Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Fowler

On Petition to Beeeear.

This petition to rehear filed by the Bailroad Company raises no new questions but is re-argument of matters urged upon the Court at the original hearing, but the Court will answer it to the following extent.

The first error assigned is that this Court erroneously set out the reasons assigned by the Commission as a basis for rejecting joint facility or terminal expense as an item of direct cost and that this Court relied on said erroneous basis in affirming the action of the Commission.

The second assignment is that the Court erred in holding that there was no showing with respect to said joint facility or terminal expense as to the per car cost which may be attributed to a particular train or a particular trip and it is asserted that the record is wholly to the contrary.

The third assignment is that the Court erred in holding that one of the reasons the Commission rejected the joint facility or terminal expense as an item of direct cost was because there was no proration of this cost with respect to the Memphis terminal as between the Kentucky and Tennessee portions of the train run involved. In response to all of these assignments we first call attention *277to the fact that this is an administrative matter to be determined by the Commission in the manner described on pages 10, 11 and 12 of the original opinion, and if there is any reasonable basis npon which the action of the Commission may be upheld, it will be upheld by this Court.

Secondly and pursuant to the above it is obvious at least to the author hereof that the Commission did not wholly accept all of the statements of the witness, Mr. Davis, but accepted some and rejected other parts of same both with respect to the particular item joint facility expense as well as the other questionable items, and held that the Railroad Company had not carried the burden of proof resting upon it.

This Court in reviewing the action of the Commission, beginning at the middle of page 7 of the opinion and running through page 9 of same, undertook to illustrate by reference to the opinion of the Commission and keeping in mind the evidence in the record that the action of the Commission was not arbitrary. In this connection we atte' apted to point out sketchily that the Commission elim mated as part of the direct operating costs a part of som.3 of the claims made by the Railroad, for instance over $5,000 under the head of engine-house expense, $8,800 of the original claim made by the Railroad as the direct expense of operating the terminal at Memphis and all of the claim for expense of maintenance of ways and structures.

The Commission did not undertake to assign all of its reasons for its action nor did this Court make any such attempt. And particularly this Court did not make any such holding as is asserted in assignment 3.

With reference to the specific reason assigned by the Commission on page 20' of its opinion, record page 29, where the opinion states, “and if it should be the fact *278that the different railroads operating therein, should reduce their cars in and out by the same amount there would be no saving to either company for it is not shown that the ‘joint facility expenses’ would be any less as a total, — therefore, the pro rata would be no less,” it is apparent that this specific statement was made in the opinion of the Commission in response to the proposition injected into the evidence by the Railroad itself to the effect that the elimination of these two trains would effect a saving. It is clear that the Commission’s statement about the matter is correct. Be that as it may, however, the Commission did not assign this as the sole reason and very clearly indicated that there may be other good reasons appearing from the record and this Court attempted to point out that the evidence does show other reasons.

E converso or on the other hand a fluctuation in a number of cars using the joint terminal by the other railroads with the number by the petitioner remaining static would work a relative increase or decrease in cost to the petitioner Railroad, which all brings us squarely face to face with the necessary conclusion that these terminal expenses are not direct operating costs of this Railroad in the operation of its trains because the cost necessarily depends upon how the other joint facility terminal owners conduct their operation.

The adjective “direct” is defined as “of a character or relation like that of straightness of course. Specif.; (1) Free from intervening agencies or conditions; hence, characterized by immediateness of relation or action; not mediate; as direct perception.” Funk & Wag-nails New Standard Dictionary, Original 1914 ed.

Hence our original conclusion that the action of the Commission was not illegal and arbitrary.

Petition to rehear is accordingly overruled.