On this appeal, we are asked to determine whether spousal incompetency to testify to confidential communications under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5914 is removed by virtue of the excep*339tions to such incompetency set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5913. We hold that it is. Since this case involved violence done upon a minor child in the care or temporary custody of the defendant/husband, an enumerated exception found in § 5913, the wife was a competent witness against her husband. There being no merit, therefore, in the defendant/husband’s assertion on appeal that defense trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to portions of the wife’s testimony, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
A jury convicted Andrew Hancharik of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, indecent assault, and corruption of a minor. The Honorable John M. Cleland, President Judge, entertained Hancharik’s amended motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment, denied the same, and sentenced Hancharik to an aggregate term of six to fifteen years’ imprisonment. On this direct appeal, Hancharik advances three issues:
1. Alleged trial counsel ineffectiveness in failing to call readily available character witnesses;
2. Alleged court error concerning declaration of mistrial or cautionary instruction relating to testimony about conversations between both spouses and a marriage counsel- or; and
3. Alleged trial counsel ineffectiveness with respect to wife’s testimony as to confidential communications.
At issue 1, Hancharik contends that the key issue in the case was one of credibility. Trial counsel had been provided with a list of possible character witnesses, but did not call all of them. Hancharik contends that where credibility is the key issue, counsel’s failure to call all readily available character witnesses constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. We do not agree.
Our supreme court, speaking through Mr. Justice Papadakos, has recently restated the standard to be applied in reviewing ineffectiveness claims:
We have taken great pains to set forth the criteria that must be established when one attempts to assert the *340ineffectiveness of counsel. The threshold inquiry in such claims is whether the issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit; for counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to assert a meritless claim.... If this threshold is met, it must next be established that the particular course chosen by counsel had no reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests.... Finally, we require that the defendant establish how counsel’s commission or omission prejudiced him....
In making assertions of ineffectiveness, we also require that an offer of proof be made alleging sufficient facts upon which a reviewing court can conclude that trial counsel may have, in fact, been ineffective. This is so because we frown upon considering claims of ineffectiveness of counsel in a vacuum.
Commonwealth v. Durst, 522 Pa. 2, —, 559 A.2d 504, 505 (1989), (citations omitted).
As to the alleged failure to call character witnesses, the record is clear that defense counsel thoroughly discussed possible character evidence with Hancharik and, in fact, did call one individual on a list reviewed by counsel. Not only was the decision not to call all of the witnesses made only after careful deliberation and consultation with Hancharik but the record does not establish that any of the witnesses would have been available or that their testimony would have advanced the fact-finding process. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 513 A.2d 373 (1986), cert. denied, Peterkin v. Pennsylvania, 479 U.S. 1070, 107 S.Ct. 962, 93 L.Ed.2d 1010, (1987); Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 375 Pa.Super. 497, 544 A.2d 1030 (1988).
We conclude that issue 1 is without merit.
At issue 2, Hancharik contends that a mistrial was mandatory following Hancharik’s wife’s testimony regarding a conversation between herself, Hancharik and a mar*341riage counselor. During the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Mrs. Hancharik testified:
A After I got out of the hospital. I refused to leave the hospital unless he agreed to see a counselor with me and the doctor set it up and we seen her briefly before I was discharged on that Friday afternoon and she more or less told both of us all we needed to do was go home, have sex, everything was going to be fine in our marriage. He should forget about his relationship with [the minor victim], he could get in a lot of trouble. He at that point told the counselor that [the minor victim] liked to kiss him and she informed him he could go to jail for that.
MR. LANGELLA: I object.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MR. LANGELLA: I’d ask the court to instruct the jury to disregard any statement as to what the counselor apparently said.
THE COURT: I don’t know that the content came out. MR. SAUNDERS:
Q ....
A ....
Q ....
A ....
THE COURT: I will instruct the jury anything that the counsellor told Mr. Hancharik as part of the counseling session, that’s hearsay and not competent evidence and should not be considered by you.
Notes of Testimony, June 25, 1986, pages 49-50.
The trial court’s cautionary instruction, to the effect that the jury should not consider anything the counselor told Hancharik, was immediate, clear and adequate. Hancharik’s counsel did not move for mistrial when the testimony was presented. Nor does our review of the record disclose any reason of manifest necessity for declaration of a mistrial. We find no trial court error with regard to issue 2. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1118, Commonwealth v. Reardon, 374 Pa.Super. 212, 217, 542 A.2d 572, 574 (1988).
