OPINION
J. CURTISS BROWN, Chief Justice.This is an appeal from a judgment awarding damages in a personal injury suit. Appellee Jackie Kirkland was cutting timber on land belonging to appellant Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. when he was struck by a falling tree and rendered a paraplegic. Kirby had contracted with K & E Wood Company to cut the wood, and K & E, in turn, had employed Kirkland as a woodcutter. Kirkland sued Kirby and was awarded damages in a jury trial. On appeal Kirby challenges the jury’s findings on right of control, negligence and employee versus independent contractor status. Kirby also alleges jury misconduct and complains of the trial court’s failure to grant a summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Kirby’s first two points of error concern Special Issue No. 1, which asked the following:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. had the right to control any part of the work of the woodcutters on the occasion in question?
Instruction: The “right to control” must be more than a general right to order the work to start or stop, to inspect progress or to receive reports.
Kirby argues that the trial court erred in submitting the issue because it was not supported by any evidence and, further, that the jury’s affirmative answer was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
An owner or leaseholder is generally not obligated to require an independent contractor to perform an on-premises activity in a safe manner. Exxon Corp. v. Quinn, 726 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex.1987), citing Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex.1985). However, Texas has adopted section 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that one who exercises some control over the independent contractor’s work may be liable if he fails to exercise that control with reasonable care. Redinger, 689 S.W.2d at 418; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965). The degree of control is less than would subject one to liability as a master; however, it is more than a general right to order the work to start or stop, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Restatement, comments a and c; Redinger, 689 S.W.2d at 418. If one retains the power to direct the order in which the work is to be done or to forbid its being done in a dangerous manner, he may be subject to liability under this section. Restatement, comment a.
The supreme court recently addressed the right of control issue in Pollard v. Missouri Pacific R.R. and stated:
In Newspapers Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.1964), this court held that if a right of control over the work has a contractual basis, the fact that no actual control was exercised will not absolve a premises owner of liability. It is the right of control, and not the actual exercise of control, which gives rise to a duty to see that an independent contractor performs work in a safe manner. Id.
759 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Tex.1988). In Pollard, a summary judgment case, an employee of an independent contractor was injured while removing certain poles and *229wires from one of MOPAC’s right of ways. The court found that MOP AC contractually retained (1) control over the completion time of the contract, (2) authority to specify the poles to be removed, (3) authority to specify insurance coverage and (4) control over access and storage of materials involving MOPAC’s right of way. The court held that MOPAC’s contractual retention of control gave rise to the duty expressly adopted in Redinger. The existence of this duty thus raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning MOPAC’s negligence. Kirby’s contract here gives it even more right of control than the contract in Pollard.
With this background, we return to Kirby’s first two points of error. In reviewing a “no evidence” point, an appellate court must consider only that evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in their most favorable light to support the jury’s findings, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. King v. Bauer, 688 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Tex.1985). In reviewing a “sufficiency” point, the court must consider and weigh all of the evidence, both that in support of and that contrary to the finding, and set it aside only if it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951).
Kirby argues that the only evidence in the record pertaining to the right to control is that Kirby retained a general right to inspect K & E's progress to ensure that K & E was meeting contract specifications. Kirby maintains those specifications required only that K & E obtain maximum utilization of the wood. Kirby denies that it controlled or had the right to control K & E’s woodcutters and states that the contract between the two companies is clear in this regard. Kirby cites the following contractual language in support of its argument:
Kirby will have no right to direct the means or methods of performance by Contractor; Contractor is to have responsibility for accomplishing the agreed results, himself employing, controlling and directing the details of performance of the work and selecting, directing and controlling his own employees.
Appellee Kirkland claims, however, that by requiring maximum utilization of the wood, Kirby controlled the critical part of the woodcutters’ work, the method of cutting the trees. Kirkland notes that the specifications required that butts of the tree and log cuts be “square and smooth without splinters, splits or crushed fibers.” This may reasonably be construed to mean that the tree must be sawed flat across with a smooth cut. The use of a smooth cut is dangerous because the direction of the tree’s fall cannot be controlled and because the tree possibly may remain standing. Kirby had the ability to forbid the smooth cut simply by changing its contract specifications, and this ability is precisely the type and degree of control that gives rise to the Redinger exception. Kirby also had the right to select the harvest areas, to control when and where the woodcutters worked and to designate the specific trees to be cut.
