(dissenting).
With due respect to the views expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Tomlinson, holding that the statute in question is constitutional, I must disagree.
I fully abide by the universally accepted rule that in passing upon the constitutionality of any Act of the Legislature we must resolve all doubts in its favor. We never consider if it is wise or unwise legislation.
J
The authority of the Legislature to pass this statute is not dependent upon any provision of the Constitution of Tennessee. The police power of the State is an inherent attribute of sovereignty and derives from the principle that such statutes are essential to the maintenance of public morals, public safety and public health.. *413As I understand the contention of the State the validity of the statute involved in the present controversy should be upheld on the theory that it is in the interest of public morals, public health and public safety, as well as the promotion of the general welfare. I cannot conceive that it bears the slightest relationship to these purposes.
T.C.A. sec. 4-113, sub-section (2) as amended, provides: “No person, firm, partnership, corporation or other entity operating or maintaining a place of business of whatsoever kind or nature shall employ, display or maintain or use any other standard of time in connection with such place of business than standard time as prescribed by this section.” It is an express prohibition against any person from voluntarily observing what is commonly known as “Daylight Saving Time”.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction in this State that the exercise of the police power of the State, to be valid, must bear some reasonable relationship to the public safety, public health or public morals. Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 145 S.W. 177, L.R.A. 1916F, 177; Campbell v. McIntyre, 165 Tenn. 47, 52 S.W.2d 162; State v. Greeson, 174 Tenn. 178, 124 S.W.2d 253.
It is my understanding, based upon all the authorities, that should the doctrine be extended beyond this general concept to include the supposed comfort and welfare of the public it cannot be exercised capriciously and arbitrarily to the infringement of personal and property rights. The police power, sought to be invoked in the ease at bar, derives from nothing.
In a number of estates it is held that “acts innocent and innocuous in themselves may be prohibited if nec*414essary to secure an efficient enforcement of valid police regulations.” (Emphasis supplied.) 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law sec. 175, p. 904. Thus in our own case of McCanless v. State ex rel. Hamm, 181 Tenn. 308, 181 S.W.2d 154, 156, 153 A.L.R. 832, it is held, “an innocent activity may be regulated or prohibited if its pursuit frequently offers opportunity for fraud or deception.” The Court was dealing with the regulation of the liquor traffic.
There is well nigh unanimity of authority to the effect that there are limitations on the police power. It is said in many decisions that the “state’s exercise of the power is reached tvhen the regulation transcends public necessity(Emphasis supplied.) 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law sec. 195, p. 939, and cases cited in the footnotes.
The argument is made that any business carried on contrary to Central Standard Time is confusing to the general public. This to my mind is too vague and innocuous to support the validity of the Act. I construe the Act not to prohibit an individual from operating his business within certain hours of the day or night. But it is a crime to advertise the fact. The Act in question is, in my opinion, an unconstitutional infringement upon the personal rights and privileges of citizens in the control of their own affairs, such control being in no way in violation of the rights of others.
In Campbell v. McIntyre, 165 Tenn. 47, 51, 52 S.W.2d 162, 163, it is said:
“ ‘Plainly, a regulation which has the effect of denying or unreasonably curtailing the common right to engage in a lawful private business, such as that under *415review, cannot be upheld consistent with the 14th Amendment. Under that amendment nothing is more clearly settled than that it is beyond the power of a state, “under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily (to) interfere with private business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them. ” Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513, 44 S.Ct. 412, 413, 68 L.Ed. 813, 826, 32 A.L.R. 661; and authorities cited; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 113, 49 S.Ct. 57, 73 L.Ed. 204, 208.’ ”
The Act in question plainly undertakes to regulate the time of day and night in which an individual may carry on a lawful business. It is fantastic to visualize it as affecting public morals, public health and public safety, which is the foundation upon which all “police power” rests. No one can say it is a matter of public necessity.
I respectfully dissent.