendant’s witness Robert W. Wagner in 1957 (defendant’s exhibit D for identification). We are of opinion that the entry papers in their entirety and defendant’s exhibit B for identification are admissible in evidence. Accordingly, plaintiff’s objections as to such documents are overruled and they are-received in evidence.
We are of opinion that defendant’s exhibit D for identification is not. admissible. Authorship of a technical publication prepared in 1957 and offered, as evidence to qualify a witness as an expert in the field covered by the publication is no evidence of the witness’ qualification in such field in 1953, the period in issue. Furthermore, since the witness’ qualifications have not been attacked and have been otherwise established, the exhibit is superfluous. Accordingly, plaintiff’s objections to the document are sustained.
*608The primary issue in this case is whether the multiple exchange rate system in effect in Uruguay at the time of exportation conferred a bounty or grant on wool tops requiring the imposition of a countervailing duty pursuant to section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
It appears from the documentary evidence presented that, on September 25, 1947, the Uruguayan Government promulgated a basic decree providing that the Executive might grant preferential exchange treatment consisting of the establishment of exchange rates varying between 1.519 and 1.78 pesos per dollar “for industries which need it in order to place their products abroad.” (Plaintiff’s collective exhibit 6.) The decree lists certain considerations which entered into the issuance thereof, such as the world economic situation and its repercussions upon Uruguay, the need to keep potential markets open to Uruguay's incipient industrial production, the prevention of unemployment, and the strengthening of industrial activity. It was noted that the Bank of the Republic concurred in the objectives of the draft decree and found that nothing stood in the way of its application from the standpoint of international agreements, since the Bretton Woods Agreement allowed a 5-year period for unification of exchange rates and Uruguay had not yet fixed the parity of its currency. It was also noted that a communication from the international Monetary Fund established the parities between 151.90 and 190 pesos per $100 and that the exchange rates envisaged by the decree were not inconsistent therewith.
Subsequent to this decree, others were promulgated from time to time assigning different rates of exchange to different commodities, ranging from 1.519 pesos per dollar to 2.35 pesos per dollar. (Plaintiff’s collective exhibit 5.) In general, higher rates were established for processed and manufactured articles.
During the period involved in the instant case, the rate of exchange applicable to wool in the grease was 1.519 pesos per dollar and that applicable to certain woolen manufactures was 2.35 pesos per dollar. Exports of combed wool tops were subject to a combined rate of exchange, namely, 76 percent at 2.35 pesos per dollar and 24 percent at 1.519 pesos per dollar. This rate was modified on July 23, 1953, to 65 percent at 2.35 pesos per dollar and 35 percent at 1.519 pesos per dollar. The first-mentioned combined rate was equivalent to an effective rate of 2.15 pesos per dollar and the second to an effective rate of 2.06 pesos per dollar.
According to uncontradicted testimony, the Uruguayan exporter was required to file a sworn declaration of a transaction with the Government exchange control authorities giving in detail the terms and conditions of sale. Unless the authorities considered the exporter was getting a fair market value for the merchandise, the declaration was not accepted. Exporters were required to surrender to the Bank of the Republic all foreign exchange acquired through sales, in return for which they received pesos at the rate of exchange assigned to the commodity involved. Although the decrees do not so state, there is uncontroverted evidence that exporters of wool tops and of wool in the grease were permitted to retain 5 percent of the dollars received to use for whatever purposes desired, including sale at the prevailing free rate of exchange, which averaged around 3 to 1. Neither the controlled pesos nor the free pesos were blocked or restricted, and both had the same value. Exporters of wool in the grease received in addition a tax exoneration of between 5 and 7 centesi-mos.
One witness Frank Raquet, general manager of Engraw Export & Import Co., the manufacturer (hereinafter called Engraw), testified that there was a free market in Uruguay where one could freely buy or sell foreign exchange without Government control. Pie was not certain whether or not it was limited to financial transactions exclusive of trade transactions. He said, “there might be something that can be bought at the free rate of exchange.”
