dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The issue presented is whether Gravois Bank (Gravois) and its proposed facility are located in the same “unincorporated community” as required by Sec. 362.107.1 Gravois Bank and the facility site for which it seeks approval are in an unincorporated section of south St. Louis County. The bank, located at Heege and Gravois roads, is in an area known as Aff-ton, while the facility site lies approximately four and one-half miles to the west at 11659-85 Gravois Road in an area generally referred to as Sappington. Crestwood Bank (Crestwood), which challenges this application, is located about one and one-half miles from the proposed facility.
We are confronted with a question of law as to the meaning of the statutory phrase “unincorporated community” found in Section 362.107 which prohibits branch banking, except it allows facilities as adjuncts of the main banking house. That Section provides that no bank may maintain “[m]ore than two such facilities ...,”§ 362.107.2(1), which may not be established “outside the limits of the [1] city, [2] town, [3] village or [4] unincorporated community in which its banking house is located.” (Emphasis added) Subsection 362.107.2(2).2 That subsection 2(2) contains a further geographical limitation preventing location of a facility “outside the county in which the bank ... is located, even if the limits of such [1] city, [2] town, [3] village or [4] unincorporated community extend across county lines... ”. (Emphasis added) Section 362.107.2(3) provides an additional geographic limitation restricting the establishment of a facility in that it may not be located (other than *515named exceptions) within 400 feet of an existing competitor bank. Notwithstanding this closely drawn statute evincing the clear legislative intent to prevent branch banking, the Board, in a thinly veiled move to destroy the restrictions against branch banking, erroneously interpreted (an error now compounded by the majority), the words “unincorporated community” of § 362.107.2(2) to mean “banking community.” It then found the proposed facility site was within the “banking community” where the main Gravois Bank was located. This misinterpretation of that statutory phrase appears in the following findings of fact and conclusions of the Board:
“ ... Findings of Fact .. .
“(d) Gravois Bank was chartered in 1913. Of its nine initial directors, four came from the Sappington area. From and after the time of incorporation, Gra-vois Bank was the only bank located on Gravois Road between Grand Avenue in the City of St. Louis and the City of Fenton, located south of the Meramec River. From the time of its organization, many of the farming families and merchants in the area along Gravois Road in St. Louis County patronized the bank. The evidence presented to the Board shows that substantial numbers of persons in the unincorporated areas of Aff-ton and Sappington along Gravois Road maintain deposit and loan accounts at the Gravois Bank. These accounts are substantially greater in dollar amount than accounts maintained with Gravois Bank by residents of the Lemay area which is geographically much closer to Gravois Bank and its existing facility. The banking habits of the residents of the Affton and Sappington areas suggest the existence of a community for banking purposes. ...
“(h) The Bank of Crestwood was incorporated in 1958. For over forty years prior to the incorporation of that bank, the Gravois Bank had served the Gravois Road community of people including both the Affton and Sappington areas. The relative proximity of the two locations and the substantial number of accounts representing people who have relied upon the Gravois Bank for banking services in the Sappington area lead the Board to believe that an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of the term ‘community’ would render a disservice to the people who have been served by the Gravois Bank. Since the only issue before the Banking Board, by stipulation, is the interpretation of the term ‘community,’ it is clear that an interpretation which allows the Gravois Bank to continue to serve its customers in the Sappington area will contribute to the convenience and needs of the community which Gravois Bank has served and will continue to serve.
“CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“1. The judicial precedents to which the Board has been referred by counsel indicate that the legal concept of ‘community’ is a broad and flexible one and one which changes shape depending upon the purposes for which the term is applied.
“2. The law under which the Commissioner of Finance approved the facility for Gravois Bank, Section 362.107, was designed to increase the convenience of banking services to the general public. It is the duty of the Banking Board to implement this statutory policy in its decisions.
