concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion to the extent that it holds that we should remand this case to the trial court with instructions for it to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding Johnson’s competency, but I would limit the scope of the hearing and determination to the question of whether Johnson was competent at the time of his sentencing. Johnson brought no pretrial motions regarding his competency before the trial court and, in fact, raised no issue involving his mental illness prior to the jury’s return with a guilty verdict. On December 30, 1997, Johnson, for the first time, brought an issue regarding his mental status before the trial court in a motion styled a Motion for a New Trial and an Order of Dismissal Notwithstanding the Verdict which he filed between the date when the jury returned its verdict, November 24, 1997, and the date of his final sentencing and the entry of final judgment, March 2, 1998. The record reflects that both defense counsel’s declarations regarding Johnson’s ability to assist in his defense and the trial court’s own doubts regarding the appellant’s competency expressed in its, Order of Mental Examination entered January 13, 1998 provided “reasonable grounds [for the trial court] to believe the defendant is incompetent.” KRS 504.100(1). In light of this, the trial court should not have sentenced the defendant without first ascertaining his competency status by conducting a hearing, as provided in KRS 504.100, on the issue whether he was competent to assist his counsel in sentencing proceedings. KRS 504.090 (“No defendant who is incompetent to stand trial shall be tried, convicted, or sentenced so long as the incompetency continues.” Id.) Trial counsel preserved this issue for our review by objecting that the unresolved questions regarding Johnson’s mental health status constituted legal cause to postpone sentencing. Accordingly, I concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it holds that this matter should be remanded to the trial court for a hearing on Johnson’s competency, subject to the qualifications expressed above.
I do not agree, however, with the majority’s view that Johnson prematurely filed this appeal or with its holding dismissing the appeal and remanding the matter to Campbell Circuit Court for a ruling on the *115post-trial motions filed prior to the trial court’s entry of judgment. Each of the four post-trial/pre-judgment motions for a new trial filed by Johnson raises issues regarding newly discovered evidence. Accordingly, the appropriate time for filing such motions is not, as the logic of the majority opinion would suggest, within one year of the verdict, but rather, as provided in RCr 10.06, “A motion for a new trial based upon the ground of newly discovered evidence shall be made within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment or at a later time if the court for good cause so permits.” RCr 10.06(1) (emphasis added). The overwhelming implication of this section is that motions for new trial which allege newly discovered evidence will not be filed prior to the entry of final judgment. I agree, however, with the majority opinion that, in order to be timely filed, a motion for a new trial based on any grounds other than newly discovered evidence must be filed within five (5) days of the verdict. In my opinion, therefore, all of the post-verdict/prejudgment motions, with the exception of Johnson’s motion for new trial addressing competency issues, were not properly before the trial court, and had no legal significance because Johnson had not timely filed them. Accordingly, the three post-verdict/prejudgment motions for a new trial had no effect on the trial court’s jurisdiction to enter final judgment, and Johnson’s appeal was timely filed.
Although the Kentucky courts have not previously addressed the status of prematurely filed new trial motions, courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that new trial motions filed prior to judgment have no effect. See In re Tutorship of Ingraham, 565 So.2d 1012 (La.App., 1990); Jessup v. Newman, 191 Ga.App. 772, 383 S.E.2d 136 (1989); Ruiz v. Ruiz, 104 Cal.App.3d 374,163 Cal.Rptr. 708 (1980); Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 57 Cal.2d 450, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937 (1962); Jones v. Kay, 110 N.E.2d 33 (Ohio App., 1951); Stone v. Boston, 218 S.W.2d 783 (Mo.App., 1949).
In my opinion, the majority’s interpretation ignores RCr 10.06(l)’s use of the phrase “after the entry of the judgment.” RCr 10.06(1) (emphasis added). This Court did utilize the word “within” when drafting RCr 10.06(1), but it did so to clarify that a motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence may be brought at any point in the year following the entry of final judgment.1 A motion filed before a time period set out by rule or statute is no different from a motion filed after a defined time period. Neither is timely filed, and neither is properly before the court. Both are nullities.
The first sentence of RCr 10.06(1) addresses motions for new trial based upon matters arising during the course of the proceedings or trial and states that such motions must be served on the prosecution within five days of the verdict. See Abramson, 9 Kentucky CHminal Practice and Procedure § 32.22 (West 1997). Motions for new trial on the basis of trial errors, if timely filed, stay the time within which an appeal from the judgment may be taken: “[I]f a timely motion has been made for a new trial an appeal from a judgment of conviction must be taken within thirty (30) days after the date of entry of the order denying the motion.” RCr 12.04(3); Adkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 309 S.W.2d 165 (1958). By contrast, RCr 10.06(2) describes the interaction between motions for new trials based on newly discovered evidence and appellate review of the underlying judgment and *116contemplates that such a motion would be filed after the entry of judgment:
After a motion for a new trial is filed and if there is an appeal pending, either party may move the appellate court for a stay of the proceedings in the appellate court, whereupon the clerk of the appellate court shall notify the clerk of the trial court that the motion has been filed. The clerk of the trial court shall notify the clerk of the appellate court of the trial court’s ruling on the motion for a new trial.
RCr 10.06; see also RCr 12.04(3) (“[I]n the case of a motion for new trial made later than five (5) days after return of the verdict, the appeal must be from the order overruling or denying the motion .... ” Id.).
To summarize, a defendant may bring a motion for new trial upon a basis other than newly discovered evidence no later than five (5) days after the verdict. If the trial court overrules such a timely filed motion for new trial, a defendant may seek appellate review of the ruling in an appeal from the final judgment. A motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence may be filed at any time during the one (1) year following, but not before, the entry of final judgment. If the trial court overrules such -a motion for new trial, any appeal must be taken from the order overruling or denying the motion.
As the trial court ordered that Johnson’s competency-based motion for a new trial be considered filed as of the date of the judgment, the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the May 29, 1998 order denying the motion. Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 761 S.W.2d 182, 184 (1988). As Johnson chose not to appeal from this order, it became final thirty (30) days' after entry and Johnson may not now seek its reversal.
I find none of Johnson’s assignments of error with respect to his trial meritorious and I would affirm the conviction, but remand the case to the trial court with instructions for it to conduct a hearing to .determine whether Johnson was competent at the time of his final sentencing. If the trial court determines that Johnson was incompetent at the time of his sentencing, the final judgment should be set aside and further proceedings conducted in accordance with KRS 504.110. If the trial court finds that Johnson was competent at the time of his final sentencing, the trial court- should enter an order, to that effect from which Johnson may seek appellate review.
. Without the word "within,” the relevant portion of RCr 10.06(1) would read: "A motion for new trial based upon the ground of newly discovered evidence shall be made [] one (1) year after the entry of the judgment or at a later time if the court for good cause so permits." RCr 10.06(1). Accordingly, it is understandable why "within” was inserted into the rule; otherwise, such a motion could not be filed until one (1) year had passed since entry of the judgment.