concurring. I concur with the results reached by the majority inasmuch as the ballot title, when read in conjunction with the popular name, sufficiently identifies the proposed act and fairly alleges its general purpose. Fletcher v. Bryant, 243 Ark. 864, 422 S.W.2d 698 (1968). However, I remain concerned that the popular name assigned to the amendment does not speak in complete candor.
As noted in Pafford v. Hall, Secretary of State, 217 Ark. 734, 233 S.W.2d 72 (1950), our constitution makes no reference to a popular name; it is merely a legislative device [Ark. Code Ann. § 7-9-110 (1987)] which is evidently useful in making it easy for voters to discuss a measure for the election. Likewise, the requirements for the popular name are not as stringent as those for the ballot title. Arkansas Women’s Political Caucus v. Riviere, 283 Ark. 463, 677 S.W.2d 846 (1984).
It is obvious to me that the popular name designated for this amendment is misleading. Although the popular name speaks in terms of “repealing” certain taxes, the ballot title speaks of “exemptions.” The majority perceives a fundamental legal difference in the terms, however, that difference is not one which will cause the voters to be misled in evaluating this amendment. Perhaps not. However, to a casual reader the thoughts of a repeal of a present tax is always appealing, whereas reference to the fact that exemptions may exist with reference to certain taxes draws little, if any, attention.
I am more troubled that part of the popular name states that the amendment authorizes “a consolidation of procedures for motor vehicle registration” when in fact, the amendment provides for a change of procedures for motor vehicle registration and taxation. In reading the ballot title it becomes clear that the nebulous words “consolidation of procedures for motor vehicle registration,” really means that the proposed amendment will authorize the General Assembly to establish procedures for assessing and collecting ad valorem taxes on motor vehicles at the time of registration of such vehicle, which is a distinct departure from existing law.
In oral argument, the state admitted that the failure to mention a proposed change in taxation procedure in the popular name was an “omission,” but not the type that would cause the voters to pause for reflection. I think that it would.
Were we to judge this case on the strength of the popular name alone, I would say that it is not free from any misleading tendency. The question then arises as to whether or not the flaws in the popular name rise to such a level that they destroy the integrity of the ballot title and the amendment. Since the ballot title fairly explains the purpose of the amendment, I conclude that the proposed amendment is sufficient to be submitted to the public for vote.
I concur.
Newbern, J., joins in this concurrence.