The opinion of the court was delivered by
Mountain, J.Plaintiffs are taxpayers of the Borough of Tenafly. They brought this action to test the validity of an ordinance and supplemental resolution which authorized the borough’s acquisition of a certain tract of land, to be funded in part by the issuance of bonds. Defendant municipality moved for summary judgment, and the motion was granted. Plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Division, and we granted certification while the appeal was there pending unheard. 71 N. J. 517 (1976). Because of the desirability of an early announcement of our decision in this case, we entered an order of affirmance on October 8, 1976. We now indicate our reasons for this determination. Cf. Retz v. Mayor & Council of Saddle River, 69 N. J. 563, 565-66 (1976).
In Fovember, 1972, the borough submitted an application to the Commissioner of Environmental Protection seeking a grant under the Green Acres Land Acquisition program to be used in the purchase of approximately 294 acres of open, undeveloped land located in the borough and known *167as East Hill. The property in question consisted of three tracts in separate ownership. A ten-acre parcel owned by Mary Ellen Dunham and another parcel of approximately the same size owned by the New Early Christian Church were purchased for about $450,000. Condemnation proceedings were instituted in order to acquire a tract of about 274 acres owned by Centex Homes Corporation. The commissioners returned an initial award of $6,600,000.
Shortly thereafter, in the summer of 1975, the borough adopted Ordinance Ho. 1088, which appropriated the sum of $7,576,000 to be used for the acquisition of the property described above.1 The total appropriation included a Green Acres grant of $2,806,000 which the borough had been assured it would receive. It also included $362,000 to he used as a down payment, this sum having been made available from other municipal sources set forth in detail in the ordinance. Finally, it included $4,408,000, the anticipated proceeds of bonds whose issuance was authorized by the ordinance.
Meanwhile Centex had taken an appeal from the award of $6,600,000. At a trial de novo the award was increased to $8,500,000, to which was added interest in an amount exceeding $1,100,000. Judgment embodying this determination was entered January 8, 1976.
*168It was of course apparent that the appropriation of $7,576,000 was quite insufficient to meet the increased purchase price. Negotiations and discussions ensued; the whole matter received very wide publicity. Finally an agreement was reached. Centex lowered the price to $9,350,000. The Palisades Interstate Park Commission agreed to purchase 14.5 acres of the tract which were contiguous to its park lands for the sum of $500,000. The Nature Conservancy, a well-known conservation organization, undertook to pay $355,000 for 11 acres, it being understood that this sum would be repaid to it as the pledges of private citizens were received. In the meantime this parcel was to be leased by the conservation society to the municipality for a consideration equal to whatever taxes might be assessed against the property. Upon payment from pledges of the whole $355,000, the tract would be conveyed by Nature Conservancy to the borough. This transfer was expected to occur within three years. Lastly, the Jewish Community Center of Englewood agreed to purchase approximately 39 acres for the sum of $1,000,000. All but three acres of this latter tract were to remain as open space. Three acres were to be used as a community center upon which appropriate buildings for recreational purposes were to be erected. An additional grant of $350,000 from the state would cover the increased cost to the borough of the acquisition. The balance of the purchase price, $7,495,000, was to be paid by defendant municipality. Thus, the borough would ultimately obtain title to 350.5 acres instead of 394; the Palisades Interstate Park would acquire 14.5 acres, and the Jewish Community Center would hold 39 acres.
On April 33, 1976 the Mayor and Council of the Borough of Tenafly adopted a resolution approving and adopting the foregoing arrangement. This resolution is the chief object of plaintiffs’ attack.
In their brief filed with this Court, as well as at oral argument, plaintiffs have limited their attack upon the municipal action to two main contentions. First, it is argued *169that Ordinance No. 1088, which provided for the appropriation and which authorized the bond issue, was susceptible of later amendment and change only by the passage of another ordinance; therefore, the resolution of April 22, 1976 was ineffective. Second, it is urged that the acquisition of this tract has removed the last substantial area of vacant land in the municipality from the reach of development, a result thought to be contrary to this Court’s decision in Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N. J. 151 (1975) (hereafter “Mount LaureV). We will consider these contentions in turn,
Plaintiffs’ argument with respect to the first point rests very largely upon the proposition of municipal law that, generally speaking, an ordinance cannot be amended or modified by a mere resolution, but only by another ordinance. Recent recognition of this general rule by our Court, with supporting authorities, appears in Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 72 N. J. 412, 421 (1977). It must be borne in mind, however, that this familiar rule is entirely subject to the will of the Legislature. If the Legislature so wishes, it may alter the rule in any .particular case, as we believe it has done here.