The jury agreed with Kirkland, finding that Kirby retained the right of control over the work of Kirkland and his fellow woodcutters to subject the company to liability under section 414. We sustain this finding as our review of the testimony clearly shows some evidence Kirby had both a contractual and an actual right to control the woodcutters’ work at the time of the accident. A question of fact for jury determination was thus presented.
The logging contract and supplements set out the terms of the agreement between the two companies. In the contract, Kirby specified the date of completion and also reserved the right to designate “the logging sets, logging trails and other roads” to be used. Section two of the contract specified the actual logging services, and therein Kirby retained the right to designate the area and the trees to be cut.
A. DESIGNATED TREES: On Selectively Cut Areas: All trees marked and designated for cutting; on Clear Cut Areas or on Diameter Cut Areas: All unmarked trees of certain size designat*230ed for cutting as specified on supplement to this agreement, and according to current rules published by Kirby, within designated boundaries and on area outlined on a map on file in the office of Manager-Harvesting, Kirby Forest Industries, Inc., Silsbee, Texas.
Kirby also reserved the right to change the contract and the specifications as evidenced by the following excerpts:
E. Additional Supplements:
As the parties may agree upon additional or changed services to be performed, they will execute additional supplement or supplements to this agreement showing the services to be performed and the payments to be made therefor. Such supplement or supplements and this agreement shall thereupon be considered together, and together will be the agreement of the parties respecting such additional services. Should Contractor undertake by verbal agreement to perform additional services before written supplement covering same is executed, all terms hereof will apply to such undertaking; and written supplement covering such services will be executed by the parties as soon as practicable. (Contract)
Specifications may be further explained or amended as necessary by Kirby’s representatives. (Specifications) (emphasis added)
Kirby’s contractual retention of control closely parallels that discussed in Pollard. In addition to the contract, the testimony concerning Kirby’s actual exercise of control is instructive. John Derkits, Kirby’s harvesting manager at the time of the accident, testified that the company’s forest management people scheduled the property to be harvested at a particular time and that the company could designate the specific trees to be cut. As for Kirby’s actual control in the field, there was testimony, particularly from the Kirby employees, that Kirby did not supervise the logging operation “in any form or fashion.” However, Derkits described the Kirby contract administrator as one who “supervised the logging contractors’ operations — not supervise, but administered the contract.” Harold Keith Axelson, a Kirby logging superintendent, stated that the contract administrator “was assigned by me tracts of timber to cut, varied, with varied products on them, and his job was to harvest those tracts of timber with the three independent contractors that he had.” Raymond Ker-vin, Jr., son of one of the K & E owners who also was employed by K & E to skid logs, answered affirmatively when asked if he had seen the Kirby woods boss come behind the woodcutters to check that the trees were actually taken out the way Kirby wanted.
Jesse Henson, who was cutting wood with Jackie Kirkland on the day of the accident, testified that the “big boss” in the field was the Kirby man and that “[o]ur boss has got to please him, and we’ve got to please him.” Furthermore, the woodcutters were subject to a “butt chewing” from their K & E boss if the Kirby wood foreman found they were cutting too high or not going far up enough in the tops. Vernon Cain, a skidder employed by K & E, testified that the wood foreman came around two or three times a week. “[H]e was the man the contractor had to work for. He come out and told you how to cut logs.” Finally, Jackie Kirkland testified as follows:
Q. Based on your experience, Mr. Kirkland, you worked out there and you saw the Kirby woods boss work; right?
A. Right, yes.
Q. And based upon what you saw, what did he do?
A. He checked behind us to make sure we were doing our jobs right.
Q. Would that include supervising the cutting of logs?
A. Yes.
Q. If you didn’t cut it the way they wanted it cut, what happened?
A. You had to do it over, plus you got eaten out.
There is also the issue of the smooth cut. The following language in section two described how the logging services, felling, *231bucking, limbing and topping, should be done.