*609Mr. Raquet also stated that for export to nondollar areas, the exporter could withhold only 2 percent of the exchange. He explained:
“X Q. Can you tell why there was that differential between the 2 and 5 percent?- — A. Sure. Everybody likes the American dollar, including Uruguay. We like to buy everything here when we can.
“X Q. In other words, you would rather make your shipments to the United States, and encourage your trade to the United States? — A. Uruguay definitely would.
“X Q. By Uruguay, you mean yourself, too ? — A. Sure. [R. 53.]”
Plaintiff purchased the wool tops involved herein from Engraw in United States currency at varying prices per pound ($0.90, $1, $1.33%, $1.38), payment being made by letter of credit. Plaintiff made no other payment and gave nothing else of value to the manufacturer or to anyone else for the merchandise and received nothing of value therefor other than the merchandise.
Mr. Raquet testified that Engraw received payment for the wool tops in accordance with the terms of purchase but did not obtain physical possession of the dollars, by reason of the Uruguayan laws already referred to. It received a credit of 2.15 pesos per dollar for 95 percent of the foreign exchange and retained 5 percent in dollars which it was free to use as it pleased.
During this period, Engraw sold wool tops in Uruguay and to countries other than the United States at substantially the same price as it sold to plaintiff. Mr. Raquet stated that the price to plaintiff was not influenced in any way by the rate of exchange and that Engraw did not receive directly or indirectly any other payment, concession, or thing of value from Uruguay or any political subdivision thereof in connection with the manufacture, production, or exportation of this merchandise.
According to Mr. Raquet, Engraw began to manufacture wool tops in October 1951 at a cost of 0.90 peso per pound. It exported 150,000 pounds in that year and greater quantities in 1952 and 1953, most of it to plaintiff. However, the witness stated that the firm would not have been able to export wool tops to the United States at the exchange rate of 1.519 pesos per dollar. He testified, but did not explain, “They would have taxed us out of business.” He also stated that the differing rates of exchange are part of the internal taxation system of Uruguay.
Kenneth W. Marriner, called as a witness for the defendant, testified that he has been in the wool and top making business since 1923 and is presently operating under the name Marriner & Co., Inc. That firm makes tops here from wool imported from foreign countries or grown in the United States. It also makes tops in foreign countries where the wool exists and imports the product into the United States. During 1953, the firm was the fourth largest producer of wool tops in the United States, but not during 1952, for the following reason. In 1952, according to the witness, the advantage Uruguay gave to wool tops made it impossible for an American manufacturer to compete. Therefore, his firm cut its own production from 10 million to 5 million pounds and purchased the total output of one of the largest Uruguayan plants. In that year, the firm sold approximately 10 million pounds of wool tops, worth 20 million dollars. Of this amount, 5,400,-000 pounds, having a value of $7,200,-000, were imported from Uruguay. During 1953, however, it imported only 2,100,000 pounds, having a value of. $2,500,000, and its production in the United States amounted to 8 million pounds. After the countervailing duty went into effect, it did not purchase any wool tops from Uruguay.
Mr. Marriner described the effect of the Uruguayan exchange rate system on wool tops and referred to a chart prepared on the basis of his personal knowledge gained in importing both wool and tops from Uruguay over the past 23 years. According to the testimony and the chart, where wool tops were made in the *610United States from Uruguayan wool and the estimated cost of the wool was 1.51 pesos or $1, duty on the wool was 26 cents and the cost of conversion in the United States was 30 cents, making the total cost in the United States $1.56. If the tops were made in Uruguay, the cost would be 1.51 pesos for the wool and 38 pesos for the conversion. Converted at the same rate of exchange applicable to wool, 1.514 pesos to the dollar, the cost would be $1.25 plus the duty on wool tops of 36 cents, making a total cost of $1.61. However, if the pesos were converted at the preferential rate of 2.15 pesos per dollar, the cost would be 88 cents for the wool tops plus 34 cents duty, making a total of $1.22, thus giving an advantage to Uruguay of 34 cents. After the countervailing duty of 22 cents was added, the total cost would be $1.44, still giving Uruquay an advantage of 12 cents over the cost of tops made in the United States from Uruguayan wool. This advantage may have been offset to some extent by the fact that United States-made tops were of better quality.
