Subject to certain exceptions, Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.08 prohibits an attorney from representing a party in an adjudicatory proceeding if the attorney knows or believes that he or she may be a witness at trial. Tex.Disciplinary R.PROF.Conduct 3.08 (1994), reprinted in Tex.Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. (Vernon Supp.1996). Relying solely on this rule, respondent persuaded the court of appeals to reverse the trial court’s judgment for petitioner because the lawyer who represented petitioner during pretrial proceedings later testified as an expert and fact witness for petitioner at trial. 883 S.W.2d 784. Although the court of appeals disqualified the testifying attorney from representing petitioner on remand, it did not specifically hold that the attorney could not testify, nor did it consider whether the other members of the attorney’s firm were disqualified. Only petitioner applied to this Court for writ of error. Apparently relying on the Court’s earlier pronouncements, both petitioner and respondent advance Rule 3.08 as the controlling standard for disqualification. Under this procedural posture, we hold that the testifying attorney appeared at trial solely as a witness, and thus did not violate Rule 3.08. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause to that court to consider respondent’s remaining points of error.
I
Petitioner Anderson Producing Company obtained a $120,000 judgment against John R. Watson and related entities (collectively ‘Watson”) in August 1990 in an action arising from a mineral lease dispute. In an effort to collect that judgment, Anderson filed the present garnishment action against Koch Oil Company in November 1990. Based on its investigations, Anderson believed that Koch *419was the principal purchaser of oil from leases operated by Watson, and therefore was indebted to him. K. Ray Campbell, an attorney with the Houston firm of Campbell, Zu-kowski & Bresenhan, represented Anderson in both the original action against Watson and the garnishment action against Koch.
Answering the writ of garnishment, Koch admitted a debt to Watson of $3967, which it paid to the registry of the court. Anderson claims, however, that Koch owed considerably more and conspired with Watson to avoid further payment. Specifically, Anderson contends that Watson executed sham transfers of his lease interests to entities under his control that were not liable on the Anderson judgment, and that Koch acquiesced in the fraudulent transfers by paying purchase proceeds to the sham transferees rather than to the court pursuant to the writ of garnishment.
Anderson claims that it learned of Koch’s wrongdoing when Campbell took the deposition of Carla Rice, a Koch representative, in April 1991. Anderson amended its pleadings a month later to allege fraud and conspiracy against Koch, Watson, and Watson’s transferees. At that point, according to Anderson, Campbell realized that he would be a necessary witness at trial because of his personal knowledge of Koch’s actions regarding the writ of garnishment. Campbell did not personally represent Anderson at any subsequent court hearings or depositions, although he spoke once at a pretrial hearing in June 1991 in response to a question from the court regarding the location of Uhland, Texas. Campbell did, however, continue to participate in settlement negotiations, assist his partner, John Zukowski, with trial preparation, and sign pleadings. Campbell signed all the pleadings until Koch filed its motion to disqualify, discussed below, at which point Zukowski began signing the pleadings. This comports with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 57, which merely requires that pleadings “be signed by at least one attorney of record.” All pleadings filed by Anderson that are in-eluded in the appellate record show both Campbell and Zukowski as attorneys of record.
In November 1992, three weeks before trial, Anderson identified Campbell as one of its expert witnesses in timely responses to the defendants’ discovery requests.1 A short time later Koch moved to disqualify Campbell and his law firm from representing Anderson, citing Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.08. Koch alternatively requested that Campbell be prohibited from testifying at trial on any matter other than attorneys’ fees. Anderson responded that Campbell would serve only as a witness at trial, not as Anderson’s attorney. After a hearing, the trial court denied Koch’s motion to disqualify Campbell and his law firm.
