dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that the only statutory duty placed upon a contracting governmental authority by the McGregor Act, TEX.REV.CIV. STAT.ANN. art. 5160 (Vernon Supp.1985), “is simply a requirement that the bonds ‘shall be approved as to form.’ ” The majority interprets this to mean that in this instance GISD was only under an obligation to “approve the payment bond when and if Hudler-Tye provided it” (emphasis added). I cannot agree.
The majority, by focusing on the duty imposed on the contracting governmental authority, ignores the statute’s language that the prime contractor “shall be required before commencing such work to execute to the ... governmental authority the statutory bonds.” The statutory language imposes an active duty on the governmental authority to require the bonds, rather than a passive duty of accepting the bonds only if submitted.
When interpreting a statute, the fundamental and primary consideration of a court is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent expressed therein. Jessen Associates, Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593 (Tex.1975). In ascertaining that intent, a court must examine the entire statute and not merely an isolated portion of it. State v. Terrell, 588 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.1979).
The clear and unambiguous intention of the legislature in enacting the requirement for a payment bond was to protect those persons providing labor or materials for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT. ANN. art. 5160 A(b) (Vernon Supp.1985). It was not intended to protect the contracting governmental authority. See Prairie Valley Ind. School Dist. v. Sawyer, 665 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.); City of Ingleside v. Stewart, 554 S.W.2d 939, 945 (Tex.Civ.App. —Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Although the majority correctly notes that both Sawyer and Stewart may be distinguished from the case at bar, both on their facts and on the theories upon which they were decided, the reasoning of those opinions — that it is reasonable for a subcontractor to assume that the governmental authority, in executing a construction contract covered by art. 5160, “will follow the law and require the general contractor to provide a bond” — nevertheless applies. Stewart, 554 S.W.2d at 945; Sawyer, 665 S.W.2d at 611. If the governmental authority fails to follow the law, then it should not be heard to claim that the subcontractor’s only remedy for nonpayment is against the general contractor on the bond that it did not require. Stewart, 554 S.W.2d at 945.
The majority’s opinion frustrates the legislative intent to protect subcontractors and to provide security where none existed at common law. It ignores the statute’s language, and it places the duty of insuring that a bond is provided by the general contractor, a party who might attempt to reduce its costs by not providing that bond. Although the statute does not explicitly impose liability on a contracting governmental authority that fails to require a bond, the imposition of such liability is clearly consistent with the legislative intent. If the intent of the legislature is ascertained, a court must enforce that intent even though not altogether consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Terrell, 588 S.W.2d at 786.
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court and hold that the contracting governmental authority has a duty to require the prime contractor to provide a payment bond prior to beginning work. If the governmental authority fails to require a bond, then it *416should be liable to subcontractors for the damages flowing from that failure.