Robert W. Wagner, who served as a commercial attaché in the American Embassy in Uruguay between 1951 and 1954, testified that he and the members of his staff were continually engaged in reporting on current economic developments in Uruguay respecting licensing and foreign exchange controls, with specific reference to the wool and wool top industries. The information thus supplied, together with the decrees of the Uruguayan Government, were used by the Department of Commerce in preparing reports such as plaintiff’s exhibit C, entitled “Business Information Service — World Trade Series, No. 636.” Mr. Wagner described in detail the operation of the Uruguayan foreign exchange system in 1953, pointing out that all foreign exchange flowed into and out of the Bank of the Republic, which bought cheap and sold dear. In his opinion, the rate applicable to wool tops enabled the Uruguayan seller to dispose of them at a lower price to the United States purchaser than he could have if he had been compelled to sell at the rate for basic commodities. In other words, the favorable rate gave the manufacturer of wool tops a larger return on his foreign exchange.
According to public record, during 1951 and 1952, American manufacturers presented statements at congressional hearings to the effect that the multiple exchange rate systems in Argentina and Uruguay gave exporters of wool tops the equivalent of a subsidy and requested the Treasury Department to impose a countervailing duty. Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 82d Congress, 1st session, on H.R. 1535, pages 685-691; Hearings before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 2d session, on H.R. 5505, pages 209-212; 253-270.
In December 1950, the Treasury Department denied that the multiple exchange rate system resulted in a bounty or grant, but in May 1953, the countervailing duty here involved was levied.
Charles R. Harley, chief of the Latin American Division of the Office of International Finance of the Treasury Department, testified at the trial that since becoming chief he had familiarized himself with the records of the Division in connection with the imposition of countervailing duties on wool tops and had conversed with Uruguayan officials in regard thereto. He stated that the Division had examined the Uruguayan exchange system and made computations which were adopted by the Treasury Department in 1953 as a basis for determining the amount of the subsidy, and, accordingly, the amount of the countervailing duty on wool tops. His studies showed that the Division—
“made a very thorough examination of the Uruguayan exchange rate system, the relationship thereto of the rate for wool tops, study of the trends of trade of wool top exports from Uruguay, a study of the effect of the exchange rate given to wool tops upon the price at which Uruguayan wool tops were sold in the United States market. [R. 184.]”
*611These studies disclosed that exports of wool tops from Uruguay were very small or negligible in 1947 and 1948, and that they began to grow in 1949. In 1950, they were slightly over 1 million pounds; in 1951, 3.7 million pounds; and, in 1952, 17 million pounds.
According to Department of Commerce Report No. FT 110, and the testimony herein, between 1950 and 1953, there was a marked increase in the importation of wool tops into this country and an even greater increase in the percentage imported from Uruguay. That percentage increased from 25 percent in 1950 to 84 percent in 1953.
According to Mr. Harley, studies were also made by the Latin American Division with regard to the competitive position of Uruguayan wool tops in the United States market. These showed that, except for December 1951 and January 1952, Uruguayan wool tops were selling below the cost of United States-produeed wool tops in amounts varying from 5 to 67 cents per pound. The average shown by an investigation in 1950 was 30 to 40 cents below the cost of American-made tops. In July and August 1952, such average was 20 cents a pound and, according to a report made to Treasury in September 1952, four Boston firms gave estimates averaging 20 to 25 cents and four other firms gave estimates averaging 7 to 10 cents below the cost of American-made tops.
In explaining the reason for the imposition of countervailing duties on wool tops from Uruguay, David W. Kendall, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, stated in a letter, dated February 8, 1957 {defendant’s collective exhibit 18):
“In the case of Uruguayan wool tops, the granting of more favorable export rates by Uruguayan authorities was followed by very large increases in U.S. imports of this commodity. In the absence of new factors contributing to substantially increased productivity in Uruguay, this increase indicated that the preferential rate for wool tops had, in fact, given an unfair competitive advantages to Uruguayan wool tops entering the markets of the United States.”