Anderson’s fraud and conspiracy claims were tried to a jury in December 1992, with Zukowski acting as Anderson’s advocate at trial and Campbell appearing as its principal witness. Although Campbell testified about the factual background surrounding the writ of garnishment, the bulk of his testimony was expert in nature, explaining the numerous assignments, transfer orders, and division orders executed by and between Watson, his transferees, and Koch that had been obtained during discovery. Based on these documents and his knowledge of industry practices, Campbell concluded that Koch had accommodated Watson’s efforts to avoid paying the Anderson judgment. Campbell ultimately testified that Koch showed Watson “a way to beat the system” by assigning his producing oil and gas properties to different entities.
Although Campbell did not act as Anderson’s lawyer during trial, he sat at counsel table except during his testimony. Moreover, he spoke once in brief response to a question posed by Koch’s attorney regarding documents, though he did so outside the presence of the jury.
The jury returned a verdict for Anderson, finding that Koch and Watson’s transferees committed fraud and engaged in a conspiracy *420to commit fraud.2 The jury assessed $164,-860 in actual damages for the fraud, and separately assessed $200,000 in actual damages for the conspiracy. It also found that Koch wrongfully paid garnished funds, concluding that this conduct proximately caused $100,000 in actual damages. The jury also awarded punitive damages of $100,000 and additional attorneys’ fees.3
After considering the parties’ post-verdict motions, the trial court rendered judgment against Koch for $153,722 in actual damages, $100,000 in punitive damages, and $119,198 in attorneys’ fees. Only Koch appealed to the court of appeals. Although it raised points there challenging the exemplary damages and attorneys fees, which that court did not reach, neither party challenges the amount of damages in this Court.
The court of appeals held that Campbell violated Rule 3.08 and that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to disqualify him. It did not consider, however, whether Campbell’s firm should have been disqualified. Focusing only on the importance of Campbell’s testimony, rather than the extent and effect of Campbell’s advocacy at trial, the court concluded that the trial court’s abuse of discretion likely caused the rendition of an improper judgment. After further concluding that legally sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict, precluding rendition of judgment in Koch’s favor, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment based on Rule 3.08 and remanded the cause for a new trial. While the court disqualified Campbell from representing Anderson in the proceedings on remand, it is not clear whether it intended to prohibit him from testifying as a witness.
II
The pre-1994 version of Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.08, which governs Campbell’s conduct at the 1992 trial of this cause, provides as follows:
Lawyer as Witness
(a) A lawyer shall not accept or continue employment in a contemplated or pending adjudicatory proceeding if the lawyer knows or believes that the lawyer is or may be a witness necessary to establish an essential fact on behalf of the lawyer’s client, unless:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the testimony;
(3) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case;
(4) the lawyer is a party to the action and is appearing pro se; or-
(5) the lawyer has promptly notified opposing counsel that the lawyer expects to testify in the matter and disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.
(b) A lawyer shall not continue as an advocate in a pending adjudicatory proceeding if the lawyer believes that the lawyer will be compelled to furnish testimony that will be substantially adverse to the lawyer’s client, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
(c) Without the client’s informed consent, a lawyer may not act as advocate in an adjudicatory proceeding in which another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is prohibited by paragraphs (a) or (b) from serving as advocate. If the lawyer to be called as a witness could not also serve as an advocate under this Rule, that lawyer shall not take an active role before the tribunal in the presentation of the matter.
*421Tex.Disciplinary R.Prof.Conduct 3.08 (1989), reprinted in 777-778 S.W.2d (Texas Cases) XCIII-XCIV (1989). In 1994, Rule 3.08(a) was amended to prohibit “employment as an advocate before a tribunal in a contemplated or pending adjudicatory proceeding” Tex.Diseiplinary R.Prof.Conduct 3.08(a) (1994), reprinted in 881 S.W.2d (Texas Cases) XXXVII (1994) (emphasis added). The remainder of Rule 3.08, and the accompanying comments, which are discussed below, were not changed.4
The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct “establish the ‘minimum standards of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.’ ” Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex.1990) (quoting Tex.Disciplinary R.PROf.Conduct preamble ¶ 7 (1989)). Although Rule 3.08 was promulgated as a disciplinary standard, rather than a procedural disqualification standard, see TexDisciplinaRy R.PROF.Conduct 3.08 cmt. 9 (1989), we have recognized that “the rule articulates considerations relevant to a procedural disqualification determination.” Ayres v. Canales, 790 S.W.2d 554, 556 n. 2 (Tex.1990). We applied Rule 3.08 as the standard for disqualification in Ayres, noting as follows:
Indeed, it would be injudicious for this court to employ a rule of disqualification that could not be reconciled with the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, we will refer to the rule for guidance in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in [granting the motion to disqualify].
