(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the trial court’s decision to award attorney fees under the lodestar method as an abuse of discretion and I would remand for an award of attorney fees as set forth in the contingent fee agreement.
Pursuant to the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA), MCL 213.66(3); MSA 8.265(16)(3), the property owner may be awarded a reasonable attorney fee, not to exceed one-third of the amount by which the ultimate award exceeds the agency’s writ*99ten offer. In re Condemnation of Private Property for Hwy Purposes (Dep’t of Transportation v Curis), 221 Mich App 136, 139; 561 NW2d 459 (1997) (hereafter referred to as Curis). Although the reasonableness of the attorney fee cannot be shown merely by reference to the existence of a contingent fee agreement, a contingent fee agreement may be considered by the court in its efforts to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee award. Id., p 140.
I believe that the following factors support an award pursuant to the contingent fee agreement as being reasonable: defense counsel spent over two years on the case (showing approximately 728 hours of billable time), counsel was experienced in the area of condemnation law and advanced novel legal theories at trial, it was not disputed that counsel is a skilled attorney with “impeccable integrity and is recognized as such by her peers,” counsel achieved a judgment for her clients that was nearly $1 million more than first offered by plaintiff, and contingent fee agreements providing for one-third of the excess of the ultimate award are customary in the locality. See, e.g., Curis, supra, pp 140-142.
Further, an award of the amount set forth in the contingent fee agreement fully compensates defendants for their property, discourages deliberately low offers, and provides a performance incentive to the property owner’s attorney because the fee awarded would be directly proportional to the results achieved by the attorney. Id., pp 142-143. The trial court’s award in this case does not recognize one of the major policy concerns behind the attorney fee provision of the ucpa, namely, that the property owners would not receive the full amount of the jury’s award *100because defendants would be solely responsible for the majority of the attorney fees.
Finally, an award pursuant to the contingent fee agreement is entirely in accord with § 16(3) of the ucpa, and nothing in the statutes or case law makes a fee of one-third in excess of the written offer unreasonable. See Detroit v Cusmano & Son, Inc, 184 Mich App 507, 513; 459 NW2d 3 (1989). I believe that defendants’ requested attorney fee amount is entirely reasonable in light of the facts of this case, and I would find the trial court’s decision to apply the lodestar method to be an abuse of discretion.
I would reverse the attorney fee award and remand for the trial court to award defendants their attorney fee pursuant to the contingent fee agreement as being a reasonable attorney fee.