Berry v. State

OPINION

W. C. DAVIS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated rape. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 21.03. The jury assessed punishment at life imprisonment in the Texas Department of Corrections.

In his third ground of error, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated rape. He concedes that the evidence may show the commission of a rape, but contends that there is no evidence of him compelling submission by a threat of death or serious bodily injury to be imminently inflicted upon her, as required by § 21.03, supra. We disagree.

The prosecutrix testified that prior to the offense she was a college student in Colorado. She stated that she had recently come to Dallas in an internship program and, thus, had been unfamiliar with the city. She and another young woman had rented an apartment together, but had not had a telephone installed. She testified that on the night of the offense she left her apartment at about 8:00 p. m. to walk to a nearby telephone booth in order to make a call. After talking to the party she called, as she stepped out of the phone booth, she saw appellant standing next to a car nearby. She testified that it was dark at that time. She heard appellant say something to her and saw him start to approach her, and she stated that she became frightened. She testified that appellant grabbed her hard by the arm and stuck something sharp *489in the back of her neck. She testified, “He told me not to do anything and he wouldn’t hurt me,” and she stated that he was hurting her arm and wrist. She stated that the object he stuck in the back of her neck felt like a knife, but that she could not see it. She testified that appellant told her that he would not hurt her if she would do what he said to do.

The prosecutrix testified that he then dragged her over to the car and forced her in, as she struggled with him. She stated that she was in fear for her life. She testified that he was stronger than she and that he kept repeating “just to do what I tell you and I won’t hurt you.” He then told her that he wanted to “make love” to her. She stated that the door on her side of the car was locked and that she was afraid to reach back and unlock it. Then, with her in the car, appellant drove around, stopping briefly to ask friends where his brother was. She was not familiar with any place appellant drove. She stated, “[w]e drove up and down the streets, some more, and whenever a car would pass, coming from the other direction, the two cars would stop, so that then they were parallel to each other, and he would just let the black people that were in the other car stare across to me so that they could get a look at me,” and that nothing was ever said during this time. She testified that she “had the feeling that maybe this man was going to have a sex orgy.”

After this, she stated that he drove to “the slums” and dragged her out of the car and took her into an apartment. She stated that he told her to relax, that as long as she did what he told her to, he would not hurt her. She stated that, although she had not yet seen a weapon, he kept telling her that he would not hurt her if she did what he said to do. Appellant then raped her and later drove her back to the telephone booth.

Upon cross-examination, she testified that when he first abducted her he stuck something sharp in her neck. She stated that this object was sharp and flat and that it felt like a sharp knife, forcibly pressed against her neck. She stated that he indicated to her that he had a weapon and that he was going to use it by putting the object against her neck. She testified that appellant did not verbally threaten her with death or serious bodily injury, other than to tell her that if she complied with his demands she would not be harmed.1

Upon review by this court, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. Rogers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 78 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Clark v. State, 543 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Esquivel v. State, 506 S.W.2d 613 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). The jury found that appellant had compelled the prosecutrix’s submission to the offense by threats of death or serious bodily harm, and we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support this verdict. The term “threats” is not limited to the use of verbal aggression but may include acts amounting to an offer to use future force. Threats may be communicated by actions, words or deeds. Seaton v. State, 564 S.W.2d 721 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Church v. State, 552 S.W.2d 138 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Rogers v. State, supra; see also, Williams v. State, 500 S.W.2d 163 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).

In the instant case, appellant grabbed the prosecutrix hard, hurting her arm and wrist. He then stuck a sharp, flat object in the back of her neck; she testified that the object felt like a knife, forcibly pressed against her neck. Appellant repeatedly told her that if she cooperated with his demands she would not be hurt; the implication of this threat, of course, is that she would be hurt or harmed if she resisted. By his actions and words, appellant indicated to the prosecutrix that he had a *490weapon and that he would use it if she resisted. These acts, coupled with his threats, are sufficient evidence of a threat of serious bodily injury. Appellant’s third ground of error is overruled.

In his first ground of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a knife obtained pursuant to an illegal search and seizure. Officer W. F. Leichliter of the Dallas Police Department testified that on the night of October 20, 1974, he was patrolling the West Dallas area when he received radio transmissions. As a result of the messages received, he went to a location in a housing project. At this address, he observed an automobile parked off of the parking area between shrubs and a clothes line pole. The officers approached the car and observed' similarities between it and the description of the vehicle for which they were looking. Further, the automobile was parked behind the house number which had been related to them. Officer Leichliter testified that as he stood outside the car looking at it, he observed a putty knife lying in plain view on the front seat. The knife was subsequently seized.

We hold that the trial court did not err in admitting the knife into evidence. The officer was standing in a public place pursuant to a lawful investigation; the knife was in plain view. A police officer may seize what he sees in plain view if he is lawfully where he is. Clark v. State, 548 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Myre v. State, 545 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Craig v. State, 533 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Casarez v. State, 504 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Pulido v. State, 503 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). This contention is overruled.

In his second ground of error, appellant contends that the prosecutor committed fundamental error during argument at the hearing on punishment in making an indirect reference to the length of time which appellant would be required to serve in prison on any sentence. No such objection was voiced at trial. Error, if any, in the prosecutor’s argument was waived by appellant’s failure to object. Duffy v. State, 567 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Wilder v. State, 558 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Hunter v. State, 530 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). This is not the sort of argument which constitutes fundamental error requiring review absent any objection at trial. This contention is overruled.

The judgment is affirmed.

ROBERTS, J., concurs in the result.

. Appellant did not testify at the guilt or innocence stage of the trial, but he did testify in his own behalf at the punishment phase. Therein, he admitted that he was the one who confronted the prosecutrix on the date of the offense, that he forced her into his car, and that he threatened her. He also testified that he was sorry for what he had done. While this judicial admission, in itself, might constitute sufficient evidence of the aggravation under § 21.03, supra, we need not base our holding upon this alone, due to the other evidence adduced at trial.