concurring:
I write separately only to note my disagreement with the Majority’s decision declining to review the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence. Citing to Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987), the Majority refuses Appellant’s request to have an appellate court re*333view the discretionary aspects of his sentence because Appellant has not included in his Brief a statement of reasons requiring review, and because the Commonwealth has objected to this deficiency.
Such decisions permitting selective review of the discretionary aspects of a sentences find their basis in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). It provides:
Allowance of Appeal. — The defendant or the Commonwealth may file a petition for allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of a sentence for a felony or a misdemeanor to the appellate court that has initial jurisdiction for such appeals. Allowance of appeal may be granted at the discretion of the appellate court where it appears that there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under this chapter. It is my view that § 9781(b), which limits appellate review
to those cases where a “substantial question” exists, is prohibited by Article 5, Section 9 of the Constitution of this Commonwealth. That Article states:
There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of record; and there shall also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from and administrative agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of such court to be as provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as may be provided by law.
(emphasis added).
The Constitution provides a defendant in a criminal proceeding with a right to have all matters reviewed which have been properly preserved at the trial court level. This “right” directly conflicts with the appellate court’s ability under § 9781 to exercise its discretion in determining whether to “grant” an appeal from the discretionary aspects of a sentence. Citing to the Constitutional provision cited above the supreme court has stated:
[A]n accused has an absolute right to appeal, Pa. Constitution, Article V, Section 9, and counsel can be faulted for allowing that right to be waived unless the accused *334himself effectively waived the right____ This requirement that counsel protect the appellate right of an accused extends even to circumstances where the appeal is ‘totally without merit.’
Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 490 Pa. 296, 416 A.2d 477, 479 (1980). A defendant’s ability to have his or her sentence reviewed by an appellate court operates as a necessary check to ensure that an appropriate punishment has been issued. The important role discretion now takes at sentencing and its limitations have been examined by the supreme court. Referring to the substantial revisions which have taken place in sentencing procedures, the court in Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d at 650 (1976) remarked:
At one time, sentencing by a court after a finding of guilt was purely ceremonial, since there was but one penalty at law for any given crime. However, during the nineteenth century, when incarceration became the primary mode of punishment, the practice of discretionary sentencing began. At first this took the form of executive pardons, and the judge’s duty remained only to apply the sentence mandated by law. However, discretionary sentencing soon became an integral part of judicial procedure; the sentencing court had increasing discretion in its choice of sentence.
The importance of this discretion cannot be overemphasized; many commentators argue that it is one of the most important, and most easily abused, powers vested in the trial court today. In United States v. Waters, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 289, 437 F.2d 722, 723 (1970), Judge Wilkey, speaking for the court, states:
‘What happens to an offender after conviction is the least understood, the most fraught with irrational discrepancies, and the most in need of improvement of any phase in our criminal justice system.’
*335It is true that the sentence imposed is normally left undisturbed on appeal because the trial court is in a far better position to weigh the factors involved in such a determination. However, we have held that the court’s discretion must be exercised within certain procedural limits, including the consideration of sufficient and accurate information.
466 Pa. at 128-132, 351 A.2d 650. (footnotes omitted.)
The power held by those who impose a discretionary sentence is not without limits. The Constitutional provision found in Article 5, Section 9 ensures that a defendant has a right to appeal. Although this right may be waived by the defendant’s own actions, it nevertheless remains the defendant’s right. Section 9781 appears, to me, to eliminate the right to appeal. For this reason, I believe 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b) violates Article 5, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Because, in my view, the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence are entitled to be reviewed by this court, I have undertaken such an examination. I have found nothing improper in the sentencing procedure employed and conclude that the sentencing judge considered appropriate factors and fashioned a sentence which did not constitute an abuse of discretion.