ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Elton Montgomery complains of Caprock Investment Corp.’s failure to produce Schedule “A,” a document listing the assets transferred from FDIC-R to FDIC-C. We note that the capacity in which the FDIC transfers assets (FDIC-R or FDIC-C) does not affect the relevant chain of title which gives the FDIC status as holder of the asset. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Patel, 46 F.3d 482 (5th Cir.1995); Bosque Asset Corp. v. Greenberg, 19 S.W.3d 514 (Tex.App.—Eastland 2000, rehearing filed).
In his motion for rehearing, Montgomery also contends that the parties stipulated that Caprock would produce Schedule A and that this alleged stipulation controls Caprock’s right to intervene. We note that, under TEX.R.CIV.P. 11, an agreement between parties that touches a pending suit is not enforceable “unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record.”
Montgomery admits that the alleged stipulation is not “in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record.” Rule 11. He argues, however, that the stipulation should be given effect as it was made in open court and entered of record. In support of this, Montgomery cites the trial court’s order which states that:
[C]ounsel for all parties present stipulated and agreed that Caprock Investments, Inc. could enter its appearance ... provided Caprock Investments forwarded to all counsel Exhibit “A” of the Contract of Sale between FDIC-C and FDIC-R.
A reference in the trial court’s order to a stipulation that does not appear anywhere in the record does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 11. Markman v. Gaitz, 499 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref d n.r.e.). Because the stipulation alleged to exist does not comply with the mandates of Rule 11, it is without effect.
Montgomery also asserts that the stipulation is enforceable despite noncompliance with Rule 11 as the stipulation is undisputed. The Supreme Court has held that, while Rule 11 “means precisely what it says,” courts may enforce undisputed stipulations whether or not they comply with the requirements of Rule 11. Kennedy v. Hyde, 682, S.W.2d 525, 529 (Tex.1984). Caprock concedes that it agreed to produce Exhibit “A” of the contract of sale between FDIC-C and FDIC-R. However, Caprock argues that the stipulation was of no effect. Even assuming that this is the type of undisputed stipulation that falls within an exception to Rule 11, we agree with Caprock.
Stipulations as to legal conclusions, as opposed to facts, are not binding on courts or parties. Cartwright v. MBank Corpus Christy N.A., 865 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ den’d). The question of whether Caprock was the proper plaintiff was a question of law. See Guaranty Federal Savings Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Company, 793 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex.1990). Therefore, the stipulation between the parties could not be determinative on this point. See Smith v. Morris and Company, 694 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.).
*714Next, in his motion for rehearing, Montgomery argues that the FDIC’s debt was discharged in Al Jonietz’ bankruptcy case and that, under the federal rules of res judicata, Caprock is barred from seeking to collect payment on the note from Montgomery and Stevens, the comakers. Under federal law, the doctrine of res judicata will apply if the parties are identical in both suits, if the prior judgment is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, if there is a final judgment on the merits, and if the same cause of action is involved in both cases. Russell v. SunAmerica Securities, Inc., 962 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.1992); Eagle Properties, Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714 (Tex.1990). Montgomery relies on Geary v. Texas Commerce Bank, 967 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.1998), for the proposition that a confirmation order, under the principal of res, judicata, is final as to all issues decided or which could have been decided at the hearing on confirmation. Unlike in Geary, the order confirming the plan before us does not purport to release the debt of the comakers. Shade v. Basse (In re Fasse), 40 B.R. 198 (Bankr.D.Colo.1984). The plan itself was never introduced into summary judgment evidence. Montgomery describes the issue that was tried before the bankruptcy court as whether the indebtedness was fully satisfied by the valuation of the collateral. However, the issue in the bankruptcy court was the discharge of Jonietz’ liability on the note, not that of his comakers. In re Fox, 142 B.R. 206, 210 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1992).
The motion for rehearing is overruled.