dissenting.
Appellant should be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty to murder because his trial counsel did not instruct him adequately as to the issues relevant to the possibility of receiving a penalty of death should he exercise his right to a trial by jury. The trial court found, and the majority does not dispute, that the primary motivation for appellant’s guilty plea was his fear that he might be sentenced to death following a trial by jury. Appellant contends that this plea was not knowing and intelligent because his trial counsel failed to discuss either the weakness of the aggravating circumstance alleged by the Commonwealth or the existence of “age, lack of maturity, or youth of the defendant”1 as a possible mitigating circumstance. Apparently conceding the factual validity of these claims, the opinion of Mr. Justice Packel nonetheless concludes that appellant’s guilty plea was knowing and intelligent. This conclusion that competent advice on possible defenses to the imposition of the death penalty is unnecessary to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to trial by jury is entirely unjustified and contrary to our case law. I dissent.
On July 15, 1974, appellant was indicted for murder. The charge arose from the June 9, 1974, shooting death of Jesse Ingram. Appellant pled not guilty and trial by jury was set for March 24, 1975. On the day of trial, appellant’s trial counsel had a conference with the district attorney who *242stated that he intended to seek the death penalty. At the noon recess, after jury selection had already begun, defense counsel advised the court that he had been discussing the possibility of a plea with appellant, appellant’s parents, and the District Attorney.2 Jury selection was delayed, and later that afternoon appellant entered a plea of guilty to murder generally, with the district attorney certifying that the evidence would not support a sentence of death. A degree of guilt hearing immediately followed and the next day the court entered its determination that appellant was guilty of murder of the first degree. No post-verdict motions were .filed and appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment on April 14, 1975.
Defense counsel then took a direct appeal to this Court, despite having waived all issues other than sufficiency of the evidence by his failure to file post-verdict motions with the trial court. Trial counsel then withdrew and appellate counsel was appointed. Appellate counsel filed motions with the trial court for a new trial and for leave to withdraw appellant’s plea of guilty. The appeal lodged with this Court was remanded to the trial court for consideration of these motions. After a hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s petition to withdraw his guilty plea but held he was entitled to file motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial. These were denied by the court en banc. This Court then reinstated appellant’s appeal.
*243It is settled that “a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment . . . .” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). E. g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1973). Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), discussed the nature of a guilty plea and the care with which it must be reviewed:
“A defendant who enters such a plea simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers. For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Consequently, if a defendant’s guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void. Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.'”
394 U.S. at 466, 89 S.Ct. at 1171. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
In Brady v. United States, supra, the Court recognized that “an intelligent assessment of the relative advantages of pleading guilty is frequently impossible without the assistance of an attorney . . . .” 397 U.S. at 748 n. 6, 90 S.Ct. at 1468 n. 6. In accordance with this principle, our cases recognize that a guilty plea cannot be truly knowing and intelligent if motivated by inaccurate advice of counsel. Commonwealth v. Wright, 444 Pa. 588, 282 A.2d 266 (1971); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970); Commonwealth v. Littlejohn and Commonwealth v. Archambault, 433 Pa. 336, 250 A.2d 811 (1969) (companion *244cases); Commonwealth ex rel. Light v. Cavell, 422 Pa. 215, 220 A.2d 883 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Cunningham v. Maroney, 421 Pa. 157, 218 A.2d 811 (1966).
