(dissenting). I do not believe, as does the majority, that the safeguards written into this will sufficiently protect the concern for the appearance of propriety and against the fear of solicitation.
The statements in this will referring to the attorney’s unique ability in probating it and protecting the testator’s wishes are:
(1) “This preferential designation of Todd J. Schmel-ing as the attorney to probate my estate is made as an expression of my intent and desire as to the manner in which I wish my affairs to be settled, and without any solicitation, suggestion or influence on the part of Todd J. Schmeling whatsoever.”
(2) “Todd J. Schmeling has represented and advised me during several years preceding the execution of this Will.”
*163(3) “[Todd J. Schmeling] has an intimate knowledge of my affairs and property.”
(4) “[A]nd he knows my views and wishes respecting many matters that may arise in the probate of this instrument.”
In Estate of Sieben, 24 Wis. 2d 166, 128 N.W.2d 443 (1964), the court stated that where there was an adequate expression of an intention that the named attorney be retained, the designation would be upheld. The expression in the instant case is nothing more than a recitation of the usual and normal relationship between a client and attorney, where that relationship has been of a general rather than specific type and has existed for any period of time.
In State v. Gulbankian, 54 Wis. 2d 605, 196 N.W.2d 733 (1972), this court expressed its disapproval of attorneys who thought that because they drafted the will, they were entitled to a preferential claim to probate the estate. The court, therein, disapproved the practice of “safekeeping” of wills by attorneys. To say that in this will there was no suggestion directly or indirectly of solicitation does not strongly protect the interest of propriety previously demanded by this court.
The personal representative named in a will cannot be said to have less interest in fulfilling the testator’s wishes than a named attorney. If the will provisions are clearly stated, there can be little doubt the probate court will see to the fulfillment of the testator’s stated wishes. That is the court’s duty.
This is not the will nor are the special conditions of attorney-client relationship sufficiently stated to make an exception to the Gulbankian rule. The fact that there is no other example of the attorney having included such a provision in other wills drafted by him or his firm is only another element to consider and is not by itself persuasive.
I would dissent and affirm the trial court.