dissenting.
I agree with the holding of the majority that the judgment should be reversed, but I disagree that an order of acquittal should be entered.
The complaint alleges in pertinent part: Larry Michael Martin, defendant, did then and there drive and operate a motor vehicle, to-wit: Volvo, in and upon 4100 block Manorfield, a public street contrary to the ordinances of said city, and, within an urban district and the corporate limits of said city, at a speed which was greater than was then and there reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing, having regard to the actual and potential hazards, to-wit: at a speed of 31 miles per hour; at which time and place the maximum prima facie reasonable and prudent speed limit applicable was 20 miles per hour. [Emphasis added.]
The State contends that this complaint charged violations of both the municipal ordinance and a violation of state law, Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6701d, sec. 166(a)(1) (Vernon 1977), which provides, in pertinent part, that a speed in excess of “30 miles per hour in any urban district” shall be prima facie unlawful. Because there was evidence that the appellant exceeded the prima facie maximum limit while driving in an urban district, I agree with the State’s analysis that there was evidence supporting the appellant’s conviction under the allegations of the complaint. See Abrams v. State, 563 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). I also agree with the State’s analysis of Howeth v. State, 645 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), relied upon by the majority. In that case, there was no contention that the defendant’s speeding conviction could be sustained under state law, and therefore, it is not controlling here.
However, I would grant the appellant’s third point of error, complaining of the trial *632court’s action in overruling his motion to quash. The appellant's motion to quash asserts that the complaint is vague because it alleges that the appellant, while driving in an urban area, violated the speed law, art. 6701d, sec. 166(a), by traveling 31 in a 20 mile per hour zone, but does not describe the authority on which the prima facie speed limit had been altered. In my opinion, this was sufficient to call -to the trial court’s attention the fact that the complaint charged offenses under both the municipal ordinance and the state law, and that the charge was vague and misleading because it alleged a prima facie speed limit of 20 miles per hour. In my opinion, the trial court erred in overruling the motion to quash, and I would reverse the conviction and remand the cause for a new trial.