*342We turn now to issue 3, the alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel with respect to wife’s testimony as to statements made by Hancharik to his wife. Hancharik contends ¿hat trial counsel was ineffective in failing to interpose objections, founded upon the spousal privilege, to the wife’s testimony that (a) Hancharik had informed her that he was desirous of adopting an older girl, (b) Hancharik had stated that he loved the minor victim very much and needed a daughter to complete the family, (c) Hancharik stated that he could only relax when the minor victim was around, and (d) there existed marital disharmony and a poor sexual relationship between herself and Hancharik. Hancharik relies upon 42 Pa.C.S. § 5914, which provides:
§ 5914. Confidential communications between spouses
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, in a criminal proceeding neither husband nor wife shall be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made by one to the other, unless this privilege is waived upon the trial.
Hancharik concedes that, under limited circumstances, a spouse will be permitted to testify against his or her mate in a criminal proceeding, wherein an act of violence by the defendant against a minor child in that defendant’s care is alleged. Prior to June 29, 1989, when the section was amended by Act No. 16 of 1989, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5913 provided:
§ 5913. Spouses as witnesses against each other
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, in a criminal proceeding husband and wife shall not be competent or permitted to testify against each other, except that in proceedings for desertion and maintenance, and in any criminal proceeding against either for bodily injury or violence attempted, done or threatened upon the other, or upon the minor children of said husband and wife, or the minor children of either of them, or any minor child in their care or custody, or in the care or custody of either of them, each shall be a competent witness against the other, and except also *343that either of them shall be competent merely to prove the fact of marriage, in support of a criminal charge of bigamy alleged to have been committed by or with the other.
(emphasis added).
Hancharik argues that the competency exception contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5913 permits Mrs. Hancharik to take the stand, but she is not permitted to testify to confidential communications during marriage, by virtue of § 5914. He seemingly relies on dicta contained in a footnote in Commonwealth v. Rough, 275 Pa.Super. 50, 418 A.2d 605 (1980) to conclude that the removal of testimonial incompetency under the “violence” exception to § 5913 does not remove the incompetency barring a spouse from divulging the contents of confidential communications on the witness stand. We reject this contention.
In Commonwealth v. Rough, supra, the defendant-stepfather was convicted of rape and corrupting the morals of a minor. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in permitting the victim’s mother, his wife, to testify concerning a telephone conversation between the two of them. A third person had placed the telephone call, handed the telephone to the defendant, and remained in the vicinity during the phone conversation. Judge Gwilym A. Price, Jr., speaking for the three-judge panel of this court, found that the communication was not confidential inasmuch as the defendant evinced no concern about the presence of a third party and took no precautions against the reception of the contents of the conversation by the third party. 275 Pa.Super. at 64-65, 418 A.2d at 613. Judge Price went on to find that, even if the conversation should not have been admitted, it could not have contributed to the verdict and therefore must be classed as harmless error. Id.
The Rough case, therefore, cannot be viewed as holding that the privilege set forth in § 5914 overrides the exception set forth in § 5913, the judgment of sentence for rape in that case having been affirmed. In addressing the testimonial privilege, the following footnote is set forth in Rough:
*3446. There is no dispute that the absolute prohibition preventing one spouse from testifying against the other during coverture, codified in the Act of May 23, 1887.... [substantially re-enacted as 42 Pa.C.S. § 5913] is inapplicable due to an exception within the statute permitting testimony in proceedings involving violence against the minor child of either. Competency under this exception does not abrogate the general privilege concerning confidential communications made during marriage.
275 Pa.Super. at 64, n. 6, 418 A.2d at 612, n. 6.
We understand the footnote as indicating nothing more than this: when the exception is not applicable, the general privilege continues to be in effect.
The section upon which Hancharik relies, in seeking to exclude his wife’s testimony, § 5914, begins by pronouncing: “Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter ...” Common sense dictates that this is a clear reference to the preceding § 5913 and the following § 5915, dealing with spousal rebuttal testimony. Had the legislature intended to make the general spousal privilege concerning confidential communications overarching, it would have simply foregone the prefatory exceptions in §§ 5913 and 5915.
