dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion represents yet another attempt to harmonize the recent line of cases which deal with the question of what constitutes a mineral for purposes of reserving or conveying “oil, gas and other minerals.” See Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.1984); Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.1980); Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.1977) (Reed I); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex.1971). This line of cases is irreconcilable and with each attempt to rectify our prior mistakes, we only compound the problem. This time, the majority attempts to correct the mistake at the expense of the Friedmans, who are the legitimate owners of the uranium.
The law should be concerned about the rights of the Friedmans as well as those of Texaco. When the Friedmans conveyed the surface estate in 1959, Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949), governed the question of what constitutes a mineral. In that case, this court held that the term “minerals” is comprised of all substances “within the ordinary and natural meaning of the word.” Id. at 997. Also, the case of Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1958, no writ) predated the 1959 conveyance. That case, written by Chief Justice Pope before his tenure on this court, holds that uranium is a mineral covered by an “oil, gas, coal and other minerals” lease. Id. at 922. Thus, in 1959 when the Fried-mans conveyed the surface estate and retained the mineral estate, the uranium was *590part of the mineral estate and owned by the Friedmans.
Consequently, T.J. Martin did not possess the right to convey uranium or any other mineral to Texaco in 1977. The cases that Texaco purportedly relied on when it entered into its 1977 lease, Acker v. Guinn and Reed I, do not concern uranium. In my opinion, the case law precedent is stronger for the Friedman’s position than it is for Texaco. The majority has taken the Friedmans’ property and awarded it to Texaco without compensating the Friedmans, whom I believe to be the true owners of the minerals.
I also oppose the majority opinion because it bases the determination of whether uranium is a mineral on the severance date of the surface and mineral estates. On the one hand, if a severance takes place after June 8, 1983, then the uranium is part of the mineral estate. On the other hand, if the severance occurred before June 8,1983, then the status of uranium depends upon the fact findings required by Acker and Reed. Consequently, for the vast majority of surface and mineral estate severances, a great deal of uncertainty remains with respect to the title of uranium. In my opinion, it is essential for surface estate and mineral estate owners to be able to rely on a title examiner’s opinion regarding the ownership of uranium. Under the majority opinion, however, a title examiner cannot safely determine title to uranium in a pre-June 8, 1983 severance, unless the surface estate and mineral estate owners resort to litigation.
Accordingly, I would hold that uranium is and always has been a mineral. As Justice Spears opined in his concurrence in Reed II: “Whatever the rule, it should be such that the ownership of the substance in question can be ascertained from examining the instrument of grant or reservation alone.” 597 S.W.2d 743 at 751. While the rule that I espouse accomplishes certainty of title, the majority’s rule fails to achieve this goal. Thus, I would reverse the judgments of the lower courts and render judgment that the Friedmans own the uranium on this tract of land.
McGEE, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.