“3. The residents and businesses along Gravois Road surrounding the main banking house of the Gravois Bank and the proposed facility site of the Gravois Bank share a sufficient community of interests to constitute that area a single unincorporated community within the meaning of Section 362.107.... ” (Emphasis supplied).3
Examining the statutory term “unincorporated community,” I find no Missouri cases construing that phrase, and decisions of other jurisdictions stem from different *516statutory schemes.4 However, for reasons now discussed, I believe the statutory limitations prohibiting placement of a facility outside the [1] city, [2] town, [3] village or [4] unincorporated community in which the main banking house is located, are locational limitations denoting geographic boundaries. The legislature has absolutely restricted placement of a facility to an area [1] within the bounds of the county, and, further [2] within the bounds of a municipal subdivision (city, town, village) or if in an unincorporated portion of the county, then within a community having an identifiable area whose community characteristics resemble those of a municipality.
The entities, [1] city, [2] town, [3] village or [4] unincorporated community, approved by the legislature as locations for a facility fall in the same category, i. e., municipalities, incorporated or otherwise, with characteristics common to such bodies. Ignoring this obvious legislative pattern, the board erroneously isolated the fourth named entity and, cutting it from its place in the statute’s sentence artificially assigned to it a meaning foreign to the sentence of which it is a part. The board and now the majority have in effect substituted the word “banking community” for the words “unincorporated community”. In its effort to justify this statutory surgery, the majority pays lip service to the doctrine of pari mate-ria, but then does violence to that tenet by blandly ignoring the remaining portion of the sentence from which the phrase is plucked. The majority refuses to read the four serially arranged limitations on branch banking of Section 362.107.2(2), in “pari materia”. If the term “banking community” were intended, the legislature would have used the term instead of “unincorporated community”. The legislature, of course, did not so do realizing that if “banking community” was to be the standard, the boundaries could be as far flung as the area in which any of the bank’s customers could be found in the county. In addition, that fourth type community appearing seriatim with the three first named is clearly intended to complement and round out the series of which it is a part. The familiar rule of construction ejusdem generis (of the same kind, class or nature), ignored by the majority, is helpful here. It suggests that in a statute enumerating particular classes followed by general terms. The general terms will be considered applicable only to things of the same general character as those specified. See, State v. Lancaster, 506 S.W.2d 403 (Mo.1974). Hence, general words following enumerated words of specific meaning are not to be construed in the loosest possible sense nor by selecting a meaning outside or foreign to the series of which the term is a part, but instead in a manner consistent to the class of which it is a part. See, Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition. While the rule is not an absolute, it provides an aid to construction and in this instance, the statute as a whole supports the doctrine’s application.
In sum, subsection 362.107.2(2) restricts the geographical area in which facilities may be located, to four types of entities in the general category of “municipalities”, with a purpose of limiting boundaries geographically of such “municipalities”. The existence and boundaries of such municipalities are quite unrelated to banking custom, *517notwithstanding the majority’s arbitrary lifting of the term from context. The statute should not be so judicially amended. Banking patterns are not the basis for the identification of existence or geographic limits of a city, town, village or unincorporated community. In sum, I submit the legislature intended that a banking facility could be placed only in the municipality where the parent bank was located and such “municipality” necessarily includes the fourth named entity set forth in the statute’s sentence. That the term unincorporated community must be viewed in the same manner, and to qualify as a facility site the location must be in an established community with traditional municipal characteristics (except formal incorporation), having geographically identifiable limits. Obviously such an entity will not have the same precision of boundaries found in a city, town or village, but as noted above, those limits are determined by geographical considerations which mark the unincorporated area as a community similar to a city, town or village, not banking patterns. See, Petition to Incorporate the City of Duquesne, 322 S.W.2d 857 (Mo.1959), and State ex rel. City of Perryville v. Pickle, 564 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. banc 1978), for general guidelines as to what constitutes a city, town or village.
The statutory theme presents a ban on branch banking with narrowly drawn exceptions created to allow banking service for persons coming by automobile. The General Assembly recognized that the physical location of established banking houses in many communities prevented development of an automobile facility attached or adjacent to the main banking house. See, Laws, 1959, H.B. 568, Sec. 1, Purpose of the Act. Clearly the legislative intent was to limit the creation of such facilities and to restrict them to an area closely proximate to the bank. The original act imposed both the restriction of city, town, village or unincorporated community and a 1,000 yard limit. Laws 1959, H.B. 568, Sec. 2. The distance restriction was increased to 4,000 yards and eventually eliminated. Laws 1971-72, S.B. 146, p. 349, H.B. 1062, p. 973. By removing the “distance” limitation but continuing the “municipality” restriction, the legislature considered the latter sufficiently territorially restrictive to obviate the perceived dangers of branch banking.