The required contents of a bond ordinance are set forth in N. J. S. A. 40A:2-12.2 The relevant portion of this provision reads as follows:
A bond ordinance shall contain in substance the following: a. an authorization for the issuance of obligations, stating in brief and general terms sufficient for reasonable identification the purpose or purposes for which the obligations are to be issued, a statement of the estimated maximum amount of bonds or notes to be issued, and the estimated cost of such purpose or purposes, but related improvements or properties may be treated as 1 improvement or property * * *.
[N. J. S. A. 40A : 2-12]3
*170The Local Bond Law further provides:
All matters not required to be contained in the bond ordinance may be determined by subsequent resolutions passed by the recorded affirmative votes of a majority of the full membership of the governing body. [N. J. S. A. 40A :2-16; emphasis supplied]
Thus, in a proceeding for the authorization of a bond issue certain required items of information must first be set forth “in brief and general terms” in the bond ordinance, N. J. S. A. 40A:2-12. Eo other matters are required to be set forth therein. All matters not required to appear in the ordinance may thereafter be dealt with by resolution in accordance with N. J. S. A. 40A:2-16, supra. Further, N. J. 8. A. 40A:2-17 contains a similar provision concerning procedures for amendment of a bond ordinance during passage. If at the time of second reading an amendment is adopted which substantially alters matter required to be contained in the ordinance, then final adoption must await further publication and another hearing. Otherwise, the ordinance, as so amended, may be adopted forthwith. This distinction between required delay and immediate passage is precisely the distinction between an ordinance and a resolution.4 See N. J. S. A. 40:49-1. N. J. S. A. 40A:2-12, 40A:2-16 and *17140A:3-17 evidence a clear legislative intent to differentiate between substantial alteration of required matter in a bond ordinance and less significant modifications. Therefore, we hold that an amendment to a bond ordinance which does not substantially alter required provisions of the ordinance may be effected by a resolution. Thus, if the April 33, 1976 resolution did not substantially alter required contents of Ordinance No. 1088, the -procedure satisfied the Local Bond Law.
Plaintiffs assert that three required provisions in Ordiance No. 1088 were improperly altered: (1) the purpose or purposes for which the obligations were to be issued, (3) the estimated maximum amount of the obligations, and (3) the estimated cost of the project.
The resolution of April 33, 1976 clearly left unchanged the estimated maximum amount of the obligations. Nothing at all was said as to this. The estimated cost of the project was certainly increased, but the cost to the Borough of Tenafly was not increased at all. It is with this expense that we must be concerned. The entire additional amount that the borough became obligated to pay was forthcoming, not from the municipal treasury, but rather from contributions and pledges of private citizens, handsomely supplemented by a further grant of $350,000 from the State Department of Environmental Protection.
The remaining issue, whether the amended disposition of the East Hill tract was an impermissible alteration of the purposes stated in Ordinance No. 1088, presents a novel question -of interpretation of the Local Bond Law. Eirst, we note that N. J. S. A. 40A:3-13 requires a statement of purpose “in brief and general terms sufficient for reasonable identification * * The statement of purpose in Ordinance No. 1088, see note 1, supra, contains a great deal of detail which goes well beyond the essential requirements -of the statute. We think that the ordinance does, however, manifest clearly a basic purpose to acquire for “public recreation and park purposes * * * an area com*172monly known as the East Hill * * The settlement embodied in the April 22, 1976 resolution does not constitute a substantial deviation from this basic purpose.