B. FELLING, BUCKING, LIMBING and TOPPING shall be done with the objective of recovering the maximum wood volume without waste (emphasis added); to wit:
(1) Stumps shall be cut low, just at the top of the root swell, or to other heights as specified in current log cutting rules published by Kirby.
(2) Butts of the tree shall be square and smooth without splinters, splits, or crushed fibers.
(3) Charred wood and oversize wood are unacceptable and must be eliminated by “jump butting” out the portion of the tree containing such material.
(4) Recovery of the wood in the main and secondary stems of the tree shall be to its full utilizable length and merchantable diameter and to variable lengths and to variable diameters as required by current rules published by Kirby.
(5) To produce specific lengths with specific trimming allowances according to current rules published by Kirby.
(6) Limbs will be cut close to and parallel to the axis of the main stem.
(7) Log cuts shall be square, smooth and without splintering, splits or crushed fibers.
A revision or supplement issued in October 1985 specifies that “stump heights shall not exceed 6" for stumps less than 12" in diameter, or one-half the diameter for those stumps larger than 12" in diameter.” Furthermore, “stumps should not be cut on a slant, and high step joints should be avoided.”
Several witnesses testified that Kirby encouraged the use of the smooth cut. Vernon Cain declared that “Kirby wants them sawed smooth. You cut in and then you cut the other way and meet up with your same — what we called match sawing.” Rodney Rhodes, a third woodcutter at the scene, agreed that they were told to cut the stumps smooth. Jackie Kirkland testified that although a step cut was the safest cut, Kirby wanted the trees cut flat. Pictures of the tree that fell on Kirkland were introduced into evidence, and no one disputed that the stump appeared to have been smooth or flat cut. Keith Axelson testified that while Kirby does not specify how contract woodcutters should cut a tree, it does specify the use of the back cut, a safer one, in guidelines for Kirby woodcutters. The evidence supports the inference that the smooth cut was encouraged, the bottom line being maximum utilization of the wood. Kirby had the power to address the issue in the contract and to forbid the work being done in a dangerous manner.
Given Kirby’s contractual retention of control and its actual exercise of control in the field, the jury finding that Kirby retained a sufficient right of control over the work to give rise to the Redinger exception is supported. Points of error one and two are thus overruled.
Section 414 states that if one exercises some control over the work of an independent contractor, then he may be liable if he fails to exercise that control with reasonable care. The jury was therefore asked to find whether Kirby had acted negligently and whether such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. In response to Special Issue No. 2(b), the jury found negligence and proximate cause in Kirby’s failure to provide for proper safety rules and procedures for the cutting and felling of trees. In points of error three and four, Kirby maintains that the trial court erred in submitting the issue because it was not supported by any evidence and, further, that the jury’s answer was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
Kirby premises its argument on its assertion that it retained no right of control over the independent contractor and therefore could assume the contractor would perform its responsibilities in a safe and workmanlike manner, taking proper care and precautions to ensure the safety of its employees. However, we have already found sufficient contractual and actual right of control to give rise to a duty. The issue is thus evidence of the negligent exercise of that control.
*232We have already shown that Kirby made no provisions in the contract for the use of a safer cut. Furthermore, the company left all safety considerations to K & E. While Kirby had safety rules for its own employees, it had none regarding the harvesting done by its independent contractors and did not know whether K & E had its own safety program. As articulated by Mr. Derkits, Kirby’s philosophy was that “the people we sell plywood to don’t tell us how to run our safety program in the plywood plant. We don’t tell the independent contractor how to run his safety program in the logging operation.”
Also, those Kirby employees who went out to the property to verify that the contract specifications were being met were not expected to check for or to report dangerous conditions, even though they were usually the last persons through the area. We take particular note of this policy because in this case the K & E crew had been sent back to recut the acreage involved. The greater danger this presents was described by one witness. “You got limbs and things that can be hanging that you break that don’t fall out. You have to go back through and watch. Them limbs and stuff might fall.” In this case, a tree fell.
