*369ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Presiding Judge.The appellant complains of our disposition of his bills of exception Nos. 1 and 2 and says that by our original opinion we have placed an unreasonable limitation upon his right to examine a prospective juror. Such was not our intention. The questions were:
“1. You understand that under the law, as explained to you, the defendant is not required to introduce any testimony whatsoever in his behalf in this cause, and I ask you that if you were taken as a juror in this cause, and at the close of the State’s case, and it had rested, the defendant likewise had rested without putting on any testimony, would you, when you deliberated in this cause upon your verdict, hold such failure on the part of the defendant to so introduce evidence before you as a circumstance against him in any way whatsoever?
“2. Now, you understand that the State is required to prove the defendant’s guilt to the satisfaction of the Jury beyond a reasonable doubt and unless you are convinced by such evidence from the State that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, it would be your duty to acquit the defendant and the Court will so charge you; Now, I want to ask you, that assuming you were taken as a juror in this case, heard all the evidence, the charge of the Court, and arguments of counsel, and then retired to your room for deliberation upon your verdict and that then, even though you thought the defendant might be guilty but if you believed then that the State had failed to show you by its evidence beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant was guilty, would you return a verdict of not guilty?”
The court qualified the bills as follows:
“The Defendant was permitted by the Court to inform each prospective juror "that the burden of proof was on the State and never shifted to the Defendant, and that the State had the burden to prove the guilt of the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and to inquire of each prospective juror whether he could and would follow the law in that respect.
“The Court permitted the Defendant to inquire of each prospective juror whether he would require the State to prove *370to his satisfaction, beyond a reasonable doubt, the guilt of the Defendant before the prospective juror would vote to find the Defendant guilty, and also to inquire that should the State fail to so prove to the prospective juror’s satisfaction the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, whether such prospective juror would acquit the defendant, and such inquiry was not denied to the Defendant concerning any prospective juror.
“And further the Court permitted the Defendant to ask each prospective juror whether in the event the Defendant elected not to testify in his own behalf, the Defendant’s failure to so testify would be taken as any circumstance against him, and such inquiry was not denied to the Defendant in his Vóir Dire Examination of any prospective juror.”
As we view the questions, they were no more than a restatement of what the court’s qualification shows was actually asked.
The trial court must be allowed some discretion in limiting the examination of prospective jurors or some trials would never terminate. We remain convinced that the appellant has failed to show that he has been deprived of any valuable right by the limitation herein assigned as error.
Appellant next complains of our disposition of bill of exception No. 17. Dr. Bundy testified that he examined the prosecutrix on the day of the trial, inserted a speculum in her vagina and found that it entered as easiy “as in any married person we have in the office.” The fact that this examination occurred slightly more than two months after the date charged in the indictment could not render the evidence inadmissible. The question of the weight to be given the same was for the jury.
Appellant’s last contention is that we erred in disposing1 of his contention that jury misconduct was shown. He seems to be laboring under the impression that if anything is said during the jury’s deliberation which is not supported by the record reversible error is shown. We do not agree. Such a rule would doubtless bring about a reversal of a great majority of convictions based upon jury verdicts. This court is authorized to reverse only where new evidence against the accused which was detrimental to his ease and probably influenced the jury adversely was heard by the jury during its- deliberations. This, we believe, is a fair synopsis of all the cases on the subject. We *371are at a complete loss to understand how a remark by one of the jurors that she had once known a school principal at Arp who had gotten into some trouble over a morals charge could be construed as new evidence detrimental to this accused.
Remaining convinced that we properly disposed of this cause originally, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.