The opinion of Mr. Justice Packel ignores these principles when it concludes that, although counsel failed to advise appellant on the merits of the Commonwealth’s case in relation to the death penalty, or the existence of a possible defense to imposition of the death penalty, appellant could knowingly and intelligently waive all the constitutional rights abandoned by a plea of guilty. Appellant’s trial counsel, in hastily arranging the plea entered into by appellant,3 advised him of no more than that the prosecutor intended to seek the death penalty and that death was a possible sentence under the statute. Surely, in determining whether a plea is entered knowingly and intelligently, there can be little distinction between an unrepresented defendant or a defendant who receives erroneous advice from counsel and a defendant who, although represented by counsel, receives no advice on key factors relevant to a decision to enter a plea. In all these instances, the defendant is forced to make his decision “ ‘in the dark.’ ” Commonwealth v. Wright, supra, 444 Pa. at 592, 282 A.2d at 268. In none can it be concluded, consistent with our concern for the protection of constitutional rights, that the defendant “possessed] an understanding of the law in relation to the facts,” McCar*245thy v. United States, 394 U.S. at 466, 89 S.Ct. at 1171, when this most serious decision was made.
Appellant’s trial counsel failed to advise him of the merits of the Commonwealth’s claim that an “aggravating circumstance,” essential to justify a sentence of death, existed in the case. The only evidence which the Commonwealth contended established an aggravating circumstance was some evidence that the victim’s wallet was removed by the defendant before the body was concealed. Removal of the wallet, in the circumstances of this case, was as consistent with an intent to conceal the crime as with an intent to rob. While our cases state that, to establish a felony-murder, the Commonwealth need not establish that the intent to commit the robbery or other enumerated felony existed prior to the killing, the rationale of this rule is based on “the difficulty in attempting to ascertain when the intent to rob was conceived in a given factual situation.” Commonwealth v. Butcher, 451 Pa. 359, 363, 304 A.2d 150, 152 (1973). The requirement nonetheless remains that the killing take place in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate the felony. Id. When the evidence tends to show, as here,4 that the killing was unconnected with any intent to rob, it is doubtful that a finding that the killing occurred in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a robbery could be sustained. Indeed, the trial court here concluded that the offense of felony-murder had not been established.
Appellant’s trial counsel also failed to advise him that the death penalty could not be imposed if the jury found as a mitigating factor his “age, lack of maturity, or youth.”5 At the time of trial, appellant was twenty years of age and had a ninth grade education. Clearly, appellant had at least a colorable claim to mitigation on this basis.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Packel does not assert that trial counsel discussed these considerations with appellant. In refusing to permit appellant to withdraw his plea, the opin*246ion of Mr. Justice Packel relies solely on its conclusion that trial counsel gave some consideration to these issues6 and was not ineffective in recommending the guilty plea. These facts, however, do not establish that appellant’s decision to plead guilty was knowing and intelligent. Although many trial decisions are properly the responsibility of counsel, the decision to plead guilty must be made personally by the defendant, to whom counsel has an obligation to explain the law in relation to the facts of the case in order that the defendant may personally weigh the risks of going to trial. McCarthy v. United States, supra.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Packel erroneously states that a counselled defendant may not withdraw a guilty plea absent a showing that counsel was ineffective. The decision to plead guilty, like the decision whether to waive the right to counsel, the right to a trial by jury, the right to testify on one’s own behalf and the right to appeal, is personal to the defendant. See ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution and Defense Function, The Defense Function, § 5.2, at 237-38 (Approved Draft, 1971); Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirement of Personal Participation, Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 Calif.L.Rev. 1262 (1966). Mr. Chief Justice Burger • recently pointed out the distinction which must be made in waiver analysis between decisions which are the responsibility of counsel and decisions personal to the accused:
“Although Noia, the habeas petitioner, was represented by counsel, he himself had to make the decision whether to appeal or not; the role of the attorney was limited to giving advice and counsel. . . . Because in both Fay *247[Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963)] and Zerbst [Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)], important rights hung in the balance of the defendant’s own decision, the Court required that a waiver impairing such rights be a knowing and intelligent decision by the defendant himself.”