The evidence suggests that Kirby attempted to insulate itself from liability as to the independent woodcutters; however, given the duty that the' jury found and we have affirmed, the failure to provide safety rules and procedures offered ample basis for the jury verdict.
Kirby next argues that this failure was not a proximate cause of the accident. However, the evidence justified the jury’s conclusion that had Kirby instituted certain safety procedures the accident could have been avoided. The requirement of a safer cut would have ensured that the trees that were cut were actually felled and in a controlled manner. Procedures for inspecting cut acreage would have ensured that any trees either caught in other trees or left standing would have been discovered and felled before the woodcutters went back into the area. The log that injured Kirkland would not have been left standing. The evidence supports the jury’s finding of proximate cause, and we overrule points of error three and four.
In response to Special Issue No. 2(e), the jury found Kirby negligent in exercising its control over the woodcutters “in providing in the Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. specifications that trees should be ‘smooth cut’ rather than ‘step cut’ so that the tree’s fall can be controlled.” The jury further found this to be a proximate cause of the accident. In points of error five and six, Kirby challenges the evidentiary basis for the submission of the issue and for the jury’s response.
We previously discussed the smooth cut issue in response to points of error one and two. A tree cut with a smooth cut poses a great danger to woodcutters. Kirby had the power to protect against that danger by requiring a safe cut in its specifications as it did for its own employees. While Kirby did not specifically require a smooth cut, the testimony and the specifications indicate that it was encouraged. Obviously, K & E and its woodcutters would do what was expected of them. The woodcutters uniformly testified that they were answerable to the Kirby woods boss and would certainly hear if they did not do the job the way Kirby wanted it done. We find sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings of negligence and proximate, cause. Points of error five and six are overruled.
In points of error seven and eight, Kirby objects to Special Issue No. 5, which asked the jury if Kirkland were acting as an independent contractor of K & E rather than as an employee at the time of the accident. The jury found that Kirkland was not acting as an independent contractor. Kirby asserts that in his Second Amended Petition, Kirkland judicially admitted he was an independent lumberjack or log cutter; Kirby therefore argues that this judicial admission, as well as the total absence of evidence that Kirkland was an employee of K & E, indicates the trial court erred in submitting Special Issue No. 5. Kirby also argues the trial court erred in not granting Kirby a new trial because the *233jury’s finding is so clearly against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust.
In its objection to Special Issue No. 5, Kirby stated only that the trial court should find as a matter of law that Kirkland was an independent contractor of K & E Wood Company and that this was not an issue in dispute. Kirby did not object to the issue on the ground that Kirkland’s status had been judicially admitted. Therefore, Kirby has not properly presented this contention on appeal. Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 276 (Tex.1986); Tex.R.Civ.P. 274.
Furthermore, the statement labeled a judicial admission read thusly: “On or about January 29, 1986, Plaintiff Jackie Glynn Kirkland was performing services as an independent lumberjack or log cutter on land in Liberty County, Texas, owned and controlled by Defendant Kirby Forest Industries, Inc.” Before a pleading may be deemed a judicial admission, it must be deliberate, clear and unequivocal. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania v. Conn, 741 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex.App.—Austin 1987, no writ). The petition was filed in a suit against Kirby, and the statement is subject to the construction that Kirkland was referring to his relationship to Kirby, not to K & E. We therefore do not find this statement sufficiently clear so as to bind Kirkland. Finally, Kirby waived error by not filing special exceptions pointing out any defects in the petition. Hennigan v. Harris County, 593 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Tex.R.Civ.P. 90, 91.
Kirby’s second argument, that the jury’s finding concerning Kirkland’s status is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, is also not persuasive. Kirby argues that the submission of the issue and the jury’s finding were prejudicial because, based on the answer to Special Issue No. 5, the jury was not able to reach a subsequent issue on comparative negligence.