Id. at 557 n. 2. In Spears, we again recognized that while the disciplinary rules do not necessarily set forth controlling standards for motions to disqualify, they provide relevant guidelines for such motions. Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 656. As in Ayres, we applied the disciplinary rules to the disqualification dispute before the Court, noting that “[t]he parties have not offered any countervailing considerations as to why the disciplinary rules should not be ... employed in this proceeding.” Id.; see also Mauze v. Curry, 861 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex.1993) (applying Rule 3.08 to motion to disqualify testifying counsel).5
Similarly in this ease, all parties rely on Rule 3.08 as the controlling standard for Koch’s motion to disqualify, and the court of appeals likewise based its decision on that rule. We disagree with Justice Owen that Koch proposed an alternative standard in the lower courts by citing Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied). The attorney in Warri-low testified as both a fact and an expert witness on behalf of his client, while also actively participating as an advocate at trial by questioning witnesses, addressing the court, and arguing to the jury. The appellate court properly held that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to disqualify the attorney based on this dual role, expressly basing its decision on Disciplinary Rules 5-101(B) and 5-102(A), the forerunners of current Rule 3.08. See 791 S.W.2d at 520 (‘We find that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to disqualify attorney King, as mandated by DR 5-102(A).”). While the court discussed underlying policy considerations, including the confusion to the jury from an attorney testifying as a material witness and then vouching for his own credibility during final argument, see 791 S.W.2d at 522, the court did not depart from the Disciplinary Rules as its standard for decision.
Koch argues in this Court that Campbell improperly portrayed himself as an advocate during his testimony by revealing that he had represented Anderson during pretrial *422matters, that he was the partner of Anderson’s trial attorney, and that he had assisted in preparing the case for trial. By making this argument, however, Koch does not call for a departure from Rule 3.08, but rather contends that Campbell in effect acted as an advocate within the meaning of Rule 3.08, thus requiring its application. Notably, Koch’s two reply points in this Court addressing the disqualification issue both expressly refer to Rule 3.08.6
Koch likewise relied solely on Rule 3.08 in the court of appeals. The subheading addressing this issue in Koch’s brief to the court of appeals provides: “The Testimony of Mr. K. Ray Campbell, Attorney For Anderson, As Both A Fact And Expert Witness Violated Disciplinary Rule 3.08.” In its argument under this subheading, Koch first quoted Rule 3.08, then argued that none of the rule’s exceptions applied, and finally concluded that “[t]he foregoing demonstrates that Mr. Campbell’s testimony violated the standards of Rule 3.08.” We thus reject the dissent’s contention that Koch has advocated some alternative standard.
Although Rule 3.08 was not promulgated as the controlling standard for disqualification proceedings, we have recognized that it articulates relevant considerations for such proceedings. While we do not exclude the possibility that we would apply a different standard under other appropriate circumstances,7 we decline to do so here when it has not been urged by the parties, either in this Court or below. Accordingly, we will analyze the present ease under the dictates of Rule 3.08.
Ill
A
Anderson argues that Rule 3.08 does not prohibit Campbell’s conduct because he did not represent Anderson in an “adjudicatory proceeding” within the meaning of the rule. Anderson contends that Rule 3.08 only prohibits a testifying attorney from acting as an advocate before a tribunal, not from engaging in pretrial, out-of-court matters such as preparing and signing pleadings, planning trial strategy, and pursuing settlement negotiations. We agree.
