dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe the information was defective because it did not allege all exceptions to the offense. Accordingly, I believe the information was properly dismissed by the District Court and would affirm.
The information provided in part that “defendant did ... knowingly call and aid in calling a called meeting of the governing body, which was closed to the public where a closed meeting was not permitted by the provisions of article 6252-17, Vernon’s Annotated Texas Statute ...” The Supreme Court of Texas has rather clearly stated that the narrowly-drawn exceptions to this statute are enumerated in §§ 2(a), (e), (f), (g)> (h), (j), (m), (n), (o), and (p). See Cox Enter. v. Board of Trustees, 706 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex.1986).
The rule applied here is that the informátion must plead all elements of the offense, including exceptions to the statute. McElroy v. State, 720 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). The purpose of this rule is to “particularize the act complained of so that its identity cannot be mistaken ...” McElroy, 720 S.W.2d at 492.
Given the fact that the Supreme Court of Texas has stated that certain portions of the statute are exceptions, I believe they should be pleaded in the information as required by the rule in McElroy. Moreover, an examination of the information reveals that it merely alleges "where a closed meeting was not permitted by the provisions of article 6252-17-” This language is so vague and general that it does not provide adequate notice to the defendant.
*369The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that language in the indictment shall allege the crime in “ordinary and concise language” and in a manner to enable “a person of common understanding to know what is meant_” Tex.Code Crim.PROC. Ann. art. 21.11 (Vernon 1990). Ordinary language does not include references to statutes, and persons of common understanding do not understand the exceptions to the Open Meetings Act unless they read the statute. I believe the face of this information does not meet this minimum standard of intelligibility.
Texas case law also supports the proposition that more specific language is necessary in this information. For example, in Benoit v. State, 561 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), the Court of Criminal Appeals wrote that the accused must be given enough information from the face of his indictment to prepare a defense. Id. at 813. The face of this information reveals a statutory reference. It does not allege facts negating every exception to the offense, or even the exceptions to the offense. I would hold that the statutory exceptions and facts negating these exceptions must be pleaded in order to provide the defendant with the specific facts required to prepare a defense.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.