¶ 47. (dissenting). We withdrew our previous opinion and reinstated this case because we recognized that State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14, facially applied here.1 This would have resulted in a circuit court evidentiary hearing at which Howell could explain his assertion that he believed his presence at the scene of a shooting was enough to convict him of first-degree reckless injury. But the majority now prefaces its analysis by declaring that Howell makes a non -Bangert2 claim. *408Majority, ¶ 1. It then avoids the common-sense conclusion that Hampton speaks to both Bangert and non-Bangert claims. There are two reasons why the majority goes astray. First, I use the majority's own definition of a Bangert claim, and conclude that Howell asserts a Bangert claim. Second, the four reasons the majority cites for not following Hampton are unconvincing.
¶ 48. Howell asserts that he did not understand the charges against him and, "as in Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d at 408, the trial court here could have headed off the problem with a sufficient plea colloquy. Had the trial court gone over what is required for party-to-a-crime liability, this issue would not be here." Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1) (2003-04) requires a trial court to determine that a plea of guilty or no-contest is made with understanding of the nature of the charge. Understanding party-to-a-crime liability is necessary if that is how the State prosecutes a defendant. This is a Bangert claim, and the majority concedes that Bangert claims need not explain in detail why a defendant failed to understand an important issue. Majority, ¶ 14.
¶ 49. The majority's decision not to follow Hampton is surprising. We have long understood that the supreme court is the primary law-defining court in Wisconsin, and that other courts must follow its precedents when deciding cases. While the court of appeals has the authority to issue opinions having precedential value, "[t]he supreme court, unlike the court of appeals, has been designated by the constitution, and the legislature as a law-declaring court." Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997) (citing State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court, 115 Wis. 2d 220, 229-30, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983)).
¶ 50. Long before Cook, this court was reminded of its limitations in State v. Lossman, 118 Wis. 2d 526, *409533, 348 N.W.2d 159 (1984). There, the supreme court reversed a court of appeals decision that the supreme court said had side-stepped an established high court precedent. "Had the court of appeals adhered to precedent, as it is required to do, this review would not have been necessary," wrote the court. Id. "It is apparent that [the court of appeals] thought the decision of this court in [State v.] Zdiarstek [53 Wis. 2d 776, 193 N.W.2d 833 (1972)] was wrong; and, hence, it attempted to avoid what is a clear and binding precedent." Id. The majority today attempts the same thing the supreme court refused to accept in Lossman.
¶ 51. The first of the majority's four reasons to disregard Hampton is that paragraphs 56 and 57 of Hampton are somehow rendered meaningless when one undertakes a "careful reading of paragraphs 50 to 65 in Hampton." Majority, ¶ 25. I disagree. The Hampton court states that the issue in paragraphs 50 to 65 "concerns a defendant's burden to make a showing that will require the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea." Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶ 50. The court concluded that when a court fails to personally advise a defendant that the court was not bound by the plea agreement and the defendant alleges he did not understand that the court was not bound by the agreement, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a motion to withdraw his plea. Id. In so concluding, the court compared and contrasted Bangert-type cases with Nelson3/Bentley4 cases, and determined that a motion alleging that a defendant did not understand that the court was bound by the plea agreement "passes the test *410of Nelson and Bentley" by alleging facts which, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief. Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶ 57.
¶ 52. A careful reading of paragraphs 50-65 reveals that the supreme court was comparing the two types of plea withdrawals to explain its conclusion that "[requiring an evidentiary hearing in the face of a supported allegation that the plea colloquy was defective is an effective means of enforcing the court's plea taking obligations." Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶ 65. Here, the defendant correctly notes: "Had the trial court gone over what is required for party-to-a-crime liability, this issue would not be here." He also cites Bangert three times in his brief to support his assertion that the trial court failed to explain party-to-a-crime liability, leading to his misunderstanding of the nature of the charge. See Wis. Stat. § 971.08(l)(a) (trial court must determine that defendant understands nature of charge).
¶ 53. If the supreme court did not mean to analyze failure to understand cases in the same way whether they are Bentley or non -Bentley cases, why did it write the following?
