concurring.
I concur in the reversal of this case for the reason assigned in the majority opinion, but I am of the further opinion that the search warrant is subject to other defects which transcend in importance that upon which the reversal is predicated.
Upon its face, the affidavit for the search warrant sought a warrant to search a private residence for specifically described personal property. The search warrant issued thereon and used in this case authorized the search of a private residence for the specifically described property.
A warrant to search a private residence must be based upon an affidavit evidencing probable cause for its issuance. Stevens v. State, 159 Texas Cr. R. 247, 262 S.W. 2d 716.
Whether probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant must be determined from the face of the affidavit. Aguirre v. State, 109 Texas Cr. Rep. 584, 7 S.W. 2d 76. “Probable cause,” as that term is used, means a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances warranting a cautious man in the belief that the accused is guilty. Silver v. State, 110 Texas Cr. Rep. 512, 8 S.W. 2d 144; Chapin v. State, 107 Texas Cr. Rep. 477, 296 S.W. 1095; Landa v. Obert, 45 Texas 539.
An affidavit on information and belief which states no facts or circumstances constituting probable cause will not support or authorize the issuance of a search warrant. Pate v. State, 129 Texas Cr. Rep. 45, 83 S.W. 2d 984; Trimmer v. State, 135 Texas Cr. Rep. 372, 120 S.W. 2d 265. Belief, alone, is not probable cause. Chapin v. State, 107 Texas Cr. Rep. 477, 296 S.W. 1095.
The affidavit, here, is based entirely upon information and belief. No facts are stated therein which would constitute probable cause. The most that can be said of the affidavit upon that subject is that the affiant swears that he has reason to believe and does believe that the alleged stolen property was concealed in the residence of the appellant and that the basis of that belief was that two informers had told him that they so believed. There are no facts stated in the affidavit by which it could be said that a cautious person would be warranted in believing that the stolen property was concealed in the residence of appellant. Nowhere is it stated what the informers represented *492to affiant whereby the magistrate might conclude that probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant.
For the reason stated, the search warrant was invalid. The search of the residence of appellant was, under that warrant, in direct violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches.
It is my opinion that there is another and additional reason why the search warrant was invalid, and that is that it was based and issued upon the affidavit of but one affiant. It is my opinion that a search warrant to search a private residence may issue only upon the affidavit of two credible persons, without reference to the character of property to be searched for.
The Constitution of this state, Art. 1, Sec. 9, and also the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution protect one against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the search is reasonable, the constitutional guarantees are not violated; if unreasonable, they are violated.
Under Title 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the legislature, by a general law, prescribed the rules whereby a reasonable search of one’s premises might be accomplished by virtue of a search warrant. Such a search, warrant could be issued “whenever written sworn complaint” was made to a magistrate, setting forth certain facts (Arts. 310, 311, and 312, C.C.P.).
Under that title, the affidavit of one person was sufficient, without reference to the character of place to be searched— that is, whether residence or place of business.
However, when the legislature came to prescribe rules for the issuance of search warrants to search for intoxicating liquor, the affidavit of two credible persons was required as a condition precedent to the issuance of a search warrant to search a private dwelling (Art. 666-20, V.A.P.C.). Under that statute, then, a search warrant to search a private dwelling, in order to constitute a reasonable search within the meaning of the Constitution, must have been issued upon the affidavit of two credible persons.
If a search of a private residence for intoxicating liquors under a search warrant be a reasonable search only when issued upon the affidavit of two persons, it follows that a search of a *493private residence by authority of a search warrant issued upon the affidavit of one person would be an unreasonable search and prohibited by the Constitution.
The legislature cannot prescribe different definitions of reasonableness as constituting a reasonable search. There must be uniformity.
It follows, then, that when the legislature required the affidavit of two' persons for a search warrant to search a private residence for intoxicating liquors, it made the same requirement of all search warrants to search a private residence. It is only by this construction that the statutes authorizing the issuance of search warrants to search a private residence can be preserved and maintained.
The affidavit for search warrant and the search warrant in this case provided, upon their face, for and authorized the search of the private residence of appellant.
The search warrant, here, was invalid because it was issued upon the affidavit of only one person.