Under the resolution, Tenafly would purchase 239.5 acres immediately from Centex, and 11 more acres from the Nature Conservancy. We consider the arrangement with Nature Conservancy to have been practically tantamount to an outright purchase by the municipality. Thus, the borough would ultimately acquire title to 85% of the tract. Plaintiffs assert that the mere diminution in acreage acquired by the municipality constituted a substantial alteration in the purposes . set forth in Ordinance No. 1088. This argument fails to recognize the need for sufficient flexibility in the fiscal mechanism to permit adaptation to conditions and circumstances discovered during the execution of a project. It would seriously hamper the effectuation of substantial public improvements were it necessary to set forth in specific detail every element of such a proposal and then require an amending ordinance each time a change became necessary or desirable. As the trial court said:
It is rare that a municipality knows exactly what it has to spend to purchase a certain item or even to construct a project, particularly in light of the common occurrence of extras; most contracts are subject to the bidding law and the value of condemned land is commonly seen under our eases not to be usually fixed until all avenues of appeal have been exhausted or there has been a settlement. **'•’* [T]he purpose of requiring prior authorization by ordinance is to insure accountability and prevent large municipal deficits. It is not intended where there were good faith proceedings to demand rigid adherence to initial calculations which are no more, than preliminary estimates, nor can the governing officials be second-guessed at every stage of litigation in the determination of what proceedings should or should not be taken or what settlements or arrangements should be entered where there is no facial invalidity and no allegation of bad faith.
Therefore, the acquisition of 85% rather than 100% of the *173tract should be judged in light of the basic purpose of the project and the future use of the remaining 15%.5
Here, the municipality has not simply abandoned the remaining acreage to development. Instead, the acquisition of 14.5 acres by the Palisades Interstate Park Commission freed the borough from the necessity of paying the purchase price for this parcel, while at the same time assuring that the land would remain open space indefinitely. The future use of this acreage is clearly compatible with the “public park and recreation purposes” expressed in Ordinance Ho. 1088. Thus, the dispute centers around the 29 acres acquired by the Jewish Community Center. This land has been zoned for open space; under this zoning, only.3 acres are available for development. The Community Center plans to construct a cultural and recreational center, and to leave the remaining 26 acres open and undeveloped. Viewed realistically, permitting development of 3 acres of the tract for related recreational purposes in order to preserve the remaining 291 acres from development does not constitute a substantial al*174teration of the original purposes.6 Rather, adoption of the settlement played a vital part in substantial achievement of the original purposes. Therefore, the resolution of April 22, 1976 was adequate to adopt the revised scheme.
We do not mean to suggest criticism of a local enactment like Ordinance No. 1088 simply because it is more informative than the law requires. The residents and taxpayers can only benefit from a detailed and comprehensive statement of what the governing body contemplates. At the same time, were we to hold that items of information or other statements set forth in the ordinance that go beyond those required by the act can be modified only by an amending ordinance, we would clearly defeat the legislative scheme of the Local Bond Law. It may of course be argued that if some ordinance provisions can be altered by resolution, the public may be misled. We think that here the test must be that of good faith. Publicity given to the enactment of an amending resolution —though not legally required — would go far to support an allegation of such good faith on the part of a municipality.
This brings us to the second argument made by the plaintiffs.7 It is their contention that the acquisition of this tract in the manner described above will effectively remove the last substantial unimproved residentially-zoned tract of land in the borough from the reach of future development. This, it is contended, is contrary to our decision in Mount Laurel, supra, which obliges developing municipalities to exercise their zoning and planning powers to include their fair share of low and moderate income housing.'
*175The borough has acted in good faith in acquiring this property for a vitally important public purpose. It is pertinent to note that the New Jersey Green Acres Land Acquisition Act of 1971, N. J. S. A. 13:8A-19 et seq., sets forth the following legislative findings:
a. The provision of lands for public recreation and conservation of natural resources promotes the public health, prosperity and general welfare and is a proper responsibility of government;
b. Lands now provided for such purposes will not be adequate to meet the needs of an expanding population in years to come;
c. The expansion of population, while increasing the need for such lands, will continually diminish the supply and tend to increase the cost of public acquisition of lands available and appropriate for such purposes;
d. The State of New Jersey must act now to acquire and to assist local governments to acquire substantial quantities of such lands as are now available and appropriate so that they may be preserved and developed for such purposes;
e. Since the most critical need for open lands now exists in the1 urban sectors of the State, special attention should be focused on the provision of lands for such purposes * * *.
