Garcia v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.

LUNDSTEN, J.

¶ 16. (dissenting). The majority concludes that Adele Garcia did not offer to transfer title to her vehicle to Mazda, within the meaning of Wisconsin's Lemon Law. I respectfully dissent because I believe Garcia gave Mazda clear notice that she was offering to transfer title under the Lemon Law.

¶ 17. As the majority explains, when certain criteria are met, Wisconsin's Lemon Law gives car owners a choice of two remedies and requires that the owners communicate their choice of remedy to the manufacturer. The applicable subsection provides in part:

To receive a comparable new motor vehicle or a refund ... a consumer . .. shall offer to the manufacturer of the motor vehicle having the nonconformity to transfer title of that motor vehicle to that manufacturer.

Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c). An offer under this subsection triggers a thirty-day time period for compliance by the manufacturer.

¶ 18. I agree with the majority that Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2) unambiguously requires that a "lemon" owner communicate to the manufacturer the remedy *635the owner desires and offer to transfer title to their vehicle in exchange for a refund or a replacement vehicle. Under the statutory scheme, a manufacturer must receive clear notice of such a demand and offer so that the commencement date of the thirty-day time period for compliance is likewise clear.

¶ 19. I point out that the majority does not seem to require magic words. That is, the majority does not say that a valid offer must include the words "offer" and "transfer title." For example, I suspect the majority would find a valid offer if Garcia had written: "Pursuant to the Lemon Law, I want a replacement car and I am willing to sign any papers or tender any papers needed to switch ownership of my current car to Mazda." Thus, I do not interpret the majority as holding that the legislature has mandated magic words. It follows that our disagreement is over whether the particular words used by Garcia communicated the offer required by the statute.

¶ 20. Garcia wrote:

It is my understanding that the Lemon Law in the State of Wisconsin is that after a reasonable number of unsuccessful repair attempts by Mazda or its authorized dealers, or that the vehicle has been out of service for a specific number of days, that I'm entitled to either a comparable replacement vehicle or a refund of the purchase price. At this time the automobile has been out of service for a period of 16 days and I would like to have a replacement.

Thus, Garcia specified that she was making her request for replacement under Wisconsin's Lemon Law and she specified that she wanted a replacement vehicle. The majority says, in effect, "ah, but she did not actually offer to transfer title to her current car when she gets the replacement." I do not understand this thinking.

*636¶ 21. There can be no doubt that Mazda understood that Garcia was invoking her right to a replacement vehicle under Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c) and communicating to the company that she would transfer the title to her "lemon" to Mazda. Indeed, she was statutorily obligated to transfer title when Mazda gave her a replacement:

When the manufacturer provides the new motor vehicle . .., the consumer shall return the motor vehicle having the nonconformity to the manufacturer and provide the manufacturer with the certificate of title and all endorsements necessary to transfer title to the manufacturer.

Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(c). It is nonsensical for the owner of a "lemon" to demand a replacement and not, at the same time, be offering to transfer title.

¶ 22. The plain language of the statute requires that the "lemon" owner communicate to the manufacturer his or her choice of remedy and a willingness to transfer title. Garcia did not simply demand a replacement. She specified that she was making her demand under the Wisconsin Lemon Law. The only reasonable way to read her letter is that she was notifying Mazda, pursuant to the Lemon Law, that she wanted a replacement car and would give up her car, including title, when Mazda supplied a replacement.

¶ 23. Did Mazda think Garcia was trying to trick it? Did Mazda think Garcia was asking for a replacement, but was not also offering to transfer title to her current car, so that she would end up with two cars? Of course not. And, just as plainly, she could not succeed in such trickery because the statute requires that she transfer title upon receiving the replacement vehicle. To repeat, the only reasonable reading of Garcia's letter *637is that she was notifying Mazda that she wanted a replacement car and would, necessarily, give up her car, including title, when Mazda supplied a replacement.

¶ 24. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.1

Mazda and Hall cross-appeal, effectively supplying an alternative reason why they should prevail on appeal. I have reviewed this issue and would decide it against Mazda and Hall. However, because this is a dissent, I choose not to expend my limited resources writing on the topic.