Rule 3.08 is grounded principally on the belief that the finder of fact may become confused when one person acts as both advocate and witness. See Tex.Disciplinary R.Prof.Conduct 3.08 cmt. 4 (1989); Ayres, 790 S.W.2d at 557 n. 4. “A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.” Tex.Disciplinary R.Prof.Conduct 3.08 cmt. 4 (1989). The rule reflects the concern that an opposing party may be handicapped in challenging the credibility of a testifying attorney. See Ayres, 790 S.W.2d at 557 n. 4 (citing Brown & Brown, Disqualification of the Testifying Advocate — A Firm Rule?, 57 N.C.L.Rev. 597, 608-09 (1979)). These rationales simply do not apply when the testifying lawyer is merely performing out-of-court functions, such as drafting pleadings or assisting with pretrial strategy. As Comment 8 provides:
This rule does not prohibit the lawyer who may or will be a witness from participating in the preparation of a matter for presentation to a tribunal. To minimize the possibility of unfair prejudice to an opposing party, however, the Rule prohibits any testifying lawyer who could not serve as an advocate from taking an active role before the tribunal in the presentation of the matter.
Tex.Disciplinary R.PROf.Conduct 3.08 cmt. 8 (1989). Thus, Campbell did not violate Rule 3.08 by continuing to draft pleadings, *423engaging in settlement negotiations, or assisting with trial strategy after learning that he would probably be called as a witness at trial for Anderson.
As noted, Rule 3.08 was amended in 1994 to expressly apply only to “employment as an advocate before a tribunal in a contemplated or pending adjudicatory proceeding” (emphasis added). Based on our discussion above, it is clear that this amendment served not to alter the substantive scope of the rule, but rather to clarify the interpretation properly inferred from the existing comments and rationale underlying the rule.
B
Koch also argues that Campbell violated Rule 3.08 by sitting at counsel table when he was not testifying. As stated, Rule 3.08 is based on the rationale that a jury may misinterpret testimony given by an advocate for one of the parties. Koch apparently contends that the jury could have perceived Campbell as an advocate merely from Campbell’s presence at the counsel table with Zu-kowski. Anderson responds that Campbell was not sitting at counsel table as an attorney, but as Anderson’s principal trial witness.
We do not decide whether Campbell violated Rule 3.08 merely by sitting at counsel table, because Koch waived this complaint by failing to object at trial. We disagree with Justice Owen’s contention that Koch was relieved from its obligation to object because the trial court had overruled its pretrial motion to disqualify Campbell. As noted earlier, Anderson responded to Koch’s pretrial disqualification motion by representing to the trial court that Campbell would not act as trial counsel. If Koch believed that Campbell was violating that representation merely by sitting at counsel table, it should have objected. Moreover, Koch made no effort to exclude Campbell from the courtroom by placing him under the Rule. Anderson does not make the argument advanced by Justice Owen, that Campbell, as an attorney of record, was exempt from the Rule. Rather, Anderson’s counsel stated at oral argument that Campbell sat at counsel table because he was Anderson’s “main witness,” and that “[h]e was there to in fact keep me informed in regard to the paperwork, things of that nature.” Anderson has never advocated whether it believes Campbell would have been exempt from the Rule had it been invoked by Koch. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 267; Tex. R.Civ.Evid. 614. On this record, Koch cannot now complain that it was prejudiced by Campbell’s presence at counsel table.
C
Koch further complains that Campbell identified himself as Anderson’s attorney while he was testifying. On direct examination, Campbell acknowledged that he had represented Anderson in the underlying action against Watson and that he filed the garnishment action against Koch. Justice Owen relies heavily on this point, highlighting portions of Campbell’s testimony and contending that he acted as an “advocate” from the witness stand.
