On Petition to Rehear
The petition tp rehear asserts that the rule with reference to collateral attack upon a judgment of-a Court of general -jurisdiction does not apply to a judgment of conviction of a criminal offense. No Tennessee decisions directly in point have been found. By indirection, some two or three seem to refute petitioner’s insistence.
State v. Galloway, 45 Tenn. 326, 337 (a contempt proceedings) observes that a judgment is void if it appears in the record that the Court was without jurisdiction. State v. McClellan, 87 Tenn. 52, 55, 9 S.W. 233, says that if a certain notice were necessary it would be-presumed to have been given on collateral attack unless it affirmatively appeared in the record that notice had not been *487given. Cantrell v. State, 190 Tenn. 64, 69, 277 S.W.2d 772, 774, incidentally observed that tbe lack of jurisdiction in a criminal proceedings “must also be determined from the face of the record”.
. Turning to authorities outside this jurisdiction, there appears in 39 C.J.S., Habeas Corpus, sec. 16, p. 456, this statement:
“Where the court had general jurisdiction of the cause and the person, error in the determination of questions of law or fact on which its jurisdiction in the particular case depends is error in the exercise of jurisdiction, and, in' accordance with the general rule, affords no ground for habeas corpus. This rule has been applied to findings as to the age, status, and domicile or residence of a person * *
The text of 25 American Jurisprudence, page' 161, is- to the same effect.
State ex rel. Du Fault v. Utecht, 220 Minn. 431, 19 N.W.2d 706, 707, 161 A.L.R. 1316, 1319, is in point. There, the petition was denied because, to use the language of the Court: — “There is nothing in the record to indicate that the court did not have jurisdiction over the offense and the person of relator”. In the course of the opinion the Court said:
• “In State ex rel. Slayton v. Whittier, 108 Minn. 447 122 N.W.. 319, this court held ¡that a judgment entered in proceedings under L.1905, c.,-285, authorizing the committal of incorrigible minors to the state training school, which recites all the jurisdictional facts, cannot be impeached or contradicted collaterally on a writ of habeas corpus.” (Citing cases.)
*488In the California case of Ex parte Downs, 95 Cal. App. 571, 273 P. 143, 144, relator sought release from prison by means of habeas corpus on the allegation that he was less than eighteen years old at the time of his trial and conviction in the criminal court; that in the criminal case the Trial Judge had refused his motion to transfer the case to the Juvenile Court because of his age. This refusal was based on the fact that, in response to the motion to transfer, the Trial Judge found-from evidence that defendant was eighteen years of age, though it developed that such finding was erroneous. The petition, in the subsequent habeas corpus proceedings, was denied and the reason assigned by the Court was this:
‘‘ Where the court has determined such facts in favor of the existence of jurisdiction, its determination, even though erroneous, is binding against collateral attack. ’ ’
A clear statement of the rule is found in the New York case of People ex rel. Hubert v. Kaiser, 206 N.Y. 46, 99 N.E. 195, 197, to-wit:
“ * * * when jurisdiction depends on the existence of a certain fact, and the court has found the fact, the fact stands until reversed upon-direct” appeal.
The New York case of People ex rel. Davis v. Jennings, 133 Misc. 538, 232 N.Y.S. 603, 605, though the decision of a nisi prius court, is referred to because it makes the same question as to the relator’s age when convicted in a previous case of some criminal offense. The writ was denied with this observation:
*489“Where the jurisdiction depends upon certain facts, and the court has passed upon those facts, its determination is conclusive until reversed- or set aside”, citing several N.Y. cases.-
In the present case the jurisdiction of the criminal court over Stewart depended, in so far as pertinent here, upon a certain fact, to-wit, his age. The Trial Court made inquiry as to that fact, and found that Stewart was eighteen years old. This finding was based upon Stewart’s ovm statement to his Court appointed attorney and to the district attorney. Such being the situation, the Court’s finding in the matter is conclusive on collateral attack, according to the weight of authority.
Petitioner has cited a number of cases outside this jurisdiction in support of his insistence. As a matter of courtesy to a well prepared petition and supporting brief, this Court -would like to discuss each of those cases. Howéver, that must be foregone because it would unduly prolong this response. In our judgment the only one of those cases"in point is State ex rel. Clayton v. Jones, 192 La. 671, 188 So. 737. By a statement made in that opinion Ave are lead to think that Louisiana considered its Criminal Court one of limited jurisdiction. It .makes the statement that “the record of the Court of limited jurisdiction must show affirmatively such facts as confer jurisdiction”. Unless that be the distinction, then we are unable to reconcile the decision with what we consider the majority view, and the sounder rule.
Two of the three Tennessee cases referred to in the petition, State ex rel. Guy v. Foster, 160 Tenn. 285, 23 S.W.2d 660, 24 S.W.2d 897, and State ex rel. Brown v. Grosch, 177 Tenn. 619, 152 S.W.2d 239, were extradition *490cases wherein the proof 'heard was on petitioner’s insistence that he was not in the demanding State at the time of the alleged offense. In the third, State ex rel. Haywood v. Superintendent, Davidson County Workhouse, 195 Tenn. 265, 259 S.W.2d 159, the question dealt with was the constitutionality of the Davidson County Juvenile Act.
The remaining insistences of the petition are discussed and determined ■ in the opinion heretofore announced. Nothing of benefit can be accomplished by repeating that discussion. Incidentally, however, in response to counsel’s sincere plea with reference to the tender years of this youth, “ignorant of his rights, naturally surrounded by hostile sentiment”, etc. attention is called to the fact though it really is of no importance here, that Stewart’s prior encounters with the law justifies the presumption that he had gained considerable knowledge as to procedure, etc., of Courts and of his rights. He was at the time of the commission of the offenses involved here on parole from the State Training and Agricultural School.
Petition to rehear is denied.