Mr. Harley described the method by which the amount of countervailing duty was determined as follows:
“[The Uruguayan exchange system] was a multiple exchange system with a basic rate of 1.519, and two other rates on the export side, plus four mixed rates at the time the first study was made. On the import side, three so-called basic rates. We wish to relate the wool tops rate to something in order to form a judgment whether or not this was a bounty under the terms of the law. We thought that the most representative, intelligent thing to do would be to take a weighted average of all the rates used, both on the export and import side; by weighted average I mean we took full account of the total value of exchange that was bought and sold at each rate, and that went into the computation. The resulting weighted • average, which we have since called a representative rate, turned out to be 1.86 pesos to the dollar. We compared this 1.86 with the then existing rate on wool tops, and determined that 18 per cent would be an appropriate countervailing duty. [R. 185.]”
This 1.86 figure was the weighted average of the import and export rates prevailing in Uruguay at the relevant time and was suggested as a representative rate against which other rates might be judged. The witness explained that for weighting purposes they had used the most recent exchange rates available at the time the study was made in 1953 and the latest available trade statistics, which were those of 1951. In arriving at the representative rate, consideration was given to the operations in the free market as to merchandise transactions and to the 5 percent retention. No consideration was given to transactions in monetary gold or those involving payment for services or balance of payments other than merchandise transactions. *612The Treasury did not place much importance on free market quotations as they represented a very narrow market. Total export and import figures were used, since it was thought that the appropriate value of the Uruguayan peso was shown in its trade transactions with all the world, and not the United States alone.
Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, pursuant to which the countervailing duty in issue here was assessed, provides :
“Whenever any country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, person, partnership, association, cartel, or corporation shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or export of any article or merchandise manufactured or produced in such country, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, and such article or merchandise is dutiable under the provisions of this chapter then upon the importation of any such article or merchandise into the United States, whether the same shall be imported directly from the country of production or otherwise, and whether such article or merchandise is imported in the same condition as when exported from the country of production or has been changed in condition by remanufac-ture or otherwise, there shall be levied and paid, in all such cases, in addition to the duties otherwise imposed by this chapter, an additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or gi'ant, however the same be paid or bestowed. The Secretary of the Treasury shall from time to time ascertain and determine, or estimate, the net amount of each such bounty or grant, and shall declare the net amount so determined or estimated. The Secretary of the Treasury shall make all regulations he may deem necessary for the identification of such articles and merchandise and for the assessment and collection of such additional duties.”
Under this statute, it has been held that multiple exchange rate systems can result in a bounty or grant. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 348, 28 CCPA 239, C.A.D. 151; V. Mueller & Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 354, 28 CCPA 249, C.A.D. 152; Robert E. Miller & Co., Inc. v. United States, 34 CCPA 101, C.A.D. 349.
The Woolworth case involved an importation of ehinaware from Germany in 1936. Ninety percent of the purchase price was paid by the importer in registered reichsmarks, each of which had been bought for $0.2142 United States currency. Ten percent was paid in so-called free reichsmarks, each of which had cost $0.4033 United States currency. The latter value had been arbitrarily declared by the German Exchange Control Board (a subsidiary of the Reichsbank) for the sale thereof in Germany. It was conceded that if the mei'chandise had been wholly paid for in free reichsmarks, the manufacturer would have received a bounty. As far as the manufacturer who received payment was concerned, there was no distinction between the free and the registered reichsmarks. The court held that a bounty had been bestowed, stating (28 CCPA p. 248):
“It is not possible to escape the conclusion from the record that the German Government by various devices and through different authorized governmental agencies was seeking to aid its manufacturers in invading foreign markets with their goods to compete in such markets with domestic producers. To this end various devices and practices were resorted to by and with the authority, encouragement, and aid of the German Government. Among such was the control of the registered marks and the limitations placed upon their use.