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 92, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2509, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (concurring opinion) (emphasis in original). Mr. Chief Justice Burger made clear that one of the decisions personal to the accused, requiring a knowing and intelligent waiver, is the decision to plead guilty. Id. at 93 n.1, 97 S.Ct. at 2510 n.1. Our cases are in accord with this standard. Commonwealth v. Wright, supra, is close on point to the facts of this case. Wright was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he was granted a new trial. Before retrial, however, Wright entered a plea of guilty, with the district attorney certifying that his guilt rose no higher than murder of the second degree. In an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice (then Justice) Eagen, we held that Wright’s plea was not knowing and intelligent because he had been erroneously advised by counsel that if convicted of murder of the first degree he could receive a sentence of death. There was no finding that Wright’s trial counsel, in recommending the plea bargain, was ineffective. No such finding can be implied, as it clearly appears that Wright received his advice prior to our decision in Commonwealth v. Littlejohn and Commonwealth v. Archambault, supra, which first held imposition of a death sentence on retrial, after a previous sentence of life, would be unconstitutional. Accord, Commonwealth v. Littlejohn and Commonwealth v. Archambault, supra (decision whether to appeal); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, supra (same).
Here, appellant’s trial counsel advised him to enter a plea of guilty, but provided him with no counsel on the merits of the Commonwealth’s allegation of an aggravating circumstance or the existence of a plainly possible mitigating circumstance which could preclude a sentence of death. *248Whether or not trial counsel’s advice constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, his failure to inform appellant of the law in relation to the facts of the case left appellant, like Wright, to make this important decision, personal to him, “ ‘in the dark.’ ” Commonwealth v. Wright, supra, 444 Pa. at 592, 282 A.2d at 268. In these circumstances, I cannot conclude that appellant’s guilty plea was knowing and intelligent.7 Accordingly, I would reverse appellant’s judgment of sentence, allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea, and grant him a new trial.
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1311(d)(2)(i) (Supp.1977).
. Appellant’s trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea that the decision to recommend a guilty plea was based upon the court’s indication, made on the day of trial, that it would rule admissible at trial evidence that the victim’s body was mutilated after the killing in an attempt to conceal the crime. Although this evidence would not establish an aggravating circumstance under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1311, trial counsel believed it would be so prejudicial that the jury would impose death under the felony-murder theory advanced by the Commonwealth.
The evidentiary ruling of the court should have been anticipated. Although the trial court believed the testimony of appellant’s trial counsel, over that of appellant, that the possibility of a death penalty had been discussed earlier, it assumed that such discussion had been minimal prior to the day of trial. This assumption is supported by the timing of the plea agreement, entered into after the selection of jurors had already begun.
. The majority’s characterization of appellant’s plea as part of a valid “plea bargain” is a generous description of the agreement arranged by appellant’s trial counsel. In fact, appellant received no bargain. At the time appellant was tried there were no rules authorizing imposition of the death penalty after a bench trial or a plea of guilty. Hence, the agreement of the district attorney to certify that the evidence did not support imposition of the death sentence conferred no benefit on appellant.
Moreover, it does not appear that trial counsel ever advised appellant that he could waive trial by jury and be tried by the court without fear of the death penalty. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1101. Nor does it appear that counsel ever advised appellant of the possibility of challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty statute in light of this circumstance, see U. S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968), or on any other grounds, see Commonwealth v. Moody, - Pa. -, 382 A.2d 442 (1977). However, appellate counsel does not assert any of these factors in his allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
. The record indicates that the motive for the killing was a long standing animosity between appelllant and the victim.
. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1311(d)(2)(i) (Supp.1977).
. Trial counsel stated, with regard to the alleged aggravating circumstance, that if the Commonwealth supported its “opinion . that the decedent was robbed of forty some dollars or something of that sort” the death penalty would have been a “very real possibility.” Concerning appellant’s youth and lack of maturity as possible mitigating factors precluding imposition of the death penalty, the opinion of Mr. Justice Packel states that trial counsel was impressed by appellant’s “full-grown age” (20 years) and “reasonable education” (ninth grade).
. The opinion of Mr. Justice Packel asserts that there is no evidence that appellant would have refrained from pleading guilty if he had been more fully informed. I know of no authority which would permit this Court to uphold an invalid plea based upon such speculation.