There is no dispute that Campbell was Anderson’s principal witness, and that it was through his testimony that Koch’s alleged wrongdoing was presented to the jury. This is not surprising, as Campbell had more intimate knowledge of the facts and was more familiar than anyone else with the documents relied on by Anderson. But Campbell did not take an active part in the trial proceedings except as a witness, and his occupation as an attorney did not ipso facto transform him into Anderson’s trial counsel.
Further, it was necessary for Campbell to reveal to the jury that he had acted as Anderson’s attorney to establish the predicate for his testimony. He clarified his role on cross-examination, however. When asked by defendant’s counsel whether he was appearing as an expert witness or as legal counsel for Anderson, Campbell responded that he was “testifying as expert witness for Mr. Anderson in this case- I’m a lawyer, but I’m not the lawyer in this case trying this lawsuit. I’m the expert witness in this case.” Because Rule 3.08 does not prohibit testifying attorneys from assisting in pretrial matters, Campbell did not violate Rule 3.08 under these facts by testifying that he had previously acted as Anderson’s counsel in the garnishment action.
*424D
Koch also argues that Anderson did not promptly notify Koch after Campbell learned that he would likely be a witness at trial. Campbell reached this conclusion by May 1991, and yet Anderson did not inform Koch until shortly before trial in November 1992, when it responded to discovery requests propounded by Koch’s co-defendants.
It is undisputed, however, that Anderson’s discovery answers were timely and that defendants did not propound earlier discovery seeking the identity of witnesses. If Campbell’s conduct had violated the general prohibition of Rule 3.08, then his failure to notify Koch sooner would probably prevent him from qualifying under the hardship exception to the rule, which requires the testifying lawyer to “promptly notif[y] opposing counsel that the lawyer expects to testify in the matter.” Tex.DisciplinaRy R.Prof.Conduct 3.08(a)(5) (1994). As discussed above, however, Rule 3.08 does not prohibit Campbell’s conduct. Moreover, the trial court afforded Koch an opportunity to depose Campbell, and Koch does not contend that it suffered prejudice from any late notification.
IV
Koch suggests in its brief to this Court that Campbell’s firm is also disqualified from representing Anderson. The court of appeals did not address this issue, presumably because Koch did not assign it as a separate point of error in that court. Koch only briefly referred to this issue in its court of appeals brief, inserting a single contention at the end of the argument section that “[t]he trial court should have disqualified Mr. Campbell and his law firm from continuing to represent Anderson in the action.” Koch included no argument as to why the firm, as opposed to Campbell personally, should be disqualified.
Even assuming that Koch adequately preserved this issue in the court of appeals, it has not properly raised the argument in this Court. Koch’s only reference to this issue is in its reply brief, where it argues that “[t]he Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court should have disqualified Mr. Campbell and his law firm from continuing to represent Anderson in the action.” This mischaraeteri-zation of the court of appeals’ holding, without more, is not sufficient to preserve error with regard to disqualification of Campbell’s firm.
Moreover, Rule 3.08 does not bar Zukowski’s representation of Anderson at trial. Rule 3.08(c) provides that “[wjithout the client’s informed consent, a lawyer may not act as advocate in an adjudicatory proceeding in which another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is prohibited by paragraphs (a) and (b) from serving as advocate.” (Emphasis added.) Comment 8 confirms that “[e]ven in those situations [in which a testifying lawyer is disqualified], however, another lawyer in the testifying lawyer’s firm may act as an advocate, provided the client’s informed consent is obtained.” These provisions make it clear that, with Anderson’s informed consent, Campbell’s partner was not prohibited from representing Anderson at trial. See Ayres, 790 S.W.2d at 558. Indeed, Koch’s counsel essentially conceded this point at oral argument. When asked whether he could prevent Zukowski from representing Anderson on remand, Koch’s counsel responded, “I don’t believe so, your honor.” Further, Koch lacks standing to challenge the adequacy of consent, which is “a matter to be resolved between lawyer and client or in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding.” Tex.Disciplinary R.PROf.Conduct 3.08 emt. 10 (1989).
