(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Toth alleged a violation of the Truth in Repairs Act (the Act), which, like the Consumer Fraud Act, is a consumer protection act. See Minn. Stat. §§ 325F.57-.66, 325F.69 (2004). In my view, the Act, like the Consumer Fraud Act, “reflect[s] a clear legislative policy encouraging aggressive prosecution of statutory violations” and should be “generally very broadly construed to enhance consumer protection.” See State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 495-96 (Minn.1996). The court, however, gives the Act a narrow reading, which erodes, rather than enhances, consumer protection. Further, the court’s interpretation of the Act both con*444travenes the clearly expressed goal of the legislature and nullifies a legislative action.
Since its original enactment in 1978, the Act has required repair shops to provide a customer with a dated invoice for repairs. Minn.Stat. § 325F.60, subd. 1 (1980); Minn.Stat. § 325F.56, subd. 2 (1980) (defining “repairs” to mean “work performed for a total price of more than $100 and less than $2,000”). And since its original enactment the Act has required the written invoice to disclose which parts were used, rebuilt, or reconditioned. Minn.Stat. § 325F.60, subd. 1(d) (1980). But, as originally enacted, the Act did not apply at all “if an insurer or service contract company pays up to 90 percent of the charge for repairs or pays a charge for repairs above a deductible amount specified in an insurance agreement or service contract.” Minn.Stat. § 325F.64, subd. 1 (1980). In other words, as originally enacted, when an insurance company was paying for repairs the vehicle owner was not entitled to even an invoice for the repair work.
In 1981, the legislature amended the Act in several ways significant to this case. First, the legislature created a new definition of “repairs” specific to section 325F.60, the invoice requirement. Under the 1981 amendment, “repair” for purposes of the invoice requirement was defined to include, among other things, “work of any value performed under a manufacturer’s warranty, a service contract, or an insurance policy.” Act of May 8, 1981, ch. 134, § 1, 1981 Minn. Laws 404, 404. Thus, under the 1981 amendment, a customer is entitled to a written invoice regardless of who pays for the repairs and regardless of how much the repairs cost. More to the point, the 1981 amendment specifically created the right of a customer to a written invoice for repairs that are covered by insurance. Second, because the Act as originally passed exempted insured repairs from all of its requirements, the legislature amended section 325F.64, the exemption section, to carve out section 325F.60, the invoice requirement. Act of May 8,1981, ch. 134, § 2,1981 Minn. Laws at 405. Whereas section 325F.64 previously exempted all of the Act if an insurer paid for repairs, under the 1981 amendment section 325F.60, the invoice requirement, applies to insured repairs.
But the legislature did not amend section 325F.63, the remedies provision of the Act. That section continues to provide that any violation of the Act “shall be deemed a violation of section 325F.69, subdivision 1, and the provisions of section 8.31, shall apply.” Minn.Stat. § 325F.63, subd. 3 (2004) (emphasis added). Section 325F.69 defines consumer fraud. Section 8.31, subdivision 3a (2004), allows a person injured by a violation of specified consumer protection laws to bring a civil action for damages and to recover costs of investigation and attorney fees. But section 8.31 also authorizes the attorney general to investigate violations of unlawful business practices, gives the attorney general the power to obtain documents and conduct discovery of unlawful business practices without the commencement of litigation, and authorizes the courts to enjoin violations of the law and impose civil penalties. Minn.Stat. § 8.31, subds. 1, 2, and 3 (2004).
The requirement that the customer be provided with a written invoice was amended in 1987 to add the requirement at issue here, namely, that the invoice also disclose whether any new parts used in repairs are or are not original equipment parts. Act of May 6, 1987, ch. 64, § 4, 1987 Minn. Laws 106, 116. Significantly, the same legislation that amended section 325F.60, the invoice requirement, made two other changes to Minnesota’s insurance laws. First, the 1987 legislation also amended Minn.Stat. § 72A.20, subd. *44512a(f)(7) (1988) (now Minn.Stat. § 72A.201, subd. 6 (2004)), to make it an unfair settlement practice for an automobile insurer to require, as a condition of payment of a claim, that repairs to any damaged vehicle be made using anything but original equipment parts. Act of May 6, 1987, ch. 64 § 1, 1987 Minn. Laws at 113. And second, the 1987 legislation amended Minn.Stat. § 72B.091, subd. 2 (2004), to require that an insurance adjuster’s appraisal of a damaged vehicle disclose to the vehicle owner “any parts to be used, other than window glass, which are not original equipment parts * * Act of May 6, 1987, ch. 64 § 2,1987 Minn. Laws at 115.
These are important consumer protections not to be lightly discarded. The requirement of a written invoice specifically detailing whether new parts used in repairs are original equipment parts is not only a check on the repair shop, but also a check on automobile insurers’ claims settlement practices. The written invoice from the repair shop is the only evidence the consumer has as to whether the insurance company has in fact paid for original equipment parts, as the statute requires. And, a written invoice in the hands of the vehicle owner that clearly discloses whether original equipment parts were used in the repairs discourages an insurance adjuster from colluding with a repair shop to bill the insurance company for more expensive original equipment parts but use cheaper after-market parts in making the repairs and split the difference.