Finally, the positioning of the phrase unincorporated community in subsection 2 of the statute (§ 367.107.2(2) rather than subsection 3) is significant to this analysis. It is located with other absolute geographic prohibitions of subsection 2, not in the discretionary review sections of subsection 3, and before an application for a facility can be approved, it must first meet the geographic requirements of subsection 2. Only after it has passed muster as to the geographic limitations requirement may the board consider the qualities of the application under the terms of subsection 3. Without question the testing as to the geographic limitations under subsection 2 do not require application of the board’s banking expertise. In contrast, subsection 3, coming into play after the application is found to qualify under subsection 2, does call for consideration of banking principals. That subsection provides that the director of finance (on appeal the Board) shall determine the convenience needs and welfare of the people of the “community and area" served. But even there the General Assembly indicates that the community served was different than the area served which reinforces my analysis that subsection 2 refers to communities, municipal in character, while subsection 3 refers to banking areas.5 In addition, the Board’s interpretation, adopted now by the majority, virtually removes the limitations on facility location by a bank such as Gravois whose main house lies in an unincorporated area, but the restrictions remain on a nearby bank such as Crestwood which happens to be located in a *518city (town or village). I do not believe the statutory scheme envisioned such disparity of treatment based solely upon the physical location of the main bank. If we are to remake the statute in the manner suggested by the majority, we should be consistent and construe the language of the sentence to read:
No bank or trust company may maintain or operate a facility outside the limits of a [banking] city, [banking] town or [banking] village or unincorporated [banking] community in which its banking house is located, nor outside the county in which the bank or trust company’s banking house is located, even if the limits of such [banking] city, [banking] town, [banking] village or unincorporated [banking] community extend across county lines.
For these reasons I would hold that the Board erred in its determination that the phrase “unincorporated community” means “banking community” rather than a geographical entity bearing the characteristics of a city, town or village.
Had the decision required the exercise of broad discretion, the proper course would be to remand for further proceedings, § 536.-140.5; however, when as here the agency action involves only misapplication of the law to the facts, the posture of the case is such that we may weigh the evidence and determine the facts accordingly. In so doing this Court should give due weight to the opportunity of the agency to observe the witnesses and in so far as appropriate, to the agency’s expertise and experience. Sec. 536.140.3; Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Commission, 560 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. banc 1977), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 803, 99 S.Ct. 57, 58 L.Ed.2d 95 (1978).
If the main banking house and the facility are not located in the same unincorporated community, then no authority to operate the facility may issue regardless of the needs, convenience and welfare of the public or the advantages or disadvantages to the bank or its competitors. The evidence in this case was predominantly documentary and largely uncontradicted. It is the conclusion to be drawn from those facts which is disputed, involving only a determination of the limits of an unincorporated community, which as noted above does not call for an exercise of the board’s banking expertise. Therefore, it is appropriate to now determine whether the bank and proposed facility are in the same “unincorporated community.”
