dissenting.
I must dissent. The distinguished trial judge in this case, the Honorable Eugene B. Strassburger, decided this action to quiet title and to strike a lien on his belief that all of the lienholder’s arguments turned on the question of whether the automatic conversion of a tenancy by the entireties into a tenancy in common survives enactment of the Divorce Code of 1980. The trial court examined the Act of May 10, 1927, P.L. 884, § 1, as affected by the Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No. 53 (Judiciary Act Repealer Act, “J.A.R.A.”), 68 P.S. § 501, and considered several trial court opinions within Allegheny County holding that the Divorce Code supersedes 68 P.S. § 501.
Judge Strassburger reviewed this court’s decision in Stop 35, Inc. v. Haines, 374 Pa.Super. 604, 543 A.2d 1133 (1988) holding that a separation agreement providing for the division of proceeds in the event of the future sale of entireties property does not operate to sever the tenancy by the entireties. However, at the time this case was decided in the trial court, Judge Strassburger could not have had the benefit of our decision in Jawork v. Jawork 378 Pa.Super. 89, 548 A.2d 290 (1988). In Jawork, we were asked to find that, where economic claims are bifurcated from the entry of the divorce decree, the effect of 68 P.S. § 501 is somehow stayed pending resolution of those' claims. We recognized, as did both parties to the appeal in Jawork, that a tenancy by the entireties becomes a tenancy in common, by *213operation of law, upon the divorce of the parties, citing 68 P.S. § 501, and went on to conclude that the status of the title after the entry of the divorce decree is unassailable. 378 Pa.Super. at 94-95, 548 A.2d at 292.
All three judges on this panel agree with Mellon Bank, appellant, that the trial court incorrectly construed the relationship between 68 P.S. § 501 and the Divorce Code. Unlike the Majority, however, I cannot find that bifurcation is determinative of the reach of Jawork. I read § 501 as covering all situations where a decree in divorce is entered. The act provides, as affected by J.A.R.A.:
§ 501. Divorced tenants by entireties hold as tenants in common; suit for sale and division of proceeds
Whenever any husband and wife, hereafter acquiring property as tenants by entireties, shall be divorced, they shall thereafter hold such property as tenants in common of equal one-half shares in value and either of them may bring suit against the other to have the property sold and the property divided between them.
As affected 1978, April 28, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 2(a)[1092], effective June 27, 1980.
68 P.S. § 501.
Mellon Bank’s judgment against Edward R. Klebach was entered on December 14, 1982. On December 30, 1982, the divorce decree was entered. I find that Mellon’s judgment lien attached to Edward Klebach’s undivided, one-half interest in the property as of December 30, 1982 and remained a lien against that interest when the property was thereafter transferred to Arlene Klebach. I should therefore vacate the order granting judgment on the pleadings and striking Mellon’s lien, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
I must emphatically dissent from that portion of the Majority Opinion which appears to create a rule of in custodia legis in regards to the real estate here at issue. The Majority concedes that all of the cases cited for this principle involve only personal property. The Majority, however, goes on to apply the principle to real property *214“under the facts of this case.” I find it startling that the Majority has concluded, without citation to any authority, that the real estate here in question “was in the custody of the divorce court pending execution of a deed in compliance with court order”.
Where, as here, the trial court has sought to deal with three distinct issues and has resolved all of them upon a theory of law which, applying hindsight after Jawork, is clearly erroneous, I should remand the case to permit the parties to present their arguments to the trial court in the light of Jawork v. Jawork. This is particularly appropriate, I believe, where the trial judge is of proven high competence, as is the case here. To seek to affirm the trial court action on the novel theory of real estate being in the custody of the law does violence to the body of law, as I understand it, and does not advance the ultimate disposition of this dispute.
I must dissent.