Sullins v. Knierim

KURT S. ODENWALD, Judge,

Concurring.

I concur with the findings and holdings of this opinion. I write this separate concurrence to address the consequences of Section 452.340.5 on children who need additional help in their education due to a developmental disability or diagnosed health problem, and the dilemma presented by requiring the termination of child support at age twenty-one for such children.

Although the parental obligation for child support generally terminates at age eighteen, Section 452.340.5 extends the parental support obligation to age twenty-one if the child is em'olled in and attending an institution of vocational or higher education and taking at least twelve credit hours per semester (or nine credit hours and working fifteen hours per week). The legislature has recognized the need to address the educational circumstances of children with special educational requirements. Children diagnosed with a developmental disability, as defined in Section 630.005, or who have a diagnosed health problem that limits their ability to carry the number of credit hours prescribed in this subsection, remain “eligible for child support so long as such child is enrolled in and attending an institute of ... higher education, and the child continues to meet the other requirements of this subsection.” Section 452.340.5. The minimum credit hour requirement per semester may be waived for children having a developmental disability or diagnosed health problem.

Waiving the minimum hour requirement for children with special educational needs is necessary and just, but may require additional time for such students to complete the course work for their degree. This delay reasonably may require students with developmental disabilities or diagnosed health problems to continue their *251education beyond the age of twenty-one. However, Section 452.340.5 does not mandate a continuation of the parental support obligation beyond the age of twenty-one for children who are legitimately pursuing their education under the credit hour waiver provision of this statute. While Section 452.340.5 accommodates children with special educational needs by allowing them to schedule classes based upon individual ability and needs, a child who is unable to accomplish his or her educational goals by the age of twenty-one is seemingly penalized because that same statute does not consider or accommodate the additional time needed beyond the age of twenty-one for such children to complete their education.

I agree with the majority that the trial court’s finding that Daughter did not have a developmental disability was against the weight of the evidence and misapplied the law. However, reversing the trial court’s finding does nothing to require the continuation of the parental support obligation for Daughter as she attempts to complete her education because Daughter already has reached the age of twenty-one. Hence, we are presented with a practical dilemma not addressed by Section 452.340.5. Under the law, Daughter is entitled to carry a reduced workload each semester. But, doing so will necessarily extend the time required for Daughter to complete her education. The evidence is undisputed that Daughter was enrolled in a community college program with a vocational goal of working as a teacher’s assistant or daycare teacher. The disability services coordinator at the community college confirmed Daughter’s need for accommodations due to her disability. Testimony from a professional counselor employed by the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, Department of Vocational Rehabilitation confirmed that Daughter needed until approximately May 2011, to achieve her vocational goals, long past Daughter’s twenty-first birthday.

Because Father’s parental support obligation terminated with Daughter’s twenty-first birthday and Father is unwilling to voluntarily provide Daughter with financial support, Daughter may be forced to abandon her reasonable and legitimate educational and vocational goals in order to provide for her basic living needs. 1 question whether the legislature intended this consequence. Just as Section 452.340.4 allows a court to extend the parental support obligation under certain circumstances, the legislature may deem it appropriate to consider under what conditions, if any, a court may order the parent support obligation to continue beyond the age of twenty-one under Section 452.340.5.