A review of the evidence reveals that Affton and Sappington evolved from separate large holdings of land by the Mackenzie and Sappington families. The Mackenzie holdings were in the Affton area— Mackenzie and Gravois Roads — ; the Sap-pington holdings in the Sappington area— Sappington and Gravois Roads. These holdings eventually devolved into truck gardens, and finally into residential development. The area around Gravois — Mackenzie became known as Aff’s Town (later Affton) after a merchant who maintained a post office there. Several miles to the west the area around Sappington — Gravois became known as Sappington and included a post office in Wohlschlaeger’s Store. Each had a small commercial area. In the 1930’s, Affton became incorporated and shortly thereafter disincorporated. The incorporated limits on the east began at the city limits of St. Louis, and extended west to slightly west of Mackenzie and were located both north and south of Gravois Road. They did not reach even to Gravois Creek. Gravois Creek and its flood plain constitute a natural and traditional barrier between the Aff-ton area and the Sappington area. This barrier is reinforced by the Missouri Pacific railroad tracks and Grant Road which parallel the creek. Immediately to the west of those barriers lie Grant’s Farm abutting Gravois Road to the north and B & B horse farm abutting Gravois Road to the south. To the east of the Gravois Creek and abutting Gravois Road on the south is a large cemetery — Sunset Burial Park. To the south of B & B Farms across Tesson Ferry Road lies Greenpark Park. The effect of these various large tracts of established, largely undeveloped land holdings is to create an additional barrier between the two areas nearly four miles in width and be*519tween ¼ mile to 1 mile in depth. From Gravois Road, south to Tesson Ferry Road, a distance of a little less than a mile, and from Gravois Road north to Pardee, a distance of slightly over a mile there are no streets or roads connecting the areas east of Gravois Creek with those west of the creek. For a distance of approximately five miles from 1-55 to the south to Watson on the north, no residential streets connect the two areas. An incorporated community— Grantwood Park — lies between the two areas north of Gravois, and the incorporated community of Lakeshire lies between the two areas south of Sunset Burial Park.
There is a branch post office located in Grasso Plaza, east of Gravois Creek at Rock Hill Road and Gravois Road, called the Aff-ton Branch Post Office. There is a post office branch west of Gravois Creek on Gra-vois Road across from the proposed facility called the Sappington Branch Post Office. Affton and Sappington are each delineated by the Census Bureau as “designated places” for census purposes. Designated places are unincorporated areas from which information is collected as it is from incorporated entities. Since the 1940 census the Bureau of the Census has defined boundaries for places that have no legal limits. Originally these were called “unincorporated places” but for the 1980 Census are called “Census designated places.” The criteria for determining such places, while not binding on this court, are instructive in determining what an unincorporated community is. Those general criteria are as follows:
“Generally, a proposed census designated place should be a densely settled population center which does not have legally defined municipal boundaries or corporate powers. It should contain a dense, city-type street pattern and ideally should have an overall population density of at least 1000 persons per square mile. It is recognized, however, that this population density cannot always be maintained because the selection of visible boundaries may require the inclusion of ‘rural’ area within the C.D.P.
“In addition, a C.D.P. should be a community that can be identified locally by its own place name, and which has developed over the years from a small commercial area or market center, rather than being a subdivision, apartment development, or general urban expansion area.”
The best three physical features for determining the boundaries of a census designated place are: (1) street features, (2) water bodies including streams, and (3) railroad tracks. As mentioned, both Affton and Sappington are treated as census designated places by the Census Bureau. Additionally, Concord Village, lying between the two is also a census designated place.
Both the Affton and Sappington areas contain a large number of commercial establishments of the types found in most cities, towns, or villages. These establishments provide the types of goods and services required on any everyday basis by residents of the area, such as hardware, drugs, food, beauty and barber care, etc. These goods and services are fully provided in both areas. Many of the commercial establishments in Affton use the name “Affton” as part of their business name. Many Sap-pington establishments use “Sappington” in their name. No business in the Affton area uses Sappington, and vice versa. Both Aff-ton and Sappington are listed as separate places in the telephone directory under the listings for emergency services and for payment of utility bills. A telephone poll of a representative sample of persons living within the two census designated places reflected that the vast majority of residents of the Affton area stated they lived in Affton. A lesser but still substantial number of residents in the Sappington area identified their residence as Sappington. An insignificant number (1) of the people polled who lived in the Affton area stated they lived in Sappington. A similar insignificant number (1) of Sappington residents identified Affton as their residence.
In its application for the facility, Gravois described the location as “Sappington (unincorporated)” in the space delineated for “city or town.” In its consolidated report *520of condition on July 23,1975, Gravois identified itself as “of Affton, Missouri.” In January 1974, the Division of Finance of Missouri certified an increase of capital stock of “Gravois Bank, Affton, Missouri.”