[N. J. S. A. 13:8A-20]
Similar findings appear in the New Jersey Green Acres Land Acquisition, and Recreation Opportunities Act, N. J. S. A. 13:8A-35 et seq. See especially N. J. S. A: 13:8A-36. We are also very mindful of the large and generous grants that were made by the State Department of Environmental Pro- * tection to ensure the accomplishment of this project. What Tenafly has done is not only in the public interest, but has also received the strongest kind of support from both the legislative and executive branches of government.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court, .Law Division, is affirmed.
Ordinance No. 1088 stated the purpose of the appropriation to be:
the acquisition, by purchase or condemnation, of lands for passive open space public recreation and park purposes consisting of approximately 294 acres of an area commonly known as the East Hill of the Borough of Tenafly and further consisting of the following tracts or parcels: (1) Lots 3B and 5A in Block 229 and Lots, 1, 2, 3 and 8 in Block 235 formerly owned by Norman E. Blankman, now owned by Centex Homes Corporation; (2) Lot 29 in Block 227 formerly owned by Ellen Ann Dunham; and (3) Lot 30 in Block 227 formerly owned by the New Early Christian Church; all the same being in accordance with the application for said contribution from the State of New Jersey under said Green Acres Local Matching Assistance Program, on file in the office of the Borough Clerk and hereby approved.
This section, N. J. S. A. 40A:2-12, is now entitled “Contents of bond issue.” The context suggests that the title should read, “Contents of bond ordinance.”
Other items of information required to be set forth, none of which are in dispute here, include the period of usefulness of the *170project, confirmation that a supplemental debt statement has been filed, any amount of increase in gross debt that will result, and those expenses that are to be included in cost.
The Local Bond Law contains much internal evidence of a legislative predilection for the use of resolutions in connection with bond issues. In addition to the blanket authorization for the use of this procedure respecting all matters not required to be contained in the bond ordinance itself, N. J. S. A. 40A:2-16, other important aspects of bond procedure are permitted to be dealt with in this way. Thus maturities of all bond issues may be determined by resolution. N. J. S. A. 40A:2-26. Under specified conditions a private sale of bonds may similarly be undertaken by resolution, N. J. S. A. 40A:2-27, and all bond anticipation notes may be marketed in this way, N. J. S. A. 40A :2-28. Substantially all details of refunding bonds may be determined by resolution. N. J. S. A. 40A :2-58.
Plain tiffs rely heavily upon O’Farrell v. Sonoma Cty., 189 Cal. 343, 208 P. 117 (1922). We think that case is readily distinguishable. In O’Farrell, the county attempted to spend almost the entire proceeds of a highway bond issue to construct less than one-half of the authorized mileage, thereby doubling the cost to the county- of the entire project. Tenafly, in contrast, has acquired 85% of the original acreage and has assured compatible use of virtually the entire tract. Further, subsequent California cases have not found O’Farrell to bar reasonable alterations in the execution of bond-financed projects. See, e. g., Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Marquardt, 59 Cal. 2d 159, 28 Cal. Rptr. 724, 379 P. 2d 28 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (“when bonds are proposed in accordance with a program based on estimated costs, the improvements may be carried out to the extent of the funds available”) ; Sacramento-Yolo Port Dist. v. Rodda, 90 Cal. App. 2d 837, 204 P. 2d 372 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949) (cooperation with other government agency in execution of project); City of San Diego v. Millan, 127 Cal. App. 521, 16 P. 2d 357 (Dist. Ct. App. 1932) (substitution of dam types).
Plaintiffs have also urged as a necessarily fatal flaw the disposition of these 29 acres under open space zoning rather than under Green Acres restrictions. We reiterate the importance of judging the extent to which the entire scheme, rather than individual components, comports with the basic purpose of the project. Further, we note that the Department of Environmental Protection increased Tenafly’s Green Acres grant in order to permit the settlement to be consummated.
Amici curiae joined in this argument.