dissenting.
A defendant charged with a felony offense has the constitutional right to be tried by a jury of twelve people. See Tex. Const, arts. I, § 10; V, § 13. While a defendant may choose to waive this right either partially or completely, he did not do so here. See Hatch v. State, 958 S.W.2d 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 1.13 (Vernon Supp.1998).
When a juror dies or becomes “disabled from sitting,” the trial court has the discretion to continue with eleven jurors with or without the defendant’s consent. See Tex. Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 36.29 (Vernon Supp.1998). The phrase “disabled from sitting” has been interpreted by the Court of Criminal Appeals as referring to a physical, mental, or emotional disability. See Carrillo v. State, 597 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). The term “disabled,” however, does not encompass bias or prejudice. Bass v. State, 622 S.W,2d 101, 105 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981).
Here, the State contends a juror became mentally or emotionally disabled due to his fear of retaliation. However, any juror who returns a guilty verdict faces at least the remote possibility of retaliation. For the fear of retaliation to become a debilitating influence, the juror must first conclude the defendant has both the will and the means to harass, intimidate, or otherwise punish him for his verdict. Such fear is based upon the perception that the defendant is endowed with a mean and spiteful character. Thus, the fear of retaliation flows from a bias or prejudice against the defendant. This fear may be well founded and clearly justified, and it may warrant a mistrial if the juror is incapable of further service. However, I do not believe fear of retaliation is the kind of “disability” envisioned by the legislature when it enacted Article 36.29. Accordingly, I would find the trial court erred when it, without appellant’s consent, dismissed the ju*739ror and continued the trial with a “jury” of eleven people.
If, after pleading not guilty, an accused is subsequently found guilty by the trier-of-faet, and he then testifies at the punishment stage of his trial and admits his guilt, he has, in essence, entered the equivalent of a plea of guilty and cannot later challenge the finding of guilt. See McGlothlin v. State, 896 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). Here, appellant testified at the punishment phase of his trial and made a judicial confession of guilt. The majority concludes that appellant’s confession waived all error committed during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, and because the improper dismissal of the juror occurred during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, such error was waived. I respectfully disagree.
The DeGarmo1 waiver doctrine referred to in McGlothlin is causal, not temporal, in nature. When a defendant admits his guilt at the punishment phase of the trial, he does not waive all error committed during the guilt/innocence phase; he waives all error that could arguably have caused the rendition of an improper verdict. While an error affecting the guilty verdict must logically precede that verdict, it is not the time the error occurs that brings it within the DeGar-mo doctrine. Rather, the doctrine applies to errors committed in attaining that verdict. Under the DeGarmo doctrine, such errors are waived not because they were committed during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, but because the issue of defendant’s guilt or innocence has been mooted by his judicial confession.
The prejudicial impact of an error committed during guilt/innoeenee may extend into the punishment phase of a trial. If, for example, inadmissible evidence is introduced over a defendant’s objection during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, and the evidence would unfairly prejudice the jury’s assessment of punishment, the defendant’s subsequent admission of guilt does not waive the “punishment error” merely because the error was committed during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial.
Here, the error occurred during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, but its effect extends to both stages of appellant’s bifurcated trial. While I agree that whatever detrimental effect the error may have had upon the jury’s finding of guilt was waived when appellant judicially confessed, a defendant’s right to a jury trial does not end with a finding of guilt. See Tex.Code CRiM. PROG. Ann. art. 27.02 (Vernon 1989). A defendant may plead guilty and still insist upon having a jury of twelve people assess his punishment. Because appellant was denied this constitutional prerogative, I respectfully dissent.
. DeGarmo v. State, 691 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).