While no one of the matters set forth above would necessarily determine the question before us, the cumulative effect is overwhelming that Affton and Sappington are not the same “unincorporated community” within the meaning of the statute. There is not an identifiable community which includes both areas. The physical barriers between them, the absence of a network of residential streets connecting them, the absence of contiguous residential or commercial development, the historical growth and development as two separate areas, the identification by residents, businesses, and government as two separate communities, and Gravois’ own recognition of two places identified by different names establishes them as two separate unincorporated communities. The evidence is less definite on the limits of Sappington or the area it covers, probably because its residential development has been more recent. Affton is a more established area and its limits more clearly defined. I would find those western limits do not reach beyond Gravois Creek. The proposed facility is not within those limits.
I have not overlooked the evidence of the social and economic similarity of the two areas. Such similarity is common throughout incorporated and unincorporated areas of St. Louis County and probably of most counties. Nor have I placed any reliance upon the various political, school, fire, police, and church boundaries which in some cases include both areas and in others do not. I agree in that respect with the Board’s finding that “[t]his evidence leads the Board to conclude that each of such boundaries was drawn for reasons related to the purpose or objective of the political or social entity encompassed therein.” I also reject Gravois’ contention that all of southern St. Louis County is a single unincorporated community. The evidence does not establish that to be true nor would such a finding comport with the statute as I interpret it. While the area is heavily populated and contains much commercial and industrial development, the record reflects that the unincorporated portions of south St. Louis County have retained their own place and name identification. That the area could legally be incorporated as a city does not mean that it is to be treated as one for purposes of the statute.6
Gravois asserts that the finding I make here would cast doubts upon the propriety of facility authorizations previously made by the Board. However, I deal only with the case before us, and this Court is not bound by prior erroneous interpretations of law by the Board, if such interpretations have in fact heretofore been made.
Judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to remand to the State Banking Board for denial of the certificate of authority to Gravois Bank for the establishment of a banking facility at 11659-85 Gra-vois Road.
. All statutory references are to RSMo 1978. Although these proceedings began in 1977, the relevant statutory provisions have not been changed since the date of the hearing.
. Section 367.107.2(2) provides no bank or trust company may maintain or operate “a facility outside the limits of the city, town or village or unincorporated community in which its banking house is located nor outside the county in which the bank or trust company’s banking house is located, even if the limits of such city, town, village or unincorporated community extend across county lines, except as otherwise provided by law; ...” (Emphasis added).
. At the meeting in which the Board delivered its decision, each member of the Board gave his reasons for his decision. These oral expressions reinforce the conclusion that “banking community” was the standard utilized by the Board.
. Respondents rely particularly upon Upper Darby National Bank v. Myers, 386 Pa. 12, 124 A.2d 116 (1956). There the words “other community” were not used in a restrictive sense but within the framework of need for banking services. That case is similar to the decision in Central Bank of Clayton v. State Banking Board of Missouri, 509 S.W.2d 175 (Mo.App.1974), which interpreted the “community and area” convenience and need standard under Subsection 3 of § 362.107. While the tests of Subsection 3 require a discretionary determination based upon banking considerations, the restrictions of Subsection 2 of § 362.107 control in the case sub judice and are absolute, not subject to discretion on the basis of banking need and convenience or similar banking institution considerations. Citizens National Bank v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 372, 200 S.E.2d 535 (1973), also cited, is similar to Upper Darby, supra. More nearly in point is Union Savings Bank of Patchogue v. Saxon, 335 F.2d 718 (D.C.Cir.1964), holding that a restriction limiting branch banks to a city or village, including an “unincorporated village,” was not met by an area having the requisite territory and population to be incorporated as a village but lacking the characteristics of a village.
. It is also interesting that Section 362.108 applicable to second, third and fourth class counties utilizes the phrase “incorporated or unincorporated town” and places a population limit on the size “town” in which a facility can be located a usage indicating that there too the unincorporated entity is equated as nearly as possible with an incorporated entity.
. The record reflects that a movement to incorporate much of south St. Louis County and parts of northern Jefferson County into the City of Meramec died for lack of support.