The offense is the possession of marijuana; the punishment, 11 years.
In view of our disposition of this case, a recitation of the facts will not be deemed necessary other than to observe that the officers searched a residence under and by virtue of a search warrant. At the time the evidence was offered, it was objected *489to, among other grounds, as follows: “The warrant issued in this case is invalid because it does not meet the requirements of Article 1, Section 9, of the Constitution of the State of Texas nor the requirements of Article 310, C.C.P. * * * We further allege that the search warrant and affidavit are invalid because it is vague and defective in describing the premises to be searched.” We quote the pertinent part from the affidavit and the search warrant: “ * * * in a (6) residence situated in Dallas County, Texas at (7) 719 Bonnie View which said (5) Billy Joe Helton occupies, possesses, controls and has charge of.” We are not so concerned with the failure to state whether Bonnie View is a street, avenue or boulevard, but the entire absence of any mention as to the name of the city where the same is located renders the search warrant vague and defective in describing the premises to be searched.
We are aware of the rule of law recently expressed in Gaines v. State, 161 Texas Cr. Rep. 589, 279 S.W. 2d 96, as follows: “The occupancy and ownership of the premises as stated in the affidavit may be looked to in aid of the description given,” but we do not believe that proof of occupancy and ownership can dispense with the necessity of describing the premises to be searched as near as may be.
Article I, Section 9, of our Constitution reads as follows:
“The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from all unreasonable seizures or searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.”
Out of the multitude of cases which have been decided by this court on the precise question before us here, there is only one case which holds that the name of the county alone is sufficient. It is Cruze v. State, 114 Texas Cr. Rep. 450, 25 S.W. 2d 875. The cases cited in the Cruze opinion do not support the decision there reached, and it is interesting to note that the Cruze case has been cited only once. It was cited recently in Franklin v. State, 163 Texas Cr. Rep. 330, 291 S.W. 2d 322, as supporting the sufficiency of the following description:
“* * * a certain private dwelling, located in Fisher County, Texas described as (a) Virgil Franklin residence, Block 153, in the original town of Rotan, Texas and being the premises *490occupied by, in charge of and under the control of Virgil Franklin.”
It should be noted that in the Franklin case the name of the city was given as well as the location of the residence within such city.
The sufficiency of the description in the Franklin case is clearly adequate, but that holding does not make adequate the description in the Cruze case or in the case at bar.
While the rule announced in the Cruze case may have been a sufficient description of the premises to be searched in some sparsely settled county a number of years ago, we judicially know that Dallas County is today one of the most heavily populated counties in the state.
We are unable to reasonably say that in that county there would be only one person having the name of the person named in the search warrant and that, therefore, the premises to be searched might be ascertained. To the contrary, there may be numerous persons residing in Dallas County having the same name.
Under the peculiar facts here presented, we are constrained to conclude that the description in the search warrant was insufficient.
Appellant’s counsel in his brief poses this poignant question, “The officer in this case, to execute the warrant, was sent out into Dallas County, where was he to go? Was he to go to Garland or to Grand Prairie, Plano, Mesquite or some other city? The warrant states no city, no distance or direction from any public place or natural object * *
We have concluded that the Cruze case insofar as it conflicts with the holding herein is unsound and should be overruled. The test “as near as may be” has not been met by the description in the affidavit and warrant before us. In Willson’s Criminal Forms, 6th Edition, Section 3251, we find this admonition: “(here describe the place where the property is concealed as accurately as possible.)”
For the error of the court in admitting the fruits of the search in evidence, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.