(dissenting). Following a jury trial in the Saginaw County Circuit Court, defendant *589was convicted of possession of heroin, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(iv), and possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(d). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of from two to four years for possession of the heroin and one year for possession of the marijuana. Defendant now appeals as of right.
Defendant, citing the Michigan Supreme Court opinion in People v Summers, 407 Mich 432; 286 NW2d 226 (1979), contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress heroin and marijuana found on his person. We agree with defendant that the facts of this case are strikingly similar to those of Summers. However, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Michigan appellate courts and found the search in Summers to be lawful. Michigan v Summers, 452 US 692; 101 S Ct 2587; 69 L Ed 2d 340 (1981). Given the United States Supreme Court decision in Summers, this assignment of error presents no basis for reversal.
Defendant also contends that the "struck method” used to impanel the jury at his trial requires reversal. The method of selecting a jury in issue departed from GCR 1963, 511.6, in that each time a prospective juror was removed by peremptory challenge, another potential juror was not immediately called to fill the removed venireman’s place. Thus, defendant was called upon to exercise peremptory challenges when less than a full jury panel was constituted. In this case, pursuant to this method, defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges by the time a potential juror who had worked for the United States Secret Service and who knew some of the police involved in the arrest was selected. Defendant’s challenge for cause was rejected by the court. However, *590before the jury began its deliberations, this juror was removed by lot and did not participate in the process of reaching a verdict.
In light of the Michigan Supreme Court decision in People v Miller, 411 Mich 321; 307 NW2d 335 (1981), this issue is extremely close. In Miller, the Supreme Court held that a defendant need not establish that he was prejudiced by the jury selection where GCR 1963, 511 is not complied with. The Court also said, however:
"A defendant is entitled to have the jury selected as provided by the rule. Where, as here, a selection procedure is challenged before the process begins, the failure to follow the procedure prescribed in the rule requires reversal. The 'struck jury method’ or any system patterned thereafter is disapproved and may not be used in the future.” Id., 326.
Unlike the situation in Miller, here defendant did not object to the struck method used to select his jury until after the prosecution rested its case. We also note that in this case, the specific juror defendant’s trial counsel desired to have removed ultimately did not participate in the deliberations. While trials conducted after the decisional date of Miller using struck methods of jury selection may have to be reversed even absent a timely objection from defense counsel, the trial in this case was conducted some 18 months before Miller. For these reasons, I would conclude that defendant’s convictions need not be reversed.