We find Commonwealth v. Nadolny, 163 Pa.Super. 517, 63 A.2d 129 (1949) to be strikingly similar to the case we now review. In Nadolny, the defendant had raped his sixteen-year old stepdaughter. At trial, the defendant sought to bar the testimony of his wife that the defendant had admitted commission of the offense to her. This admission was clearly a confidential communication between spouses. The trial court overruled the objection and permitted the testimony of the wife. The statute in effect at that time was the predecessor of 42 Pa.C.S. § 4913, namely 19 P.S. § 683.
The Nadolny en banc court properly assumed that the only issue to be decided was whether a consensual rape fit within the term “violence attempted, done or threatened.” The court stated:
*345We have no doubt that the mother of the victim is a competent witness against her husband in a criminal prosecution for statutory rape. If the offense were a common law rape, no question could arise.
163 Pa.Super. at 519, 63 A.2d at 130. (emphasis added). On this appeal, we shall follow Nadolny.
More recently, our court has held that not only is the spouse competent to testify in domestic violence cases, she or he may be compelled to testify. Commonwealth v. Hess, 270 Pa.Super. 501, 411 A.2d 830 (1979), appeal dismissed, 499 Pa. 206, 452 A.2d 1011 (1982).
The purpose of the exception found in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5913 is to protect spouses and minors from domestic violence. This protective policy clearly outweighs the marital harmony policy which underlies the general language found in this section and in § 5914. Packel & Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence, § 601.2, pages 370-71. (West Publ., 1987).
Even more recently, our supreme court has had occasion to construe the language found in § 5913. In Commonwealth v. Scott, 516 Pa. 346, 532 A.2d 426 (1987), the supreme court reversed this court’s attempt to broaden the meaning in § 5913 to include violence to a non-family victim where, in the same criminal episode, a spouse or minor child had also been harmed or threatened, but no criminal proceeding had been brought on that spousal/child attempted violence. The appeal involved the husband’s conviction for taking the life of a non-family member. The supreme court held that the statutory exception does not apply where the criminal proceeding is solely for violence against a victim who is neither the spouse nor within the class of protected minors.
The court stated that, the legislature having spoken on the subject, the exceptions provided could not be supplemented by judicial fiat. 516 Pa. at 351, 532 A.2d at 429. The obverse is equally true. Where the exception is spelled out in clear and unmistakable terms, that language cannot be ignored or disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the statute’s spirit. Id., 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).
*346We conclude that defense counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to object to the wife’s testimony as to confidential communications, since 42 Pa.C.S. § 5913, as in effect at the time, was an express and complete exception to the spousal testimonial privilege on the facts of this case. The result is exactly the same under House Bill 570, now Act No. 16 of 1989, approved June 29, 1989.
Under Section 2 of Act 16, the act shall apply to all criminal cases pending on the effective date of the act which, under Section 3, took effect immediately upon passage. Although Act 16 converts spousal incompetency to testify into a waivable spousal privilege, the Act makes mandatory the testimony of a spouse where the defendant spouse is charged with murder, rape or involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, while continuing the lack of any privilege in matters involving bodily injury or violence to family members or minors. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5913, as now in effect, provides, in pertinent part:
§ 5913. Spouses as witnesses against each other
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, in a criminal proceeding a person shall have the privilege which he or she may waive, not to testify against his or her then lawful spouse except that there shall be no such privilege:
(1) ....
(2) in any criminal proceeding against either for ... violence attempted, done or threatened upon ... any minor child in their care or custody, or in the care or custody of either of them;
(3) ....
(4) in any criminal proceeding in which one of the charges pending against the defendant includes murder, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse or rape, [emphasis added].
The legislature, by enacting the amendments to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5913, has made it abundantly clear that a spousal privilege simply does not exist in criminal proceedings where violence has been done or threatened upon a minor *347child in the care or custody of the spouse/defendant or where the charge against the spouse is involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. Under no analysis, therefore, could it be said that an objection to the testimony of the wife based upon a spousal privilege would have had merit.
We have found no error in the manner in which Judge Cleland handled the wife’s testimony regarding conversations with the marriage counselor and defense trial counsel’s objection thereto. We conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective in his management of character witness testimony and that any objection to the wife’s testimony concerning the communications of the husband/defendant would have been meritless.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
BROSKY, J., files a concurring opinion, in which CIRILLO, President Judge, joins. TAMILIA, J., files a concurring opinion.