V
A
Both dissenting opinions base their arguments for disqualification largely on the fact that Campbell, despite offering expert testimony at trial, was being compensated as an attorney, through his firm, on a contingency basis dependent on Anderson’s success in the litigation. Campbell testified to this fee arrangement at trial, and Anderson’s counsel confirmed it at oral argument. Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.04(b) forbids a lawyer from “pay[ing], offering] to pay, or aequiesc[ing] in the offer or payment of compensation to a witness or other entity contingent upon the content of the testimony *425of the witness or the outcome of the case.” Thus, it certainly could be argued that Campbell and his firm violated this rule by basing Anderson’s case on Campbell’s testimony, where the members of the firm (including Campbell) were being compensated based on Anderson’s success. Koch, however, did not raise this issue in the trial court or on appeal. We decline to articulate a standard for disqualification on unassigned error, and we furthermore express no opinion regarding whether Campbell or his firm violated Rule 3.04(b).
B
Justice Owen views Campbell’s conduct as an ethical breach that, unless condemned by this Court, will reinforce the public’s negative perception of lawyers. Regrettably, we agree that public dissatisfaction with the legal profession and, indeed, with our entire legal system is unacceptably high. See, e.g., 20-20: The Trouble with Lawyers (ABC News television broadcast, Jan. 2, 1996). Nevertheless, we' seriously doubt whether the problem of “lawyers testifying in court” contributes to any measurable extent to our public image. We believe that frequent expense and delay, occasional erratic results, and over-legalization of daily affairs of life are at the root of the popular discontent with the civil justice system. This Court is addressing many of these problems through our regulation of the legal profession, our pending amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, and various ongoing task forces and committees, such as the legislatively mandated Judicial Efficiency Commission. We simply disagree with Justice Owen’s apparent conclusion that disqualifying Campbell and his firm in this case will cure the lack of public confidence in the legal profession.
VI
One final evidentiary issue remains. Campbell testified that Koch showed Watson “a way to beat the system.” Koch argues that the trial court erred in admitting this testimony over Koch’s timely objection, contending that Campbell failed to demonstrate personal knowledge supporting the testimony. See Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 602 (“A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.”). The record reflects that Campbell’s testimor ny was based on his review of the documents executed by Watson, Koch, and the transferees, and that Koch had ample opportunity to cross-examine Campbell regarding the basis of his conclusion. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to strike the testimony.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for consideration of Koch’s remaining points of error.
. This discovery, which was propounded by Koch's co-defendants, inquired only about expert *420witnesses, not potential fact witnesses.
. The claims against Watson were severed prior to trial due to his bankruptcy. Watson's transferees are not parties to this appeal.
. The jury assessed the following attorneys’ fees:
A.Through Trial $1,000,000
B. Appealed to the Court of Appeals $2,000,-000
C. Seeking Writ of Error to the Supreme Court $3,000,000
D. Granting Writ to the Supreme Court $4,000,000
. The Comments to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct were prepared by the Model Rules Committee of the State Bar of Texas and reviewed and amended by this Court in connection with our adoption of the Disciplinary Rules in 1989. Tex.Disciplinary R.Prof.Conduct 3.08 (1989), reprinted in 777-778 S.W.2d (Texas Cases) XCIV-XCVI (1989).
. The dissent incorrectly argues that the Court applied an alternative standard in Mauze. After quoting the text of Rule 3.08, the Court in Mauze held as follows: "The [attorney's testimony] does not come within any of the five exceptions enumerated in Rule 3.08(a). Consequently, the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied Mauze’s motion to disqualify counsel.” 861 S.W.2d at 870.
. These reply points state as follows:
REPLY POINT ONE: THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY APPLIED RULE 3.08 OF THE TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
REPLY POINT TWO: THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT RESPONDENT WAS PREJUDICED BY K. RAY CAMPBELL’S VIOLATION OF RULE 3.08.
. The dissent offers several reasons about why Rule 3.08 should not be the controlling standard, some of which we find intriguing.