In addition, the defendant must allege that he did not in fact understand that the court was not bound by the plea agreement because that information/explanation was not provided. We think a motion of this nature passes the test of Nelson and Bentley: a motion to withdraw a plea that alleges facts which, if true, would entitle the defendant to relief. The allegation that the defendant did not understand is, admittedly, conclu-sory; but the allegation raises a question of fact and perhaps law that requires resolution.
Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶ 57. No matter how carefully one reads paragraphs 57 and 58 of Hampton, *411failure to understand is failure to understand. I am not convinced by the majority's first reason.
¶ 54. The majority's second reason is that Bangert mandated a burden-shifting procedure to ensure that trial courts follow mandated plea colloquy requirements. Majority, ¶ 26. That is certainly true. But even if trial courts comply with Bangert requirements, a defendant may legitimately claim that he or she did not understand something which, had he or she understood, would have negated his or her decision to plead guilty. Underlying both Bangert and non -Bangert claims is a due process right to know all the relevant facts before entering a guilty plea. If conclusory allegations of misunderstanding are adequate to satisfy due process under Bangert, why is a different procedure necessary to satisfy due process in non -Bangert cases? Hampton recognizes this, which is why the supreme court in Hampton permitted conclusory allegations of misunderstanding in non -Bangert cases. The majority's second reason does not convince me.
¶ 55. The majority's third reason merely revisits its disagreement with Hampton. The majority's policy determination is that busy trial courts should not have to spend time dealing with motions to withdraw pleas where an allegation of misunderstanding is conclusory. Majority, ¶ 27. The majority would require defendants to explain in detail why they failed to understand. The supreme court has concluded otherwise: "The allegation that the defendant did not understand is, admittedly, conclusory; but the allegation raises a question of fact and perhaps law that requires resolution." Hampton, 274 Wis. 2d 379, ¶ 57. Courts may differ as to whether a defendant who signs an affidavit claiming non-understanding should be entitled to a hearing to determine whether the constitutional requirement of *412understanding is present or absent. But the supreme court has the last word on this issue. Whether that word is troublesome and whether we disagree with the supreme court's policy choices are not valid reasons for departing from the supreme court's clear language.
¶ 56. The final reason the majority believes it can disregard Hampton is that State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶ 42, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906, makes a "clear reference" to Nelson/Bentley plea withdrawal motions. Majority, ¶ 28. This reason is wishful thinking. I do not cite Hampton to convince a reader that the supreme court is unaware that Bangert and Nelson/Bentley claims are different. It clearly is aware of the difference. That is not the issue here. The issue is whether, in a Nelson/Bentley affidavit, the defendant is required to explain in detail why he or she did not understand something he or she was told or which he or she read. That was decided in Hampton, in the paragraphs I have quoted.
¶ 57. Common sense tells us that the supreme court was correct. It is difficult to the point of impossibility to explain why one misunderstood something. Was there room noise? Did the perceiver have a problem with the meaning of a word? A sentence? Was the defendant's attorney rustling papers? Is a person's vocabulary limited in some respect? We know that some people are more intelligent than others. There are a myriad of reasons why people do not understand each other. No one always remembers why he or she did not understand something. Many people do not know why they do not know what they do not know. For example, appellate judges have been known to say to each other that they do not understand something a colleague believes he or she has explained. Explaining why one *413does not understand is often difficult if he or she does not understand in the first place.
¶ 58. Brown, another unanimous supreme court opinion, and Hampton were written by the same author. The Brown court cites the same paragraph of Hampton which the majority believes is a paragraph in which the supreme court did not mean what it said. Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶ 67. One would think that if the supreme court did not mean what it said the first time around, it would not cite the same paragraph of Hampton without noting the problem the majority identifies. But it did not. Instead, it cited Hampton because, earlier, it had questioned why the defendant had not directly alleged that he did not understand the nature of the charges against him. Id., ¶¶ 66-67.
