I concur in tbe result and tbe fundamental proposition that there is a total lack of evidence to make a jury question on negligence of Manning as a proximate cause of tbe collision. I disagree with tbe approach to this principle because I think that tbe majority have weighed tbe affidavits and determined that tbe Manning vehicle bad stopped behind tbe Bull vehicle before tbe collision. The majority seem to have assumed that Manning’s stopping within a few feet of Bull’s car was the only negligence which could have been found from tbe affidavits. Since both tbe trial court and this court must resolve all doubts in favor of the party against whom a summary judgment would be rendered and draw all inferences in question in favor of that party, I think we must accept the Bull affidavit at face value. In that affidavit, appellant Bull states that as be approached a vehicle stopped at tbe stop light, be glanced in bis rear view mirror and observed an automobile approaching close behind him, and this automobile crashed into his rear bumper before he could come to a complete stop and pushed his car several feet forward. But even conceding that this is true, there is nothing in any of the affidavits or answers to interrogatories to indicate that there was ever more than one impact to the rear of the Bull vehicle. The affidavit of Chote that he ran into the back of the car in front of him and knocked it into the car in front of it is a clear indication that Chote’s action was the cause of Manning’s vehicle striking the Bull car. Consequently, any negligence of Manning in following the Bull vehicle too closely or failing to keep a proper lookout could not have been the proximate cause of the damages to appellants.