“As has been said, concededly a bounty would have followed the payment of the total purchase price in *613free marks. It seems clear that, since the registered marks which were used became immediately worth the same to the manufacturer as free marks, the identical ultimate result in dollars and cents was obtained. In the one instance a direct bounty would have been paid; in the other the result was reached indirectly.”
In the Miller case, the merchandise consisted of thumbtacks, also imported from Germany, in 1937. The goods were paid for in so-called Aski marks which were purchased at a lower price than the current value of free or gold reichsmarks. Under German regulations, Aski marks could be used in payment for exported goods and subsequent to such use were redeemed by the German Government at the same value as free reichsmarks, thereby enabling the German manufacturer to dispose of his goods at a lower dollar equivalent than he would otherwise charge. It was held that the merchandise was in the “bounty-fed” class and was subject to countervailing duty.
It has also been recognized internationally that multiple currency practices can in certain circumstances constitute a subsidy to exports which may be met by countervailing duties. Interpretative Notes to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, ad Article VI, paragraph 2, 82 Treas. Dec. 305, T.D. 51802.
The “plain, explicit, and unequivocal purpose” of our countervailing duty statute was set forth in Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 7 Ct.Cust.Appls. 97, 106, T.D. 36426, affirmed 249 U.S. 34, 39 S.Ct. 218, 63 L.Ed. 461, as follows:
“Whenever a foreign power or dependency or any political subdivision of a government shall give any aid or advantage to exporters of goods imported into this country therefrom whereby they may be sold for less in competition with our domestic goods, to that extent by this paragraph the duties fixed in the schedule of the act are increased. It was a result Congress was seeking to equalize regardless of whatever name or in whatever manner or form or for whatever purpose it was done. The statute interprets itself as a member of an act calculated to maintain an accorded protection, incidental or otherwise, as against payments or grants of any kind by foreign powers, resulting in an equalization thereof to any extent directly or indirectly. * * * ” [Italics quoted.]
At pages 113-114 of 7 Ct.Cust.App., the court stated further:
“Whatever may have been the purpose or consideration of the payment made upon exportation of these spirits, the incontrovertible fact is present that it necessarily encouraged their exportation and enabled the exporter to sell them at a proportionately less price in competition with the goods of this country. It is a payment directly to the exporter for and upon exportation and the entry of said goods in our body commerce. The doctrine of the case, therefore, may be paraphrased from the language of the Supreme Court in Allen v. Smith, supra [173 U.S. 389, 19 S.Ct. 446, 43 L.Ed. 741]:
“Whether allowed in consideration of services rendered or to be rendered, or with the object of a public interest to be obtained, production or manufacture to be stimulated, or a moral obligation to be recognized, it is a bounty.”
In our opinion, the facts presented here support the Treasury Department’s finding that, at the time of its decision, wool tops exported from Uruguay received bounties or grants within the meaning of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
One of the purposes of Uruguay’s multiple rate of exchange system was to aid industries which needed assistance in order to place products abroad. Under such a system, which assigns different exchange rates to different commodities, some exports are favored over others. In the instant case, the record shows that wool tops were favored over many other commodities and that the manufacturer *614was enabled to sell them to the United' States profitably, which he could not otherwise have done. Wool tops produced in Uruguay were offered and sold at a proportionately less price in competition with domestically produced wool tops. The percentage of wool tops imported from Uruguay increased markedly between 1950 and 1953, which increase was vastly out of proportion to the general increase in imports of this commodity. By means of the exchange rate granted to wool tops, an inducement was offered for the exportation of wool in the form of tops rather than in the form of unmanufactured wool. The result was to increase seriously the importation of wool tops into this country from Uruguay and to permit their sale at lower prices in competition with domestically produced wool tops.
