dissenting:
Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to comply with due process requirements in his probation revocation hearing. Specifically, he alleges that there is no evidence in the record to show that he received written notice of the probation violations. I agree and would, therefore, reverse and remand for another probation revocation hearing.
On November 26, 1974, after appellant pleaded guilty in a Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, the court sentenced him to 15 years’ probation on a charge of burglary,1 and to a consecutive 4 years’ probation on a charge of criminal conspiracy.2 On the charge of possession of an instrument of crime,3 the court committed appellant to the Haverford State Hospital until cured of alcoholism. As a specific condition of probation, the court stated that appel*435lant could not partake of any alcoholic beverage unless prescribed by a physician.
On August 12,1975, Radnor police officers arrested appellant in Delaware County and charged him with rape,4 simple assault,5 terroristic threats,6 and recklessly endangering another person.7 On August 20, 1975, after a preliminary hearing before a District Justice appellant was bound over for Grand Jury action. On November 13, 1975, after a hearing, the Montgomery County Court revoked appellant’s probation8 and sentenced him to a 5 to 15 year term of imprisonment for burglary and a consecutive 2 to 4 year term of imprisonment for criminal conspiracy. This appeal followed.
Appellant contends that the lack of written notice on the record deprived him of due process of law. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 652.(1973), the United States Supreme Court held that an alleged probation violator is entitled to certain due process rights before his probation can be revoked. A probationer is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing.
“At the preliminary hearing, a probationer or parolee is entitled to notice of the alleged violations of probation or parole, an opportunity to appear and to present evidence in his own behalf, a conditional right to confront adverse witnesses, an independent decisionmaker, and a written report of the hearing. [Morrissey v. Brewer] 408 U.S. [471], at 487, 92 S.Ct. [2593] at 2603, [33 L.Ed.2d 484]. The final hearing is a less summary one because the decision under consideration is the ultimate decision to revoke rather than a *436mere determination of probable cause, but the ‘minimum requirements of due process’ include very similar elements: ‘(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation or] parole.’ Morrissey v. Brewer, supra.” Gagnon, supra at 786, 93 S.Ct. at 1761-62.9
These requirements serve as substantial protection against ill-considered revocation. Pennsylvania courts have frequently applied these standards to probation and revocation proceedings. Commonwealth v. Stratton, 235 Pa.Super. 566, 344 A.2d 636 (1975); Commonwealth v. Davis, 234 Pa.Super. 31, 336 A.2d 616 (1975); Commonwealth v. Alexander, 232 Pa.Super. 57, 331 A.2d 836 (1974). In Stratton, supra 235 Pa.Super. at 569, 344 A.2d at 638, we stated: “ . Gagnon requires, inter alia, that written notice of the alleged probation violations be furnished to the defendant as part of the Gagnon II hearing. There is no evidence in the record to show that the appellant received written notice. The probation revocation hearing, therefore, did not satisfy the requirements of due process.” (Emphasis added). In Alexander, supra, the appellant’s parole officer testified that he had orally informed appellant of the alleged probation violations. We reversed and remanded because the record did not reflect that appellant had received written notice of the claimed violations and thus, the Commonwealth did not *437satisfy the minimum due process requirements of Gagnon. See also, Commonwealth v. Martin, 241 Pa.Super. 222, 360 A.2d 733 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kile, 237 Pa.Super. 72, 346 A.2d 793 (1975); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 234 Pa.Super. 498, 340 A.2d 483 (1975). I believe that Alexander and Stratton control the instant case. The Commonwealth concedes that there is nothing in the record before our Court which indicates that appellant received written notice of the alleged probation violations. Moreover, in a probation revocation hearing, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proof. Although proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required, the Commonwealth must establish a record to demonstrate that it complied with the minimum due process requirements of Gagnon.
The Majority attempts to distinguish this Court’s prior case law. They hold that “the dispositive consideration is whether notice was in fact received.” (At 431). The Majority then notes that, as an appendix to its brief, the Commonwealth submitted a letter from the Montgomery County Adult Probation-Parole Department to appellant which charges him with violating his probation. This letter is not a part of the record. Based upon this letter, our Court finds that appellant in fact received written notice of the alleged violations, thus satisfying the requirements of due process. I have examined the letter and it is completely illegible.
I am compelled to dissent from the dangerous precedent the Majority sets in considering evidence completely de hors the record. One of the fundamental tenets of our judicial system is that a court may only consider evidence properly before it. “The right of a litigant to in-court presentation of evidence is essential to due process.” Commonwealth ex rel. Valentine v. Strongel, 246 Pa.Super. 466, 371 A.2d 931 (1977). Accordingly, a court is not permitted to base its findings on evidence that is not in the record. See Wood v. Tucker, 231 Pa.Super. 461, 332 A.2d 191 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Oncay v. Oncay, 153 Pa.Super. 569, 34 A.2d 839 (1943).
*438In the instant case, there is nothing in the record before us which indicates that appellant received written notice of alleged probation violations. Therefore, I believe that the Commonwealth has failed to comply with the requirements of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra. Any consideration of the letter appended to the Commonwealth’s brief is entirely inappropriate and violates essential due process requirements. I would reverse and remand for a new probation revocation hearing.
SPAETH, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
. The Crimes Code, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, eff. June 6, 1973; 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502.
. The Crimes Code, supra; 18 Pa.C.S. § 903.
. The Crimes Code, supra; 18 Pa.C.S. § 907.
. The Crimes Code, supra; 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121.
. The Crimes Code, supra; 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701.
. The Crimes Code, supra; 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706.
. The Crimes Code; supra; 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
. The Crimes Code, supra; 18 Pa.C.S. § 1371, provides authority for the revocation of probation. See also, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1409.
. The United States Supreme Court first articulated these standards in a case involving parole revocation. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).