The court holds that, despite the amendment of section 325F.60, the invoice requirement, to specifically require that customers receive a written invoice even if insurance pays for the repairs, there is no remedy available to those customers if the written invoice is not provided or, as here, the written invoice is inaccurate or incomplete.1 Not only does the court conclude there is no remedy available to customers, but the effect of the court’s decision thwarts the purpose of the 1987 insurance reform legislation. Because the court’s decision removes violations of the invoice requirement from the scope of section 8.31, it bars the attorney general from investigating violations of the invoice requirement in the case of repairs covered by insurance. It similarly eliminates the power of the courts to enjoin violations of the invoice requirement and to award civil penalties for such violations. It also deprives vehicle owners of the information they need to resist unfair settlement practices by insurers. And it eliminates the paper trail necessary to detect kickbacks from repair shops to insurance adjusters. With the legislature having specifically created these protections for consumers by means of the written invoice requirement, I cannot, accept that the legislature intended its actions to have no “teeth” by not providing a remedy for violations of the invoice requirement.
But that is what the court concludes. To reach this conclusion the court relies on what it considers to be the plain language of section 325F.64, the exemption provision. Section 325F.64, subdivision 1, provides:
*446Sections 325F.57 to 325F.59 and 325F.61 to 325F.66 shall not apply if an insurer or service contract company pays up to 90 percent of the charge for repairs or pays a charge for repairs above a deductible amount specified in an insurance agreement or service contract.
The court concludes that under the plain language of section 325F.64, the exemption provision, the remedies available under section 325F.63 — including the authority of the attorney general to investigate and prosecute violations — are not available if the repairs are paid by insurance. But under the plain language of section 325F.64, section 325F.64 itself — the exemption provision — does not apply to insured repairs: “Sections 325F.57 to 325F.59 and 325F.61 to 325F.66 shall not apply if an insurer or service contract company pays * * *.” (Emphasis added.)2
I would therefore conclude that the language of the statute is not unambiguous, and we must construe the statute to effectuate the intent of the legislature. Tuma v. Comm’r of Econ. Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn.1986). In doing so, we are to be guided by several principles. First, in ascertaining the legislature’s intent, we consider the occasion and necessity for the law, the mischief to be remedied by it, the object to be attained by it, the circumstances of its enactment, and the consequences of a particular interpretation. Hersh Props., LLC v. McDonald’s Corp., 588 N.W.2d 728, 736 (Minn.1999). Second, the statute should be construed to make it effective, rather than to nullify it. Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. 215, 223, 21 N.W.2d 612, 616 (1946). Third, we should construe the statute to avoid absurd or unjust consequences. Hince v. O’Keefe, 632 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Minn.2001). Finally, remedial statutes are to be liberally construed. State v. Indus. Tool & Die Works, Inc., 220 Minn. 591, 604, 21 N.W.2d 31, 38 (Minn.1945).
Applying these principles, I would hold that the 1981 amendment removed section 325F.60, the invoice requirement, from section 325F.64, the exemption provision, for all purposes, and therefore section 325F.63, which provides that “any violation” of the Act is a violation of section 325F.69, subdivision 1, applies to any violation of section 325F.60, the invoice requirement. The occasion and necessity for the law and the mischief to be remedied by the Act as amended in 1981 and 1987 appear to have been in part the practice of automobile insurers in conditioning payment of claims on the use of other than original equipment parts, which as this case demonstrates have the potential to void the *447manufacturer’s warranty on the damaged vehicle. The objects to be attained by the Act as amended are enforcement of the statutory prohibition against unfair settlement practices and deterrence of insurance fraud by putting in the hands of the consumer an itemized invoice from the repair shop showing whether or not the insurance company paid for original equipment parts. This interpretation is in accordance with the legislature’s clearly expressed goal of requiring that customers receive a written invoice when repairs are paid for by insurance. It also gives effect to the legislature’s 1987 amendment by providing a remedy for any violation of section 325F.60 and concomitant unfair settlement practices by the automobile insurer. Finally, it promotes our goal of construing consumer protection statutes broadly to enhance consumer protection.
. The court suggests that, even without the ability to enforce the written invoice requirement under section 8.31, Toth still has ”[w]hatever common law rights Toth has in the absence of the Truth in Repairs Act.” Under the common law, it would appear that Toth will recover no more than $803.44. The comparison of those rights, whatever they may be, to Toth’s rights under section 8.31 only illustrates that this is precisely the type of case — one involving clear consumer fraud and small monetary damages — that the private attorney general provision, section 8.31, subdivision 3a, was designed to make economically possible for private plaintiffs to prosecute and for private attorneys to take.
. The court also relies on our earlier decision, Mutual Seivice Casualty Insurance Co. v. League of Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust, 659 N.W.2d 755 (Minn.2003), in which we held that a pedestrian struck by a police car was not entitled to benefits under Minnesota’s No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 65B.41-71 (2004), because of an obscure provision in the definition of "motor vehicle” that required the car to be registered. Because of another obscure provision in Minn.Stat. § 168.012, subd. 1(b) (2004), patrol cars are not required to be registered or display numbered license plates.
Nowhere in League of Minnesota Cities Insurance did we suggest that, in drafting either the No-Fault Act or the list of motor vehicles required to be registered, the legislature had in mind whether a pedestrian struck by a marked police car should be entitled to no-fault benefits. In contrast, in this case, the Act was amended for the specific purpose of requiring that customers receive certain information about their insured repairs in order to discourage insurance fraud and unfair claim settlement practices. It is unreasonable to assume that, having done so, the legislature would then render the requirement a nullity by providing no remedy for its violation. The ambiguity in the Act after its amendment is evidence enough that the legislature intended to provide for such a remedy.