It is clear from the record in this case that the Treasury Department imposed the countervailing duty on wool tops only after careful consideration of the entire situation and after circumstances had changed sufficiently to show that the preferential exchange rate had given such an advantage to Uruguayan exporters as to constitute a bounty or grant within the meaning of section 303. Although the United States and other countries may have recognized or approved multiple exchange rate systems in general and although there may have been various causes for'Uruguay’s action, nevertheless, section 303 of our tariff act imposing countervailing duties in certain circumstances has not been repealed. It must be applied whenever it is shown that a bounty or grant has been bestowed. The fact that United States representatives on the International Monetary Fund and the National Advisory Council did not object to Uruguay’s multiple exchange rate system in general is not relevant. Whether or not such a system is objected to, whenever the result is a bounty as to any particular article, the statute requires that countervailing duties be imposed. The facts here show that the preferential exchange rate did result in a bounty to the Uruguayan exporter.
Plaintiff also claims that the levying of countervailing duties in the instant case was a violation of the most-favored-nation clause of the trade agreement with Uruguay, since no countervailing duty was imposed on wool tops from Argentina. First, the record does not establish that Argentina’s exchange system resulted in a bounty on wool tops. Second, as stated in defendant’s brief:
“Since the application of the countervailing duty statute is dependent upon a determination whether in any given country a grant or bounty has been paid or bestowed directly or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production, or export of any article or merchandise, and since the situation in any given country is unique, any comparisons with action taken or not taken by the United States Government with regard to the imports from any other countries are not relevant.” [Italics quoted.] [P. 30.]
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 82 Treas.Dec. 305, T.D. 51802, under which the regular duties on the present wool tops were assessed, provides that countervailing duties may be imposed if not in excess of the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have been granted, directly or indirectly, on the product.
Furthermore, it has been held that the imposition of countervailing duties does not violate the most-favored-nation clause. Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 136 F.2d 1019, 31 CCPA 63, C.A.D. 249; Marion R. Gray v. United States, 70 Treas.Dec. 811, T.D. 48679; Douglas Fairbanks v. United States, 56 Treas.Dec. 371, T.D. 43643.
Plaintiff also claims that by levying countervailing duties on wool tops from Uruguay and by not levying them on wool tops and other products from other countries having multiple rate systems, its constitutional rights have been violated. Plaintiff itself contends that a *615multiple rate system does not result in a bounty or grant in all cases. Other factors must be considered in order to determine whether the action of a foreign Government is, in fact, the bestowal of a bounty or grant. Such a determination was made in regard to wool tops from Uruguay but not in regard to other products from Uruguay or wool tops from other countries. There is nothing in the record from which the court could determine that countervailing duties could or should have been assessed in other situations. Under these circumstances, certainly, it cannot be held that the assessment of countervailing duties on Uruguayan wool tops is prohibited because such duties were not assessed on other merchandise.
Plaintiff’s further argument that failure to comply with certain provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., 60 Stat. 237, invalidated the assessment of countervailing duties is controlled by the decision of the court of appeals in United States v. Elof Hansson, Inc., 296 F.2d 779, 48 CCPA 91, C.A.D. 771, to the effect that any procedural irregularity was waived by participating in the investigation without making timely objection. In the instant ease, plaintiff had actual notice of the investigation and did, in fact, supply information on the matter.
Plaintiff complains further that the method used by the Treasury Department in determining the amount of the countervailing duty was unreasonable and arbitrary. It is evident that under the circumstances of this ease it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to determine the exact amount of the bounty. Congress clearly had such a situation in mind when it provided that the Secretary of the Treasury shall ascertain and determine, or estimate, the amount. V. Mueller & Co. v. United States, 3 Cust.Ct. 139, C.D. 220, affirmed 115 F.2d 354, 28 CCPA 249, C.A.D. 152. In that case, the court pointed out (3 Cust.Ct. p. 143):
“ * * * When a foreign country has declared a bounty or a fixed amount, by a statute, the Secretary can readily ‘ascertain and determine’ the amount thereof and can ao declare as, for instance, the rate of duty imposed by Belgium on motorcars or the rate of duty imposed by Germany on cardboard, etc. (T. D. 41934), but where the bounty or grant is made through or by means of a manipulated currency, for instance, then the Secretary must resort to the other direction in the statute, viz., ‘he shall from time to time * * * estimate the net amount of each such bounty or grant, and shall declare the net amount so * * * estimated.’ ”
In the instant case, the estimate was made by taking account of all merchandise transactions for which the Uruguag-an peso might be used, including merchandise transactions in the free market, and the amount of exchange actually bought and sold at the rates applicable to the transactions. From this, a representative rate was found which was used as a base for estimating the countervailing duty. It is clear from the record that this was not done arbitrarily or capriciously but that the action was based on extensive studies and on available statistics on exchange rates and trade.
