This case is a so-called “welfare cheating” case. The defendant was charged with stealing by deceit, as defined and denounced by § 570.030.1. That statute, in pertinent part, provides:
“A person commits the crime of stealing if he appropriates property or services of another with the purpose to deprive him thereof ... by means of deceit or coercion.”
A jury found the defendant guilty, and assessed the defendant’s punishment at “No imprisonment, but a fine, in an amount to be determined by the court.” The trial court then assessed defendant’s punishment at a fine of $5,000, as authorized by § 556.011, RSMo 1978. We reverse and remand.
Some general statement about the case is appropriate. The State’s theory was that the defendant obtained state-administered, federally assisted entitlements, specifically, AFDC and Food Stamps in an amount larger than that she should have received because she represented to the Division of Family Services that no member of her household received any Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
The procedure utilized by our Division of Family Services to establish eligibility for state-administered entitlements requires an affirmative statement that an applicant for AFDC (or other public assistance where income level is an eligibility criterion) does not receive SSI benefits, at least when SSI benefits are required to be counted as part of the household income. Upon evidence tending to indicate that defendant represented she was receiving no SSI benefits at a time when she was eligible for and was receiving SSI benefits from the general government — and thereby received excessive entitlements — the State instituted this prosecution as a theft by deceit. Such procedure was proper even though the representation was made prior to the enactment of § 205.967 in its present form. State v. Malveaux, 604 S.W.2d 728, 734-35[7] (Mo.App.1980); See also Annot., 22 A.L.R. 4th 534, 543-46, § 4 (1983).
With this background in mind, we consider defendant’s contention that the trial court should have sustained her motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State’s case-in-chief because the information did not allege reliance upon the misrepresentation made by the defendant. The State answers this contention by repeating the unquestioned rule that when an *454information alleges all essential facts constituting the offense but fails to set out those facts necessary for the accused’s defense, then the information is subject to a challenge by a bill of particulars but is not fatally defective. State v. Lewis, 642 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Mo. banc 1982). We do not find that precedent controlling in this case, primarily because of the nature of the offense charged.
The information upon which the defendant was tried read as follows:
“Bradshaw Smith, Prosecuting Attorney of the County of Carter, State of Missouri, under his oath of office as such Prosecuting Attorney, charges that the defendant, Edith M. Yoyles in violation of section 570.030, RSMo, committed the class C felony of stealing, punishable upon conviction under Sections 558.011.-1(3) and 566.011, RSMo, in that on or about March 10, 1980, in the County of Carter, State of Missouri, the defendant appropriated public assistance payments and food stamps, of a value of at least one hundred fifty dollars, which said property was in the possession of and operated by Missouri Department of Social Services, and defendant appropriated such property from the Department of Social Services and with the purpose to deprive them thereof by deceit, by misrepresenting that the defendant did not receive SSI benefits when, in fact, defendant had been and was presently receiving SSI benefits.”
The offense of stealing by deceit is a purported innovation of the Criminal Code. So, the narrow inquiry in this case is the extent to which the elements of “stealing by deceit” were changed by the enactment of §§ 570.010 and 570.030. In our opinion, very little. The comment to § 570.030 notes that in 1955, the General Assembly extensively revised the law of larceny, as it did. Laws of Mo.1955, pp. 507-509. The 1955 act contained the following language:
“Section 2. Stealing unlawful. — It shall be unlawful for any person to intentionally steal the property of another, either without his consent or by means of deceit.”
This section appeared in the 1959 revision and subsequently as § 560.156.2. It was replaced by § 570.030 when the Criminal Code of 1979 was enacted. Section 570.030, as far as material here, adds only the words “or coercion” as a method or means of stealing.
Section 570.010(7), RSMo (Supp.1983), defines “deceit” to mean “purposely making a representation which is false and which the actor does not believe to be true and upon which the victim relies, as to a matter of fact, law, value, intention or other state of mind.” The commentary to the original version of § 570.010 ran as follows:
“(7) ‘Deceit.’ Currently, Missouri statutes do not define deceit. Most of the new codes do define it, but often the definition is verbose and complicated. The Code definition is more straightforward. It makes it clear that the actor must purposely make a representation which is false, which he does not believe is true and upon which the victim relies. ”
So, the elements of “deceit” as conceived by the framers of the Criminal Code may be conveniently said to be that an accused 1) purposely, 2) make a representation of fact, law, value, intention or other state of mind; 3) which he does not believe to be true, and 4) upon which the victim relies. (Emphasis added.)
There are several rules which are well established and which control and govern the sufficiency of the information filed in this case. An indictment or information must allege all elements of the crime intended to be charged and if such elements are missing they cannot be supplied by intendment or implication. State v. Gilmore, 650 S.W.2d 627, 629[6] (Mo. banc 1983); State v. Brooks, 507 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Mo.1974); State v. Atterberry, 659 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Mo.App.1983); State v. Charity, 619 S.W.2d 366, 367[2] (Mo.App.1981). Further, if the statute creating the offense uses generic terms in defining the crime, it is necessary that indictments or *455informations thereunder recite the conduct constituting the crime with sufficient particularity as to inform the accused of the specific offense of which he is accused, so as to enable him to prepare his defense or plead his conviction or acquittal as a bar to further prosecution for the same offense. State v. Kesterson, 403 S.W.2d 606, 609[1] (Mo.1966); State v. Fenner, 358 S.W.2d 867, 869-70 (Mo.1962). And, it is clear that to the extent § 570.030 denounces stealing by deceit, it uses generic terms to define the offense. State v. Eckard, 655 S.W.2d 596, 597-98 (Mo.App.1983).
Perhaps this information recites facts sufficient to apprise the defendant of the fundamental particulars of the offense charged against her so as to enable her to prepare her defense, although the defendant made three separate applications, the information does not specify any particular application, and only by inference can we gather that the defendant represented she was not receiving SSI benefits, knowing the representation to be untrue. Nowhere does the information charge reliance by the Department of Social Services on any of the applications in computing and paying out the public assistance the defendant received. This is an essential element of theft by deceit. State v. Kesterson, supra, 403 S.W.2d at 611[3,4]. The information is fatally defective, the motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State’s case-in-chief was timely and accordingly, the cause is reversed and remanded.
However, so the opinion will not be misunderstood, we should point out that because the information was fatally defective, the trial court never had jurisdiction and thus jeopardy did not attach. Schlang v. Heard, 691 F.2d 796, 798[2] (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 951, 103 S.Ct. 2419, 77 L.Ed.2d 1310 (1983). Therefore, on remand, the State should be afforded an opportunity to seek leave to file an amended information or take such other action as the State deems advisable. State v. Cunningham, 380 S.W.2d 401, 403[10] (Mo.1964). It is so ordered.
TITUS, J., concurs. PREWITT, C.J., and CROW, P.J., concur specially. MAUS, J., dissents.