The trial court defined “independent contractor” and “employee” in these words:
“Independent Contractor” means a person who, in the pursuit of an independent business, undertakes to do specific work for another person, using his own means and methods without submitting himself to the control of such other person with respect to the details of the work, and who represents the will of such other person only as to the result of his work and not as to the means by which it is accomplished.
“Employee” means a person in the service of another with an understanding, express or implied, that such other person has the right to direct the details of the work and not merely the result to be accomplished.
Kirby did not object to this wording. As a result, the jury had to consider the evidence in light of these definitions, and, once again, the evidence created a question of fact for the jury’s determination.
There was testimony that Kirkland was self-employed and paid his own income tax and social security. However, Kirkland also testified that he had been “employed” by K & E for seven to eight months prior to the accident. Furthermore, the testimony indicated that, in addition to the result to be accomplished, the K & E bosses had input into the details of the work. When the Kirby woods boss came out and complained about the woodcutters’ work or gave instructions about where to cut, it was the K & E boss who relayed the messages. K & E also established certain procedures the woodcutters were to follow such as what to do if a cut tree lodged in another tree. Given the trial court’s definitions of independent contractor and employee, we hold that the jury’s finding was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Points of error seven and eight are overruled.
Kirby next complains that the trial court improperly denied Kirby’s motion for new trial because of jury misconduct. Kirby contends that the affidavit of juror Coun-sellor establishes that outside influences were improperly brought to bear upon the *234jurors in this case. Specifically, those outside influences were a discussion of attorney’s fees by jurors, which resulted in a substantial increase in damages, and pressure from employers to return to work, which resulted in two jurors changing their votes.
Under the jury misconduct rules, Tex.R. Civ.Evid. 606(b) and Tex.R.Civ.P. 327, all testimony, affidavits and other evidence is excluded from consideration by the court when a claim of jury misconduct is raised unless it is shown that an “outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.” Robinson Elec. Supply Co. v. Cadillac Cable Corp., 706 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). “Outside influence” is not defined by the rules; however, case law has construed the term such that an outside influence must emanate from outside the jury and its deliberations. Clancy v. Zale Corp., 705 S.W.2d 820, 829 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Put another way, it must come from a source other than the jurors themselves. Robinson Elec. Supply, 706 S.W.2d at 132.
Clearly, the alleged misconduct concerning discussions about attorney’s fees does not meet the courts’ interpretation of “outside influence.” Kirby argues, however, that this court should be guided by Tex.R.Civ.P. 226a in determining what constitutes an outside influence. The instructions to the jury in Rule 226a contain the trial court’s admonishment not to consider certain evidence in rendering a verdict. Kirby would argue that if the jury considers anything in violation of these instructions, then this court should determine that an outside influence has been improperly brought to bear upon the jurors.
When it amended the jury misconduct rules in 1983 and 1984, the Texas Supreme Court chose to adopt a stringent “outside influence” test with the goal of insulating most of the jury deliberation process from scrutiny. See Robinson Elec. Supply, 706 S.W.2d at 132-33. We are bound by those rules and we therefore decline to adopt Kirby’s argument.
Concerning the pressure from employers to return to work, this seems to be an unfortunate aspect of the jury system about which little can be done. There are always pressures not only from employers but also family, recreation and personal preferences of jurors. We do not consider these normal pressures to be an outside influence within the meaning of the rules. Were they to be considered an outside influence, few verdicts would stand. Finally, we note that Mrs. Counsellor’s affidavit is contradicted by an earlier one signed by her stating that no outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon her or any other juror. Point of error nine is overruled.
In point of error ten, Kirby claims that the trial court improperly denied Kirby’s motion for summary judgment because there was no evidence that Kirby was liable under any theory of premises owner liability. An order overruling a motion for summary judgment is not subject to review upon appeal. Ackermann v. Vordenbaum, 403 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Tex.1966); Huffines v. Swor Sand & Gravel Co., 750 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1988, no writ). Point of error ten is thus overruled.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.