It has long been held that the finding of the Secretary of the Treasury as to the amount of a bounty is final and not subject to judicial review. Downs v. United States, 4 Cir., 113 F. 144, affirmed 187 U.S. 496, 23 S.Ct. 222, 47 L.Ed. 275; Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. United States, 3 Cir., 178 F. 743, 19 Treas.Dec. 347, T.D. 30494; Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. United States, 1 Ct.Cust. Appls. 242 T.D. 31276.
In the first Franklin Sugar Refining Co. case, the court stated:
“ * * * It is the province of the Secretary of the Treasury, under the act, ‘from time to time to ascertain, determine, and declare’ the amount of the bounties granted; and when this is done by the Secretary his finding and declaration of the same *616are binding upon the collector, the Board of General Appraisers, and the courts, and no evidence will be admitted upon a hearing before any of these tribunals to contradict the determination of the Secretary. If the importer feels that an injustice has been done, his remedy is by appeal to the Secretary.of the Treasury.
“It was undoubtedly the intention of Congress, in the enactment of this section, that the findings of the Secretary as to the amount of bounties paid by the foreign countries and collectible upon importation of merchandise as a countervailing duty should be final so far as any revision or examination by the courts is concerned. We see no difference between this provision of the act of 1897 and that section in the various tariff acts which requires the Secretary of the Treasury to proclaim the values of foreign coins after they have been ascertained' by the estimate of the Director of the Mint, in so far as the finding of fact is to be regarded as binding upon the courts under this provision.
“As to the values of foreign coins, the Supreme Court in four cases, to wit, Arthur v. Richards, 90 U.S. 259, [23 Wall. 246, 259, 23 L.Ed. 95]; Cramer v. Arthur, 102 U.S. 612, 26 L.Ed. 259; Hadden v. Merritt, 115 U.S. 25, 5 Sup.Ct. 1169, 29 L.Ed. 333, and U. S. v. Klingen-berg; 153 U.S. 93, 14 Sup.Ct. 790, 38 L.Ed. 647, declared that the finding or estimate of the Director of the Mint, as proclaimed by the Secretary of the Treasury was binding, not only upon the collector, the Board of General Appraisers, but upon the courts as well, and we have no doubt it was the intention of Congress that, in the matter of the collection of the countervailing duties, the amount fixed by the Secretary of the Treasury to be collected on importations cannot be inquired into by the courts, but must be settled as declared by the Treasury Department. If there has been a mistake, the remedy is by appeal to the Secretary. In case that has not been done, the courts cannot admit evidence for the purpose of inquiring into the question as to whether the amount fixed by the Secretary was or was not correct.” [19 Treas.Dec. 347, 350, T.D. 30494.]
In accordance with this principle, it has been held in recent cases that the determination of the rates of exchange of foreign currency by the Federal Reserve bank is within the bank’s discretionary power and is not reviewable by the courts. Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 65 S.Ct. 522, 89 L.Ed. 765; Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. United States, 37 CCPA 56, C.A.D. 420; Amalgamated Textiles, Ltd. v. United States, 24 CCPA 74, T.D. 48378.
In view of these decisions, the Secretary’s determination of the amount of countervailing duty to be imposed on wool tops from Uruguay is final and is not subject to review here.
For the reasons stated, the protest is overruled. Judgment will be entered accordingly.