¶ 59. The majority asserts that Hampton is a Bangert case, but in the supreme court the State argued Hampton as a Bentley case. The State asserted: "Moreover, a court's failure to personally inform a defendant that the court is not bound by the negotiated sentencing recommendation does not invoke the Bangert burden-shifting framework because it is not information required to be provided pursuant to Bangert." Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner at 27, State v. Hampton, 2004 WI 107, 274 Wis. 2d 379, 683 N.W.2d 14 (No. 2001AP509-CR) (available in Appendices and Briefs, 274 Wis. 2d 324-424 at tab 3). Thus, the supreme court needed to address both approaches to plea withdrawal and determine what was necessary for each approach. The language used in paragraphs 57 and 58 of Hampton is therefore not, as the majority would have us believe, a mere rejection of the State's Bentley argument, but is what it purports to be, a requirement that an allegation of failure to understand is "qualitatively different" and raises a question *414of fact necessitating an evidentiary hearing at which the defendant's assertion of misunderstanding can be tested. The court's discussion of "understanding" is common to both types of plea withdrawal cases.
¶ 60. As a matter of policy, we employ a burden-shifting analysis in Bangert while we do not in Nelson/Bentley cases. But both types of cases are Wisconsin's response to the Supreme Court's determination that a guilty plea must be intelligent, voluntary and made with understanding. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). A defendant does not constitutionally "understand" differently under the requirements of Bangert than the "understanding" that may be necessary in some Nelson/Bentley cases. A defendant can misunderstand the range of punishments to which he will be subjected or something the trial court is not statutorily or by case law required to explain. Both misunderstandings, if true, are a problem because as a matter of due process, a guilty plea is valid only if voluntary, intelligent and understood.
¶ 61. Hampton recognized this, and Brown followed suit. Indeed, Brown directly addressed the fact that Brown not only failed to offer a detailed explanation of why he did not understand, his motion did not directly state that he failed to understand some vital information in the first place. The supreme court could have held that this was fatal to Brown's case. But it did not. Instead, a unanimous court wrote:
We share the State's concern that this motion does not allege directly that the defendant did not know or understand certain information that should have been provided or addressed at the plea hearing. A defendant is not required to submit a sworn affidavit to the court, but he is required to plead in his motion that he did not *415know or understand some aspect of his plea that is related to a deficiency in the plea colloquy.
Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶ 62.
¶ 62. As a constitutional matter, there is no reason for the majority to attempt a distinction which depends on its conclusion that it may safely ignore Hampton. Howell tells us that he did not understand party-to-a-crime liability, a complex and not totally intuitive subject to begin with. He says that his attorney explained party-to-a-crime in a way that led him to believe that his presence at a shooting would permit a jury to find him guilty. The majority would require something more than Howell's misunderstanding, though that would not be possible except under the most unusual of circumstances. With the requirements the majority announces, defendants who really do not understand vital information, and therefore cannot enter a voluntary plea, will still be held to the results of the plea. I cannot join in this conclusion.
¶ 63. Guilty pleas are not easy tasks for trial courts or defendants. Hindsight is always twenty-twenty, and pleader's remorse cannot be discounted. Still, with the time appellate courts and continuing judicial education programs have spent on the subject, and with the assistance of a district attorney intent on reaching a just end to a criminal case and defense counsel making sure that his or her client has all the information to make an informed choice, valid guilty pleas are certainly attainable. Evidentiary hearings on motions to withdraw pleas may not end with trials, but they are part of a system that endeavors to assure that the guilty are found guilty and those not proven guilty are released. I do not agree that we get to a better world by interpreting Hampton to mean something other *416than what it says and going beyond Brown in motion requirements. The majority opinion only adds to the confusion it purports to solve. I conclude that Howell should be given the opportunity to make his case to the circuit court.
¶ 64. I believe that the body of law the majority describes as "highly complex and too often counter-intuitive" is made so by the requirement that we divide due process violations into Bangert and non -Bangert types. Majority, ¶ 46. Neither the majority nor I can change that. Perhaps trial courts need an incentive to avoid certain categories of due process violations, but I am not sure that is necessary. I lay no claim to infallibility. If my interpretation of the cases the majority interprets differently is ultimately rejected, I can only hope that what results will be an easily understood rule. Until then, I can only respectfully dissent.
The most the majority now concedes is that "there may be some ambiguity in Hampton." Majority, ¶ 29.
State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986).
Nelson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 489, 195 N.W.2d 629 (1972).
State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 60 (1996).