(dissenting). — I respectfully dissent from the holding in the. principal opinion. In the Rogersville case, R.S. Mo. 1949, § 165.673(2), II Laws Mo. 1947, p. 373(2) required a county board of education to submit to the State Board of Education a specific plan for the initial reorganization of the school districts of the county not later than May 1, 1949. The county board failed to do so until February 1, 1950, which was nine months after the *766dead line fixed by the statute. The sole question for decision in that ease is whether this invalidated the reorganization of the county school district and school bonds issued by it.
The issue in the Washington County Eeorganized School District case, turns on the proper construction of two statutes, E.S. Mo. 1949, §§ 165.677 and 165.693, Y.A.M.S. The first of these statutes provides that if the State Board of Education rejects the county board’s original plan of reorganization it shall return it to the county board, which may revise it and return it to the state board. If the latter again rejects the revised plan the county board may nevertheless present its own plan to the voters at an election to be held on the first Tuesday in November, 1949, which was November 7. ■ This is the explicit requirement of the statute. But the record shows the election was not held on that date but on November I,'1949, and that the plan failed to carry.
The other statute, Sec. 165.693, provides that if the proposed enlarged district plan [406] does not receive the required majority affirmative voté, the school districts shall remain as they were prior to the election, but the county board of election shall prepare another plan, which shall be submitted “to a vote in like manner as the first, hut not sooner than one yecvr nor later than two years after the date of disapproval of the first plan.” [Emphasis mine]. Then the statute continues: “Any subsequent plan shall not be submitted sooner than one year following the date on which the last vote on reorganization was taken.” A second election on the revised plan was held on November 6, 1951, which was five days later than the two year limit set by the statute.
Several cases have been cited by relators showing the liberal attitude adopted by our courts in construing the time element in such case. But in my opinion the more recent statutes have been more stringent in that regard. They mean what they say. They are reorganization statutes and explicitly provide for the successive steps to be taken, and when. But they do not foreclose further action altogether because the concluding sentence of Sec. 165.693 permits the submission of further organization plans at annual elections thereafter.
However, the binding effect of the reorganization statutes is shown by the ruling in State ex inf. Rice ex rel. Allman et al. v. Hawk, 360 Mo. 490, 494, 496, 228 SW. (2d) 785, 787-9 (7-9). In that case a special election was held on April 1, 1948, to divide a common school district into two parts, and to annex the two portions thereof severally to two consolidated districts. Both propositions were defeated. Thereafter another special election was called by the directors of the common school district to be held on March 31, 1949, to annex the whole thereof to one of the two consolidated school districts. On March 30, one day before the proposed special election of March *76731, 1949, the board of directors of the common school district annulled it on the ground that Sec. 10484, B.S. 1939, I Laws Mo. 1947, p. 508, forbid the holding of the second election within two years after the first one of April 1, 1948. Nevertheless the election of March 31, 1949 was held and the proposition carried. But this court ruled it was invalid because it was held within two years after the first election.
It is stated in 29 C.J.S., § 198, p. 283, that “statutory provisions relative to the time or date for holding an election have been construed as mandatory * Likewise it is said in 18¡»Am. Jur. § 112, p. 250: ‘ ‘ The prevailing view seems to be that where the date of an election is not left to the determination of officials, but is unequivocally fixed by statute, the provision is regarded as mandatory ard the election officials have no authority to change the date. An election held at a time other than that prescribed will be held void K‘ #. * * * Under • a provision that' a proposition once submitted and decided either way by a majority of the voters cannot be resubmitted within a period of two years, an election thereon 'held two days short of such period after the preceding election has been held void. ’ ’ Citing Battle Creek Brewing Co. v. Calhoun County, 166 Mich. 52, 131 NW. 160, Ann. Cas. 1912 D 946 and 90 Am. St. Bep. 62, note.
State ex inf. Stipp ex rel. School Dist. v. Colliver (Mo. Div. 1) 243 SW. (2d) 344, 349(4) declares: “The rule is that ‘time and place * * * are of the substance of every election,’ and failure to comply with the law in these particulars is not generally to be treated as a mere irregularity.’ ” Citing 2 Cooley on Constitutional Limitation (8 Ed.) p. 160; State ex rel. Fahrman v. Rose, 160 Mo. App. 682, 693, 143 SW. 502, 506(7). See also State ex inf. Mayes v. Goodwin (Mo. Div. 2) 243 SW. (2d) 353, 354(3).
Under the statutes and decisions cited and discussed it is my view that the alternative writ of mandamus in each of the two cases under adjudication, No’s 43,404 and 43,405, was improvidently issued and that the same should be ordered quashed.