ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR TRANSFER
PER CURIAM.Timmi Ann Pracna (defendant Pracna), in a post-opinion motion per Rule 84.17, suggests that any retrial in this case should include retrial of Count IX of her counterclaim. Judgment was rendered against defendant Pracna on Counterclaim-Count IX in accordance with the jury’s verdict. No appeal was taken from that part of the judgment. Defendant Pracna nevertheless suggests that Counterclaim-Count IX is so interrelated and interconnected with Karen Trimble’s (plaintiff) Count I that trial of one requires trial of the other.
Defendant Pracna relies on Portell v. Pevely Dairy Co., 388 S.W.2d 790 (Mo.1965), and Bramblett v. Harlow, 75 S.W.2d 626 (Mo.App.1934). Both cases were tort actions for negligence arising from automobile accidents. Each accident involved two motor vehicles. In each case the driver of one of the vehicles sued the driver of *506the other vehicle. In each case, the driver who was sued counterclaimed on the basis that the driver who instituted the suit was negligent. The judgment in each case was reversed because of errors in verdict-directing instructions. The errors went to issues of liability. Because findings of liability on the respective petitions and counterclaims depended on a jury’s evaluation of a single set of facts, new trials were ordered on both the claims raised in the petitions and the claims raised in the counterclaims. This occurred even though the party in each case in whose favor judgment was entered had not appealed. As explained in Bramblett, “[T]he petition and counterclaim involve but one and the same principal issue, that of whether [one party or the other] was ultimately responsible for the collision. Upon the question of negligence, the proof of the one cause of action would obviously disprove the other.” 75 S.W.2d at 633. Likewise, in PorteU, the court, in ordering a new trial as to both the claims in the petition and the counterclaim, observed the proof of one would necessarily disprove the other. See 388 S.W.2d at 793.
This case differs from the cases on which defendant Pracna relies. It is not a negligence case in which both parties claim the other is liable in tort by reason of a single occurrence. Count I of plaintiffs amended petition is an action for breach of contract. The jury that tried the case found for plaintiff and assessed damages that the trial court initially included in its judgment. The judgment was later changed to allow plaintiff no damages on her Count I contrary to the jury’s verdict. As explained in this court’s ruling on Point IV of plaintiffs appeal, the trial court did not have authority to enter judgment as to damages that was not consistent with the jury’s verdict. But for plaintiffs assertion of error in Point VIII of her appeal, the claim of error directed to the trial court granting a “partial directed verdict” on Count I of the amended petition, this court would have remanded the case with directions to enter judgment on plaintiffs Count I in accordance with the jury’s verdict. However, because of the error to which Point VIII of plaintiffs appeal was directed, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial for purposes of assessing damages attributable to defendant Pracna’s (and Treveil-lian Heartfelt’s (defendant Heartfelt)) breach of contract.
Defendant Pracna’s Counterclaim-Count IX was not premised on a theory of breach of contract. It is an action for money had and received. Unlike claims and counterclaims in Bramblett and PorteU, defendant Pracna’s claim was based on a different theory of recovery than Count I of plaintiffs amended petition. Further, unlike those cases, the issue to be determined on retrial is not liability. The jury in this case determined defendant Pracna breached the contract on which plaintiffs Count I is based. It likewise found defendant Pracna was not entitled to recovery from plaintiff on her Counterclaim-Count IX for money had and received. There remains no issue for determination with respect to liability as to the two claims. The only remaining issue is the amount of damages to which plaintiff is entitled on Count I of her amended petition.
In this regard it is apropos to acknowledge the differences in causes of action for breach of contract and for money had and received. The elements plaintiff was required to prove to recover for breach of contract were (1) existence of an enforceable contract between she and defendant Pracna, (2) that mutual obligations had arisen under its terms, (3) that defendant Pracna or defendant Heartfelt had not performed obligations imposed by the contract and (4) that plaintiff was thereby damaged. Rice v. West End Motors Co., 905 S.W.2d 541, 542 (Mo.App.1995).
*507A claim for money had and received is premised on a claim that money has been paid “which in equity and good conscience ought not to be retained.” Alarcon v. Dickerson, 719 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Mo.App.1986). It is a legal action based on equitable principles. Id. Defendant Pracna’s claim for return of funds paid was submitted and argued to the jury independent of plaintiffs claim for breach of contract. The jury found against defendant Pracna. Defendant Pracna’s argument that she should have a new trial on her action for money had and received because it is interrelated and interdependent with plaintiffs claim for breach of contract amounts to a change in the theory on which her claim was tried. “An appellate court reviews a case upon only the theory tried, and a party will be held to that theory on appeal.” Matthews v. Moore, 911 S.W.2d 664, 669 (Mo.App.1995).
The other portions of defendant Prac-na’s Motion for Rehearing and Alternative Motion for Transfer appear to be reargu-ments of issues determined by the opinion heretofore filed. The motion is denied.